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ABSTRACT 
The thesis discusses the development of my artistic research in relation to the critique of 
the ocularcentric Western philosophical tradition developed by twentieth century French 
thought, as referred to by Martin Jay and Amelia Jones. The work reviews the positions 
of both authors with respect to the relationship between Lacan's Mirror Stage and Gaze 
and Merleau-Ponty's Chiasm or Intertwining within two areas of investigation: the self 
and strategies for its engagement with the external world. 
The research was conducted by adopting an evolutionary approach, which allowed me 
to test hypotheses through artistic experimentation. The structure of the thesis 
encompasses these two theoretical discussions in relation to my artistic practice, fully 
presented in the enclosed cd-rom. 
The first discussion, in Part I and IL analyses the Mirror Stage and the emerging of the 
self, its psychological implications and manifestations in the history of art, with 
particular emphasis on self-portraiture, the performative self, Body Art and my own 
production. 
In Part III, the concept of Chiasm/Intertwining 
- 
developed from the notions of visuality 
and Gaze 
- 
is discussed in relation to inter-subjectivity in Body Art. The issue of the 
interaction between artist/audience and environment is also investigated in my most 
recent artworks, which question the primacy of vision over the other senses. 
I believe my original contribution to be both in the content of the artworks and the 
methodology adopted, rather than at theoretical level. By adopting a set strategy in the 
creation of my work, I challenged the static artist-audience relationship implicit in the 
one-way perception of representations based on central-focus perspective. My 
hypothesis, which encompasses a two-way artist-audience interaction, was first tested in 
the body of work I produced in 1999. The theoretical argument of chiasmatic 
intertwining I subsequently developed, allowed me to place my practice within the anti- 
ocularcentric discourse and confirmed the direction undertaken in the practice to be 
satisfactory. The validity of my initial hypothesis was further confirmed by the 
participation of the audience in aspects of the art making process of the recent video- 
live installations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This research is led by the understanding of the methodology implied in conceiving my 
ideas to become an integral part of the works produced. For instance, the investigation of 
the relationship artist-perceiver (through the artwork) is located in my personal experience 
of shifting between the position of artist and that of perceiver of my own work within the 
creative process. This has led to the development of strategies for presentation of the work 
in which the audience participates. By implying these methods within the structure of the 
works, the boundaries dividing the audience's perceptual space (and often passive role) 
and the artist's space (and active role) become blurred; moreover the audience is partially 
involved in the creative process for which a third symbolic space is being constituted 
within the work. In this light, my own body presence and its representations, are to be 
understood as the vehicle for the relationship and interchange with the self, the audience 
and the environment 
The discussion by Martin Jay in a critique of the ocularcentric Western philosophical 
tradition by French thought in the twentieth century, also referred to by Amelia Jones, 
becomes the ground for part of my own artistic investigation. For both authors I have 
reviewed their position in respect to the relationship between Jacques Lacan and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty: the Lacanian concepts of the Mirror Stage and Gaze, which lead me to 
Merleau-Ponty' s Chiasm or Intertwining, to which the notion of inter-subjectivity and 
interchange, particularly in relation to my live performance pieces, is linked. The 
theoretical account of these and other authors revolves around two main areas of 
investigation: the self and its engagement with the external world. For this reason the 
structure of the thesis includes the two relevant philosophical sections grounding the 
artistic research related. 
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Vision is the sense primarily involved in the artistic investigation as well as in the 
theoretical discussion. Vision, together with the other senses, through which we perceive 
the world, has been investigated and questioned in the interactive art pieces. In my 
practice the above mentioned relationship of artist-self image/audience/environment is 
tested and challenged through a series of projects, performances, documented actions, 
photographs and interactive digital work. As the research developed my own artistic 
intuition of producing interactive work has proved to have been appropriate for some, as 
they meet the research methodological requirements to gain data. Whereas the latest video 
live installations deal with a less tangible aspect of interaction theorised as interchange, 
where the audience's involvement consists of them witnessing the piece's creation. In 
some cases their reactions became part of the work itself, in others these create the 
condition for the event's delivery. 
1. The process 
This thesis including the practical works, recorded in the attached CD-rom, attempts 
to represent my process of experimentation and theoretical research. 
The research's original title `The identity of the real in relation to concepts of space', 
first changed into ` The identity of the real in relation to the experience and 
representation of space', has been submitted as `The Artist's Performative Practice 
within the Anti-Ocularcentric Discourse'. This title evolution is significant for the 
path undertaken in my practical work in relation to the theory and it mirrors my 
investigation. In this, the investigation of methods of spatial representation 
introduced the discussion of alternative ones and, in parallel, the conceptual and 
psycho-analytic approach gave way to a more experiential one which finally led to 
phenomenology. Moreover, the performative element in my work, specifically 
grounded in phenomenology, expresses the importance of the physical engagement 
in the space within a post-Cartesian theoretical context. Particularly in the later stage 
of my work, the interconnection of the senses in Merleau-Ponty's thought became 
one of the main sources for my practical thinking. This also allowed my work to 
develop beyond the narrow corridor of solely visually oriented modes of expression. 
Although not addressed directly in the actual title, the issue of space is implicitly 
discussed both in the theoretical and practical research as follows: 
" the perspectival Renaissance constructed space is, according to Martin Jay, opposed to 
Baroque and Dutch Art, and it was first challenged in my piece StretchedMirror (1997) 
by referring to Lacan's Gaze and again deconstructed in Diagrammi (1999); 
" Merleau-Ponty's spatial concept of the Flesh of the World is the conceptual 
territory for the interchange with the audience, which takes place in my 
performative pieces; 
" my attitude towards drawing diagrams both for composing a piece in the space and to 
translate visually theoretical concepts, thus creating different grounds for investigation, 
can be an example of my speculative process involving a spatial component 
The process involved in the development of the research has, of course, been complex: 
some practical works have begun intuitively and I have discovered parallels. Some works 
have been influenced from the start by theoretical concepts drawn from philosophy and 
psychology: the self; self-representation; the psychology of self-identification; the self in 
the social arena; the dissolution of the Cartesian concept of the self and space through 
phenomenology. I recognise also that the form and content of my work has drawn on, and 
developed ideas from, the history of art itself, particularly the concept of the performative. 
I have therefore attempted to put my work into the context of art history and recent work 
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by established artists. I have also attempted to link both this historical review and my own 
experiments to a developing set of theoretical concepts: the changed priority of the visual 
over the other senses and synaesthesia. 
All concepts implied for different disciplines have had some value in understanding my 
own practical work and in many cases have led me to explore artistic ideas in a different 
way. In retrospect, my PhD research has led me to identify a number of component issues 
from the history of art that come together in various ways in my practical work. These are: 
" The construction of spatial concepts and their contradictions through the tradition of 
perspective. 
" The representation of the artist's self through self-portraiture and its link to the politics 
of women's self representation. 
" The concept of the mirror in the act of artistic self-reflection, self-representation. 
" The implications of considering the position of the spectator in the art process, drawing 
particularly on art forms emerging from performance, happenings and Body Art. 
9 The concept of inter-subjectivity as a result of the ` open' form of art making, 
presentation and audience feedback. 
In exploring modes of expression through senses alternative or complementary to 
vision the research also touched upon: 
" The concept of the inter-sensory relating to notions of synaesthesia leading to work 
exploring touch and smell. 
" The issue of memory in relation to the absence ofvision linked to imagination has emerged. 
In the process of my research, as in the works I have produced, the progression is not strictly 
linear and therefore it does not seem entirely coherent, as this is a creative nquiry and allowed 
a number of stimuli in. Many works address arange of issues simultaneously and many of the 
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issues have emerged for me in the process of mating work and considering the theoretical 
framework As a consequence, some issues were addressed in parallel in more than one work, 
whereas some other aspects of the same notions needed to be theoretically investigated The 
research activity became somehow multidirectional and can be read in both synchronic and 
diachronic ways (as shown in fig. 1). The structure of the thesis reflects this and is devised to 
discuss a number of concepts. Within this structure, the diary inserts also mark moments of the 
ongoing speculation prior to any conscious choice of research direction, thus letting intuition to 
emerge. 
In the quotations from the diary I have kept throughout, I have taken the decision to 
retain all the faulty spelling and grammar, where the initial inadequacy of my grasp of 
colloquial English as an Italian is reflected. In the spirit of a perfonnative attitude I believe 
these `inadequacies' remain a point of reference that may later lead me to some other 
interpretation of the diary. Here, it expresses the attempt to link art making to a critical 
self-understanding in a way that balances the more formal theoretical debate. Some of the 
intentions and personal reasons behind the production of the pieces have not been 
revealed. This is due to both a methodological choice and a firm believe in the non 
possibility to express or illustrate the work fully with words. The unexplained side is the 
possibility for the audience to participate according to their own life experience. 
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1.1 List of works included in the research 
Works presented to the public 
title Production or Presentation Venue Outcome Format Year 
Ancora Cerca National Portrait Gallery, Performance 1999 
London, UK 
Pianacoteca Tosio 8-monitor video 2002 
Martinengo, Brescia Italy installation 
Blugiallo The Global Cafe' London Participatory video 1999 
BluX Camberwell College Video Live Installation 2000 
`Exchange 2000', Watershed Video Live Installation 2000 
Centre, Bristol 
London Biennale Video live Installation 2000 
Diagrammi 48th Venice Biennale Interactive performance 1999 
Drawing Scents Lethaby Gallery, London Interactive installation 2002 
Live Archive (transition) Lethaby Gallery, London Video piece 2002 
Madrid Lethaby Gallery, London Video piece 2002 
Mirroring `Performance as Research' Interactive performance 1999 
London College of Fashion 
`Exchange 2000' Watershed Interactive performance 2000 
Centre Bristol 
Morning Toilette My own flat London Performance 2000 
Tate Modem London Video live installation 2001 
Lethaby Gallery London Video installation 2002 
Myme My own flat, London 
Public Private London Underground and Video live installation 2002 
Perceptions 02 Neon Gallery, Bologna, Italy 
Public Private Toynbee Studios, London and Video live installation 2001 
Perceptions my home, Cambridge 
PubliciPrivate www. photoinsight. org Digital photos 2001 
Through Senses CADE Conference Glasgow Interactive video 2001 
Works in progress 
Don't touch installation 2001 
Life Archive installation 2001 
Noisy Depth installation 2001 
Take my breath away installation 2001 
Works undertaken before the start of this research project 
Stretched Mirror Centre for Sculpture, Drawing and installation 1997 
Yorkshire Sculpture Park, UK 
3D Mirror Centre for Sculpture, Drawing 1997 
Yorkshire Sculpture Park, UK 
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Part I. METHODOLOGY FOR THEORY AND ART PRACTICE 
If the non-linear journey of my research were to be visualised it would be a 
multidirectional diagram. A similar pattern can be found in the structure of the thesis, 
where diverse positions of theoreticians and artists in relation to a similar concept are 
investigated to let an original one arise within my artistic research as an answer. 
An evolutionary approach, combining both empirical and theoretical methodologies, 
has been adopted to let specific hypotheses and methodologies emerge, in a circolar 
way. Synchronicity and diachronicity is implied in the development of different 
concepts through different works, the analysis of which led to new hypothesis to be 
tested through the production of new work (as shown in fig. 2). 
In the methodology implied in the practice, the process for production comprises four phases: 
I. Intuition and research and the relationship to theoretical context (contains notes 
and symbolic drawings). 
II. Intentions and proposition (contains propositional diagrams). 
III. Realisation (of the work depending on instruments, audience, context). 
IV. Analysis of obtained data in relation to the theoretical context (these can be 
unexpected and alter my initial intentions) opening up new research questions. 
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audience 
4edb ack 
The earlier diagram in figure 2a regards the use of diagrams in artistic practice 
research. This includes different types of diagrams and text notes used at different 
stages of the research: propositional, analysis and documentation : 
diagram type 1: in which a possible concept of the work is expressed (spatial + 
abstract concepts); 
diagram type 2: describing the event after it has taken place and compared to the 
initial intention. From these diagrams, together with the observations, new hypotheses 
arose for the work to follow. Neither of the two types of diagrams are fixed models: they 
change according to each single project. While writing the thesis the diagram type 2 have 
become the instrument of analyses for most of the work produced. 
I. 1. Interactivity 
Different interactive research methods are used to incorporate data into the works. 
Here are some examples of the main methods used in some of the produced pieces. 
Diagrammi (1999)1 is a multimedia interactive performance; as part of the piece the 
audience were invited to communicate through a very quick word association game. 
The video piece Blugiallo (1999)2 (fig. 3) was realised by overlapping scrolling text 
over a video image of my own body while breathing. This was the result of a 
dialogue over a period of time through text messages, where the other person did not 
know the aim of the dialogue when participating. By producing the piece I understood 
that the imput of the other person gave an unaspected meaning to the work. 
1 Presented at the Venice Biennale 1999, publication on the event canbe f ud in ` Institiici in Great Britain: Artist as Rte. Diagrams', Oste atthe VeniceBiefv2ale publish dby Charta, Milan 2000, presented as pat ofexlubitionDMacracy, 13 Apni- 13 May 2000- Royal College of Art, Landon. Also in ilhvwwmedia. uvwe. aauleauhangee ailing and htpYAvww. dxpUarJmrnnel. coan/oa ntrm dmshtml? Ca itT1=1484 a desaiption of the piece will be given at a latex stage. 2 Presented at the ` Global Cafe' in London in November 1999 in the exhibition com/and/see. 
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to sense deeply 
to listen 
to smell 
to touch 
to taste 
to breathe deeply 
deeply 
inside 
deep inside 
I sink 
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slowly 
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1- the artist's concept expressed in stimuli (a), ak-eady contemplating a number of 
possible responses, Is presented to the audience (b). 
2- the audience responses are reincorporated Into the work. 
3- the artwork represent am eeting point, the screen of representation onto which 
artist's concept and audience feedback meet (a+b). 
4- the presence of unpredided response (e. g. 6), ever changing element according to the 
contexts, indicates the instable nature of the dynamic's results. 
figure 4. l)iaýttram on interaction and method for incorporation of 
research data 
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figure 5. Through Senses, stages of interactive dynamics, exhibited at CADE Conference, Glasgow School of Art, 2001 
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1. I \.. 
Most of the other works produced during my research, including Mirroring (1999- 
ongoing), Sense., (designed in 2000-2001), Through Senses (2001) (fig. 5) and others 
are based on the diagram produced to schematise how the interactive pattern (as 
shown in fig. 4) is imbedded in the art making process involving the audience. 
Furthermore, in some cases, such as in the pieces Mirroring, BluX (2000), Drawing 
Scents (2002) and Public Private Perceptions (2001-2002), the feedback from the 
audience in different environments incorporated back into the work have had an 
important impact on the construction of its meaning and format. The following 
observations from my diary notes, refer to Mirroring. 
`291100 Trans from 270700 
observing printed images (selected stills from the shots: 
chosen criteria for page composition: portraits of both 
myself and the person I met. A description of author, 
place, date, context is given above. I now realise that 
with some people, the close ones I notice elements 
constantly repeated. 
This means that all the collected material will provide 
different ways of selecting and presenting. Within the 
group of images there can be for example a group of 
portraits of me and the person I meet in different places, 
of people I meet in specific contexts. Perhaps here as much 
as in DIAGRPMMI I can trace a graphic of the archive in 
relation to the one I used then. ' 
I 
Some of the works produced were presented in various venues and contexts. The 
changing conditions of the place, the audience and, of course, the way I (and the 
piece) reacted to that environment influenced the delivery and reception of the piece 
(fig. 6). This was noticed while confronting the various outcomes. The analysis was 
very helpful for the production of new pieces and the understanding of weaknesses 
to be improved in the pieces when presented again. 4 
3 Notes from my diary. 
B1uX was presented in 3 contexts: on I of June 20M at Camberwell College London. on 21" of June 2000 as part of the 
London Biennial and at the screening session at the Conference Exchange 20(X), Watershed Centre in Bristol, on 2 
November 2000, Mirroring was acted in many contexts, Public Private in 2 places. Drawing Scents in I and will 
be in another 2, as explained at p. this can also be found in the chart at p. of this introduction. 
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:: ý: ý 
= feedback 
figure 6. Diagram of gathering of feedback from the audience in a defined context, created in 1999 
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I. 2. The care of the self in the practice of writing 
In the seminar Technologies of the Self presented in 1982 at University of Vermont, 
Michael Foucault discusses the concept Take care of the self in ancient Greece and 
the practice of writing and diary keeping as an instrument for analysis. 5 This is to be 
related to my own activity of writing propositional and analytical notes, and as a 
reference in order to develop the practice. 
Foucault explains that these practices were constituted in Greek as epimeletsthai sautou, 
meaning to take care of yourself, the concern with self, to take care of yourself. The 
precept to be concerned with oneself for the Greeks was one of the main principles of 
cities, one of the main rules for social and personal conduct and for the art of life. Foucault 
explains that for us now, this notion is rather obscure and faded Generally the most 
important moral principle in ancient philosophy is considered to be the Delphic principle, 
gnothi seauton (meaning know yourself) rather than Take care of oneself, but without 
doubt, our philosophical tradition has overemphasised the former and forgotten the latter. 
In Foucault's view, the Delphic principle was not an abstract one concerning life; it was 
technical advice, a rule to be observed for the consultation of the oracle. Know yourself 
meant: do not suppose yourself to be a god. 6 
There are several reasons why Know yourself has obscured Take care of yourself, 7 
amongst which Foucault particularly explores the way that, in theoretical philosophy 
s Foucault, M., `Technologies of the Self', Martin, L. H., Gutman, H., Hutton, Technologies of the Self, A Seminar with Michael Foucault, The University of Massachusetts Press 1988, 6 Ibid, pp16-49. 7 Foucault explains that there has been a profound transformation in the moral principles of Western society. We 
are more inclined to see taking care of ourselves as an immorality, as a means of escape from all possible rules. 
`We inherit the tradition of Christian morality which makes self-renunciation the condition for salvation. To know oneself was, paradoxically, a means of self-renunciation. We also inherit' Foucault states 'a secular 
tradition that sees in external law the basis for morality. How then can respect for the self be the basis for 
morality? We are the inheritors of a social morality that seeks the rules for acceptable behaviour in relations with 
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from Descartes to Husserl knowledge of the self (the thinking subject) takes on an 
ever-increasing importance as the first step in the theory of knowledge, thus, in the 
modem world, knowledge of oneself constitutes the fundamental principle. 
For the purposes of my research and, particularly, its concern with the self-reflection, following 
Foucault, I shall review in some detail the less popular concept of The care of the self. 
The first philosophical elaboration of the concern with taking care of oneself is found 
in Plato's Alcibiades 18. Neoplatonism in the third or fourth century AD shows the 
significance given to this dialogue and the importance it assumed in the classical 
tradition. The Alcibiades is considered to be the first dialogue of Plato - the first to 
be read, the first to be studied. It was the arche. In the second century, Albinus said 
that every gifted young man who wanted to stand apart from politics and practice 
virtue should study the Alcibiades. It provided the point of departure for all platonic 
philosophy and Taking care of oneself was its first principle. 
Foucault analyses the care of self in the Alcibiades I9 and describes the notion of 
epimeleisthai: taking pains with oneself. This is divided into two questions: What is 
this self of which one takes care and of what does the care consist? The care of the 
self is the care of the activity and not the care of the soul-as-substance. Foucault 
explains that when you take care of the body, you do not-take care of the self. The 
others[... ] `"Know thyself' has obscured "Take care of yourself' because our morality, a morality of asceticism, 
insists that the self is that which one can reject' Ibid., p. 22. $ Plato, Alcibiade, trans. W. R. M. Lamb, in Plato, Harvard, Cambribge, Mass, 1967, Vol. 12. 
9 Ibid., pp23,24,25. Foucault explains that Alcibiades is about to begin his public and political life. He speaks 
before the people and be all powerful in the city. He is satisfied with his traditional status, with the privileges of 
his birth a heritage. He wishes to gain personal power over all others both inside and outside the city. Socrates 
intervenes and declares his love for Alcibiades who can no longer be the beloved, he must become a lover. He 
must be active in the political and the love game. There is a dialectic between political and erotic discourse. Socrates helps him gain the upper hand 
- 
to acquire tekhne 
- 
Alcibiades must apply himself, he must take care of himself. Concern for self always refers to an active political and erotic state. Epimeleisthai expresses omething 
much more serious than the simple fact of paying attention. It involves taking pains with one's holdings and one's 
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self is not clothing, tools, or possessions; it is to be found in the principle that uses 
these tools, a principle not of the body but of the soul. One has to worry about ones 
soul 
- 
that is the principal activity of caring for the self. 
The second question in the text illustrated by Foucault is how must we take care of 
this principle of activity, the soul, and of what does this care consist. The soul cannot 
know itself except by looking at itself in a similar element: a mirror. Thus, it must 
contemplate the divine element. In this divine contemplation, the soul will be able to 
discover rules to serve as a basis for just behaviour and political action. 
`The effort of the soul to know itself is the principle on which just political action 
can be founded, and Alcibiades will be a good politician insofar as he contemplates 
his soul in the divine element. '10 The dialogue ends when Alcibiades knows he must 
take care of himself by examining his soul. 
In Foucault's view, this text illuminates the historical background of the precept 
`taking care of oneself' nd sets out four main problems that endure throughout 
antiquity, although the solutions given often differ from those in Plato's Alcibiades. " 
According to Foucault, writing was also important in the culture of the care of the 
self. `One of the tasks involved in the care of the self is that of taking notes on one- 
self to be reread, writing treatises and letters to friends to help them, and keeping 
healt. It is highly significant that the concern for self in Alcibiades I is directly related to a defective pedagogy, 
one that concerns political ambition and a specific moment of life. io Ibid., p. 25. 11 First, there is the problem of the relation between the care of the question is presented in an alternative way: When is it better to turn away from political activity to concern oneself with oneself? The second, there is the problem of the relationship between the care of the self and pedagogy. For Socrates, occupying oneself with 
oneself is the duty of a young man, but later in the Hellenistic period it is seen as the permanent duty of one's 
whole life. 
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notebooks in order to reactivate for oneself the truths one needed. Seneca's letters are 
an example of this self-exercise. '12 
In traditional political life, oral culture was largely dominant, and therefore rhetoric was 
important Yet the development of the administrative structures and the bureaucracy of the 
imperial period increased the amount and role of writing in the political sphere. In Plato's 
writings, we see how dialogue gave way to the literary pseudodialogue, although by the 
Hellenistic age, writing prevailed, and real dialectic was practised through correspondence. 
Taking care of oneself became linked to constant writing activity. `The self is something to 
write about a theme or object (subject) of writing activity. That is not a modem trait born 
of the Reformation or of Romanticism; it is one of the most ancient Western traditions. It 
was well established and deeply rooted when Augustine started his Confessions. ' 13 
Foucault contends that the new concern with the self involved a new experience of self. 
The new form of the experience of the self is seen in the first and second centuries, when 
introspection became more and more detailed. Attention was paid to nuances of life, mood 
and reading, and the experience of self was intensified and widened by virtue of this act of 
writing. An example of meticulous concern with the details of daily life, with the 
movements of the spirit, with self-analysis in writing activity can be found in this extract 
from Marcus Aurelius letter of AD 144-45 to Fronto: 
Hail, my sweetest of masters. We are well. I slept somewhat late owing 
to my slight cold, which seems now to have subsided. So from five A. M. 
till nine I spent the time partly in reading some of Cato's Agriculture and 
partly in writing not quite such wretched stuff, by heavens, as yesterday. 
Then, after paying my respects to my father, I relieved my throat, I will not 
12 Ibid, p. 26. 
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say by gargling 
- 
though the word gargarisso is, I believe, found in Novius 
and elsewhere 
- 
but by swallowing honey water as far as the gullet and 
ejecting it again. After easing my throat I went off to my father and attended 
him at a sacrifice. Then we went to luncheon. What do you think I ate? A 
wee bit of bread, though I saw others devouring beans, onions, and herrings 
full of roe. We then worked hard at grape-gathering, and had a good sweat, 
and were merry and, as the poet says, "still left some clusters hanging high as 
gleanings of the vintage. " After six o'clock we came home[... ]14 
This letter presents a description of everyday life where the details of taking care of 
oneself are here, all the ` unimportant' things he has done. In Aurelius' letter these 
details are important because they are you 
- 
what you thought, what you felt. 
Foucault suggests that the examination of conscience begins with this letter writing. 
Diary writing, following on from reflexive letter writing, comes later. It dates from 
the Christian era and focuses on the notion of the struggle of the soul. '5 
In my own research the practice of diary writing has been an important tool for self 
analysis, it enabled me to look at intuitive thoughts and ideas from the outside, it 
provided me with instruments for the analytic self to emerge. Within my research 
this concept of the split self will be discussed further in relation to psychoanalysis. 
13 Ibid., p. 27. 14 Ibid., p. 28. 
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I. 3. The relationship between diary and memory for archiving 
Lacan' s concept of the Gaye based on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's 
Chiasm/Intertwining is a key consideration for the production of most of the works in 
my research 16, being implied in the methodology diary keeping. 
A written diary along with visual forms of collecting information, or recording have 
formed part of the research. For example: the performative work Mirroring (1999- 
ongoing); the collection of images on environments to form the body of work 
Public Private (2001); and the video piece Life-Archive (transition) (2001). 
`2gth Feb 2000 
about the fragment, about the collection of fragments of 
time, of experiences, of places, of people, referring to 
the concept of mirroring: through meeting people I 
recognise an aspect of myself in them, and viceversa AND 
VICEVERSA. This because really I do not think to be the 
focus of my work. It is by being honest by placing myself 
in that central position and by admitting that I can just 
say things from my own view point, that I finally 
understand that it is not enough and I need the other 
people's viewpoint. But again, I need it not for myself but 
in order to be able to express OUR concept. Living my 
experiences in life I can catch and absorb from others, 
they give me a lot. My personality, myself is made out of 
everything I have lived also with others. 
Collected images of myself together with other people I 
meet constitute a kind of diary, now : what kind of a 
diary? [... I 
17 
151 produced the piece bluX with a text that is directly related to this notion of the care of the self, which is 
illustrated at a later stage because also based on a chiasmatic composition, and therefore relates to Merleau- 
Ponty' s notion. 
16 lt will relate particularly to the shift between artist-viewer in the making and perceiving of the work itself. 
" Writing about the piece Mirroring from my diary 29 February 2000. Part of this was published in Cologni. E.. 
In Between, exhibition catalogue, Lethabv Gallery London 29 May- 1 June 2002. 
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In my own project Mirroring, started on 6November 1999,18 the exchange with the 
position of the other is a central issue (fig. 7, fig. 8). This piece produces a shift in 
the ever-changing positions of both artist and audience and enabled me to 
incorporate both of them in the space of artistic representation. The work, in this 
sense, represents an overlapping of theory, practice and methodology: the audience's 
feedback is here used as data for research as well as part of the artwork. The action 
involved in the making of the piece has been repeated in various venues and 
contexts, allowing me to collect a considerable number of images. 
The work constitutes the basis for the subjective approach I have adopted in the 
production of my research. While performing and collecting material for the project 
over a period of nearly three years, I understood that my life experience fed into it 
and altered my initial perception of the work itself, influencing its outcomes. This 
also applies to my understanding of the theoretical issues I encountered and 
methodologies implied in my research. As a consequence, my reading of models, 
diagrams and meanings is transitional and temporary, because it depends upon their 
position within a particular context and time. 
's This performance was first presented part of the paper `The idea of the mirror between audience and performer let's 
make a Portrait! '- on 6 November 1999- Performance as Research- International Symposium 
- 
The London Institute- 
London and on 8 November 1999- Central Saint Matins College. Also as part of the paper `Interaction as a research data 
collecting system: the chiasmus', at conference: Exchange 2000: facilitating research in Art, Design and Technology, Watershed Centre, University of West England, Bristol- 2/3 Nov. 2000, published on hup"I/www. media. uwe. ac. uk/exchangeonline. In have recently published an artist book ofMirroring in three copies which 
represents just one of the many possible ditions. The work also is a research in practice exercise: an overlapping of thaxy, 
practice and methodology: the audience's feedback is here used as data for research as well as part of the artwork My own 
and the audience's action of mutual portraying happens in my everyday life. The result is video material from which stills 
are taken of both my view of the other and the other's view of myself. This piece is a visual diary of myself and people I 
meet in different contexts, in which we both play a different role, though which we communicate. 
23 
'Mrtotww mrawaclw pwi mvme 'work or Fqclqvess1 
tir+cý o No. « 1999 pe to rice a% R*%*wCh 9rj")ouum TP" London n*hft in 
ist ltape 
a eýseýwurý a' dMr ýIAýscýnwrý 
and sup" 
" cow"J lAhan owes Is Grlw. v+ft 
EI pid Li LI C+. ý+ 
figure 7. 'Jirrorinj' stages involved in the production process 
., 
.. w" 
.t \r. tM. ýW\ý tMb 
. MIY 
wY. 
Y. t'.. m. IrY. 
.. r. ý b \r. . tA. " t. t 
Yb . M1ý 
11ýM 1 
IuNlu tit. t 1 tut. t. Iwo. 
... 
Wt ýNýlq Stlt u tb 
"IYtta. lpl. l 
Ittatlui tut . ýyt.. " "1 5511N5y. I.. YS 
YN. IIM "u wlll. ý t.. a 
1>"I 
rý 
. 
I" N h NW 
IuNlu. sall_ S "5.44 
. 
w1 I. luar 
: 
IYNI., Il wl Ma 1 ý, ytt, nINt1" 1atYt 
. 5. -. t 
. 
N. ly u . 4.,.,, 
Ya. 11 
"uEYt-. ýtteW Iw 
YN 1Na 
figure 8. Layout of 3 pages for publication, 2000 
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Another form of visual diary is constituted by the series of photographs Public Private, 
published on the website www. photoinsight. org in August 2001; the idea for the work 
started to take shape in February 2001 by observing some previously collected images. 
`A series of photographs has been taken in various places 
since the beginning of the PhD with no particular purpose, 
but that of recording stimuli coming from the surrounding 
environments. This photographs reveal a vivid interest in 
spatial concerns which apparently would not find a 
conceptual location into the artistic discourse I was 
pursuing at the time, focused on my own represented image. 
I want to include them into the photo diary because they 
have been the basis for a greater focus on the relationship 
between myself and the other (in a particularly connotated 
context). 
Roses 
Autoscatti 
National gallery 
British museum 
Various homes 
public/private 
`I started to look at pictures of my homes. In the past 
four 
years I moved to few different places in London: 
130 Shroffold Road, 
Bromley Kent 
BR1 5NJ october/november 1997 
Flat D 34/36 Gertrude Street 
London SW10 OJG dicember 1997/August 1998 
4 Gladstone Court 
97 Regency Street 
Westminster London W1P 4AL August 1998/August 1999 
11 Carlton House 
127 Cleveland Street 
London W1P 5PL August 1999/April 2000 
18c Schubert Road 
London SW15 2QS Aril 2000/April 2001 
58 Eden Street 
Cambridge CB1 1EL April 2001 
I recently started to play with those images somehow 
stepping in and out continuously in relation to the fact 
that would live in a certain home and relate to the same 
public places differently. I now go to London and the Tate 
Gallery appears to be a little bit far away from my own 
experience because London is no longer my city. I produce 
digital images using stills from my digital video clips 
trying to give that idea of displacement, of being the 
absent subject and the spectator at the same time. This is 
suggested by juxtaposing or overlapping private spaces and 
public spaces in order to create a new non existing one: a 
non belonging space' 
19 
19 From my diary June 2001. 
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Public Private (fig. 9) is a body of digitally enhanced still images which I have been 
working on while travelling, mostly between Italy and England. As I wrote in August 
2001: The body of work is the beginning of a visual diary of my perception of 
environments I deal with: public and private spaces and buildings, within which my 
own role in relation to others' changes. As much as the relationship between private- 
intimate spaces and public-institutional spaces, this investigation involves the 
positioning of myself as artist and subject looking from within or outside the context. 
[... ] The superimposition of two different environments allows me to create a space 
in between, a sort of non belonging space where I locate myself. 20 
In Live Archive (transition), a video produced in 2002 (fig. 10), 1 adopted a non- 
linear composition. This was achieved by alternating a still shot of myself, while 
involved in the domestic activity of making coffee in the morning, with short shots of 
other environments I used to encounter in my daily routine. These two shots also 
coincide with two opposite viewpoints: the first from the position of the other looking at 
me, in a narrative present time, the second from my own viepoint in specific moments 
and places, like a series of flashbacks. The result is a continuous shift of attention from 
present experience to past experience; the spectators have the choice to position 
themselves conceptually in one of the two, or to be in a condition of transition. 
20 Three images were published in August 2001 on on N%NN w. photoinsight. org. 
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In these pieces, more clearly than in the others, the presence of the obsessive element 
of collecting is evident. This was intentionally investigated by means of keeping 
everyday experieces alive and constructing archives for future reference. Moreover, 
in referring back to them, I continuously verify my own recollection from memory 
and can compare it to the documentation. 
Marina Wallace in her essay Images of Knowing for the catalogue Public 
Private Perceptions, 2' traces an account of the relationship between 
photographic images, memory and senses in relation to my own project Public 
Private Perceptions. By illustrating methods of memorising in ancient times, 
she argues that memory can be compared to a photographic archive. Wallace 
suggests that ` our memory of the visual world is fed by a wealth of images that 
populate our visual field. Some of these images are projections of "live" and 
"real" things, of the three-dimensional "moving" objects that occupy our 
world; some are two-dimensional renderings of "life", they are transcriptions 
of the "real world" produced in various graphic forms and by different media, 
such as painting, film, and photography. ' 22 Wallace then states that our 
emotional and psychological responses to two-dimensional images are quite 
different from those we have when looking at three-dimensional images. 
Equally, we react differently in front of moving or still images. This discourse 
is relevant to define the nature and role of documentation of time based pieces 
and live events also in relation to my own process methodology, which will be 
discussed at a later stage. 
21 Public Private Perceptions, Diary of the Creative Process and other Fragments, edited by Elena Cologni, 
contributions by Marina Wallace, Malcolm Le Chice, Elio Grazioli, published in March 2002 by Galleria Neon Associazione Culturale, Bologna, Italy, pp. 20-26. 22 Wallace, op. cit., p. 21. 
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Part H. MIRRORING: THE RELATIONSHIP ARTIST-SELF IMAGE 
Representational ambiguities have to date played a major role in my artwork (for 
example, in the use of perspective and its paradoxes in three dimensions in Stretched 
Mirror, 1997, where the viewer would experience the dichotomy between the visual 
and the physical perception of the constructed space). These ambiguities have been 
used sometimes to test the deceptive nature of sensory perception and at other times 
to stimulate the observer's interaction with the questions posed in the work. Because 
the practical artistic investigation has evolved in a direction where the most used 
media are video and photographyyalso as documentation of performances) a new 
understanding of technologies and methodologies for the spectator's involvement 
becomes necessary. 
The surface for spatial representation is here considered as a screen, a partition 
between the space for the art and artist and that occupied by the observer. The 
concept of the mirror 
- 
but also Chiasm, intertwining, symmetry, self-reference, 
repetition 
- 
becomes the basis for a process of development of art practice that 
questions and then breaks the static schema of the relationship. 
The following is an attempt to map the complex metaphoric significance of the 
mirror in some philosophical and psychological aspects, and also through the history 
of representational conventions. Particularly, this will include the illustration of art 
pieces where the concept of reflection coincides with the position of the viewer 
within the relationship artist/viewer, in the making or perceiving of the artwork. The 
accent will be placed on the artistic outcome that takes the form of a self-portrait (the 
artist's own image) in photography, video and performance based work. 
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ILL The emerging of the self 
Rudolph Gasche, in `The Tain of the Mirror', states that the concept of philosophical 
reflection is a name for philosophy's eternal aspiration for self-foundation. In his 
view, only with modern philosophy 
- 
philosophical thought since Descartes 
- 
did 
reflection explicitly acquire this status of a principle par excellence. Reflection as a 
principle of philosophical thinking, from the moment it became the chief 
methodological concept for Cartesian thought, has signified a consideration of the 
significance of the very experience in which objects are given. For instance, with 
such bending back upon the modalities of object perception, reflection shows itself to 
mean primarily self-reflection, self-relation, self-mirroring. Gasche states that ` By 
lifting the ego out of its immediate entanglement in the world, Descartes establishes 
the apoditic certainty of self as a result of the clarity and distinctness with which it 
perceives itself. '23 Furthermore, `through self-reflection, the self 
- 
the ego, the 
subject 
- 
is put on its own feet, set free from all unmediated relation to being. In 
giving priority to the human being's determination as a thinking being, self reflection 
marks the human being's rise to the rank of a subject. ' According to Gasche, 
Descartes's is the first epoch-making achievement of the concept of reflection, and it 
characterises modem metaphysics as a metaphysics of subjectivity. 24 
Bernard Brunon25 writes that the painting Las Meninas heralds the emergence of a 
self on the stage of Western culture, from the time when it was painted to the time 
Louise Bourgeois made her Torso, the self had been invented, registered and 
23 Gasche, R, The Tain of the Mirror, Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection, Harvard University Press, 1986, 1997 5s` printing, p. 13,14. 2albid. 
25 Branon, B., Autoportraits, Here's Looking atMe, catalogue of exhibition at Espace Lyonnais d'Art Contemporain Ville de Lyon, 29 Jan- 30 Apr. 1993. 
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recorded. In Brunon's view, the self was the most significant production and driving 
force of the humanist thought dominating Western culture. 
Rita Carter writes that at about eighteen months children seem to develop self- 
consciousness. They no longer point at their reflection in the mirror as though they 
see another child, and if a dab of coloured powder is put on their face while they are 
looking at their reflection they rub it off- they don't rub the mirror as younger 
children do. Carter also states that the simultaneous emergence of speech and self- 
consciousness may simply reflect the parallel maturation of the two relevant brain 
areas: language and front lobes of the brain. Or it may be that the two are inevitably 
connected. Language gives the child the tool it needs to form a concept itself that it 
can then place outside its own experience and regard in relationship to others. 26 
Martin Jay suggests that the precise moment of the appearance of the self in a young 
human being has been determined scientifically as the Mirror Stage by Lacan. 
On 3 August 1936, Lacan read a paper to the Fourteenth Congress of the 
International Psychoanalytic Association, which met in Marienbad with Ernest Jones 
presiding. It was entitled The Mirror Stage. Yheory of a Structuring and Genetic Moment 
in the Constitution of Reality, Conceived in Relation to Psychoanalytic Experience and 
Doctrine. 27 Although unpublished, it was the predecessor of a later version delivered to the 
Sixteenth Congress in 1949 and included in Ecrits, the collection of Lacan's work which 
appeared in 1966,28 the main rudiments of the Mirror Stage argument seem to have been 
in place by the mid-1930s. Jay recalls that the universalization and normalisation of the 
26 Carter, K, Mapping the mind, Seven Dials, London, 1999, p. 156. 21 The paper was indexed as `The Looking-Glass Phase' in The International Journal of Psycho Analysis, 18 (1937), p. 78. 28 The title was now The Mirror State as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience. 
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Mirror Stage was abetted by Lacan's absorption of several other influences, some 
narrowly psychological, others more generally cultural29. 
Jean-Francois Chevrier writes that there is no longer truth of the self but only its 
`imaginary'. Anyone looking in a mirror, even seeking to discover their true identity, 
discovers first of all a fixed image of themselves, a persona to which they try to 
restore movement and life by a whole range of grimaces, facial gesticulations and 
minuscule, perverse gestures of defiance. They are attempting to act and influence 
their persona. It is the same in photography. Every self portrait is inevitably by its 
very nature a doubling, an image of the other. Our simplest most familiar experience 
of the photographic self-portrait is a constant reminder of the primordial fiction and 
the primal alienation of the first Mirror-Phase described by Lacan. 30 
We have only to understand the Mirror Stage as an identification, in the 
full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that 
takes place in the subject when he assumes an image 
- 
whose 
predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in 
analytic theory, of the ancient term of imago. 31 
I think that it can be argued that every self-portrait is the portrait of another and, in 
the process of producing one, artists confront themselves with a reflected image. 
29 Jay, M., Downcast Eyes, the Denigration of Vision in Twentieth 
-Century French Thought, University of California Press, 1994, p. 342. Among them were scientific studies of imitation in animals, especially pigeons 
and locusts, and Roger Caillois's remarkable comparison of insect with human behaviour in the pages of 
Minotaure. These works seemed to have alerted Lacan to the importance of visual fusion with the other through 
morphological mimicry. According to Caillois, however, such a fusion was accompanied by a loss of psychic 
energy. Borrowing a term from Pierre Janet, Caillois called this condition `psychasthenia', which meant a drop in 
o strength. 
Chevrier, J-F., ` The image of the Other', in Staging the Self, Self-Portrait Photography 1840-1980s, catalogue 
of exhibition National Portrait Gallery 3 Oct 1986-11 Jan 1987, p 9. 
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Lacan's study of the child's recognition in front of the mirror is seen as being 
formative of the function of the I as recounted in psychoanalytic experience. 
The child, at an age when he is for a time, however short, outdone by the 
chimpanzee in instrumental intelligence, can nevertheless already 
recognise as such his own image in the mirror. 
In Lacan's view, this recognition is the expression of situational perception, an 
essential stage of the act of intelligence. This act, as in the case of the monkey, once 
the image has been mastered and found empty, immediately rebounds in the case of 
the child in a series of gestures `in which he experiences in play the relation between 
the movements assumed in the image and the reflected environment, and between 
this virtual complex and the reality it reduplicates 
- 
the child's own body, and the 
persons and things around him[... ]'. 32 
Lacan describes the child's activity in front of the mirror: 
Unable as yet to walk, or even to stand up, and held tightly as he is by 
some support, human or artificial he nevertheless overcomes, in a flutter 
of jubilant activity, the obstructions of his support and, fixing his attitude 
in a slightly leaning-forward position, in order to hold it in his Gaze, 
brings back an instantaneous aspect of the image. 33 
He also states that this jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infant 
stage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursing dependence, would seem to exhibit in 
an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the ` I' is precipitated in a primordial 
31 Lacan, J., Ecrits, A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, Norton & Company, New York-London, 1977, p. 1. 
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form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before 
language restores to it, in the universal, its function as subject. 34 
Amelia Jones states that Lacan's Mirror Stage 
- 
in which the subject `coheres' in 
relation to a misrecognised image of his own unity as body/self/ image 
- 
coincides 
with Merleau-Ponty's observations in its acknowledgement of the simultaneous 
contingency of self on other and the fundamental narcissism of this relation. `It is 
the image through which the subject seeks to know herself or himself but fails, 
succumbing to self-alienation, and through which the subject attempts to cohere 
itself, but it can only do so at the price of becoming the other. '35 
Martin Jay suggests that Merleau-Ponty began to be more sympathetic to certain 
psychoanalytic ideas near the end of his career. 36 Jay describes that, rather than construing 
Freudianism merely as a version of causal psychology, in The Structure of Behavior, 
Merleau-Ponty began to appreciate its substantive contribution to the philosophical 
problems he so obsessively explored, to revise completely the pre-reflective cogito of 
Phenomenology through an increased sympathy for psychoanalysis and, in particular, its 
notion of the unconscious. Jay states Merleau-Ponty found that one aspect of the 
unconscious especially congenial complemented his earlier interests in the cognitive 
development of children, the role of the Mirror Stage in creating the knowing self. In his 
1960 essay The Child's Relations with Others, Merleau-Ponty drew on psychologists 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Lacan, J., Ecrits, A selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, Norton & Company, New York-London, 1977, p. 2. 35 Jones, A., Body Art Performing the Subject, p. 46. 36 This is part of the anti-ocularcentric discussion he illustrates in Jay, M., Downcast eyes, p. 320. 
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like Henri Wallon and Paul Guillaume, who had discussed the cognitive implications of 
specular images. 37 Jay writes : 
What he called autoscopy, or the external perception of a self, was 
responsible, among other things, for an ideal, uniform notion of space, 
which is assumed to be the same wherever the image of the child 
appears. It also has profound affective implications that purely cognitive 
psychology fails to explain. 38 
In Jay's view, psychoanalysis, through the work of Jacques Lacan, provided a useful 
corrective. Having recently read Lacan' s seminal papers, The Psychic Effects of the 
Imaginary Mode and The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the 1, 
Merleau-Ponty noted that they accounted for an aspect of specularity that Wallon had 
noted but neglected to address: the child's jubilation on seeing itself for the first time. 
But in addition to registering the positive emotional implications of the Mirror Stage, 
Merleau-Ponty followed Lacan, as he read him, in discerning negative ones as well. 
Thereupon I leave the reality of my lived me in order to refer myself 
constantly to the ideal, fictitious, or imaginary me, of which the specular 
image is the first outline. In this sense I am torn from myself, and the 
image in the mirror prepares me for another still more serious alienation, 
which will be the alienation by others. For others have only an exterior 
image of me, which is analogous to the one seen in the mirror. 39 
37 Merleau-Ponty, `The Child's Relations with Others', in The Primacy of Perception, pp. 12511 He distinguished between the ` specular image', which is a psychological phenomenon, from the "image in the mirror, " which is 
merely physical. 38 Jay, p. 321. 
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The conflict between the internal and external senses of the self leads to aggressive 
feelings as well as narcissistic jubilation. As Jay notes, Merleau-Ponty took from 
Lacan the recognition that the Mirror Stage could well be the source of an alienated 
self and conflict between visually constituted selves. 40 
One of my concerns is to note that here, and also experienced in my art practice, visual 
experience means a crisis of the boundaried well-formed self. A parallel to my on experience 
in the Lacan's account on the precarious formation of that self is addressed ata later stage. 
In 1931, the French psychologist Henri Wallon had published a paper entitled `How the 
Child Develops the Notion of His Own Body. '41 Although the published version of 
Lacan's Mirror Stage essay mentions Wallon only in passing, Jay suggests that he was 
deeply influenced by the argument in this piece and Wallon's lectures from 1928 to 1934. 
Wallon had experimented on the differences between animal and human infant 
behaviour in front of a mirror, demonstrating that whereas the former failed to take 
its reflection for itself, the latter did so. Thus was born a visually constituted notion 
of the self. Wallon also noted that children often identified very closely with the 
feelings of others, for example crying when another child felt pain. This phenomenon, 
known as `transitivism', investigated by other child psychologists uch as Charlotte Blihier 
and Elsa Kohler, suggested that the temporary confusion of self-image and the image of 
the other could be understood as functional in the creation of a healthy self. 
39 Merleau-Ponty, p. 136. 40 Jay writes that the Merleau-Ponty equation of the mirror stage with the creation of the ego ideal or the super 
ego was not what Lacan had meant; he identified it squarely with the ego itself and thus explicitly jettisoned 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological notion of an ego prior to the cogito. For all his appreciation of Merleau- 
Ponty's positive appropriation of his work, Lacan thus carefully distanced himself from his interpretation of it in 
the tribute he wrote after the philosopher's death and in later statements. This can be found in Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsycho-analysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan, NewYork, 1981, p. 119. 41 Wallon, H., ` Comment se developpe chez 1'enfant la notion du corps propre', Journal de Psychologie (November-December, 1931), pp. 705-748. 
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Whereas Wallon conceived of these experiences in essentially positive terms as 
advances in the maturation of consciousness, Jay suggests that Lacan's interpretion 
of them was more dark. In Jay's view, Lacan transformed Wallon's positive 
description of specular identification in a negative direction by absorbing Hegelian 
analyses of master-slave interaction presented in Alexandre Koj eve's lectures at the 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes in the mid-1930s. Kojeve's influential anthropological 
reading of The Phenomenology of Spirit as a dialectic of desire, violence, and 
intersubjective recognition left a strong mark on Lacan, as it did on an entire 
generation of French intellectuals. 42 
The initial attempt to achieve a coherent sense of selfhood is made by reducing the other to 
an image of the self in a manner similar to the projective transitivism by Wallon: 
This violent derealization of the other, however, proves unsatisfactory, 
for only when the other is truly separate from the self can the self benefit 
from its recognition. A second stage of the dialectic thus entails 
acknowledgment of the ineradicable otherness of the nonself, which 
resists reduction to a specular double. In Kojeve's terms, a `higher' self is 
constituted by a dialectic of desire in which achieving the other's 
recognition supplants solipsistic visual projection. 43 
A comparison between Lacan and another member of Kojeve's audience, Sartre, for 
the similarities in their attitudes toward the Gaze, can be traced. Martin Jay states 
42 According to Kojeve, human consciousness emerges over time in response to a primordial desire to overcome a lack, a felt sense of incompleteness on the part of the biological proto-subject. But what defines human as 
opposed to animal desire is that its realisation must entail an interaction with the desire of the other, an interaction 
which is the basis of history. 
41 Jay, M., Downcast eyes... p. 342 
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that in the 1949 article Lacan specifically criticised Sartre, as he would Merleau- 
Ponty fifteen years later, for positing an irreducible core of subjective autonomy, a 
`self-sufficiency of consciousness'44 prior to the intersubjective dialectic of desire. 
Lacan implied that the residual Cartesian cogito latent in phenomenology must be 
rejected. But, in Jay's view, what Lacan did not spurn was Sartre's radical 
demolition of the transcendental ego created by the internalised look of the other. 
Insisting that the ego was nothing more than an illusory construct based on a false faith in a 
mirror image of corporeal wholeness, Lacan set himself resolutely against ego psychology. 
The Mirror Stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from 
insufficiency to anticipation and which manufactures for the subject, 
caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies 
that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I 
shall call orthopaedic and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an 
alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's 
entire mental development. 45 
The therapeutic goal of a strong, integrated ego, therefore, is misguided, for rather 
than proving an escape from the vicissitudes of alienation, it is itself the greatest 
alienation of all. Produced by identification with a specular mirage, a dead image of 
a body like a film `suddenly stopped in mid-action, '46 it is in Jay's opinion, nothing 
less than an instantiation of what Sartre called `bad faith'. 
u Lacan, The Mirror Stage, p. 6. 45 Lacan, The Mirror Stage, p. 4. The language of armouring is also found in Lacan's in The Function and Field 
of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis'in Ecrits, A selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, Norton & Company, New York-London, 1977, pp. 101,109. 
"Lacan, 
`Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis, ' Ecrits, A selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, Norton & Company, New York-London, 1977, p. 17. 
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Jay sees here the link between Lacan's work on paranoid violence and his discussion of 
the Mirror Sruge 
. 
If specular identification meant the rigid constriction of the psyche, 
failing to move beyond the Mirror Stage could lead to a repetition of its aggression. 
Lacan states that the `fragmented body usually manifests itself in dreams when the 
movement of the analysis encounters a certain level of aggressive disintegration in 
4' the individual'. 
The double, infinitive repetition, modularity and the ('hiusm are typical visual 
references to the mirror ontology discussed. These had often been present in my 
practical research in the composition of the pieces. More recently, though, I am more 
conscious of the psychological unfolding of some of my own experiences, and the 
implications in the use of those modular, multifaced compositions. Lately an 
aggressive aspect of my personality manifested itself in vivid images, which, as 
psychologist Emily Holmes told me, are usually produced by fear. At the time by 
meaning to face my parallel thinking, I wrote: 
211101 Dialogue: The subjective self, the analytic self 
SS-I fear my thoughts 
AS-It is because you are tired and stressed, you work too hard! 
SS-No it's all their fault! They have so much power, they control my 
thoughts. 
AS None does that, you are in control of your thoughts 
SS-No, I cannot, at that level; I see red, blood, somone heating me, 
and myself heating someone, and sometimes I love so much and hate so 
much, I get confused on the meaning of these words and feelings. 
AS-There is a common ground for these sensations, you know, Lacan... 
SS-Who cares about him, I do not want to understand I am angry, very 
angry, none should mess with my perception of reality, this is what 
they have done to me, fuck you, all of you and fuck me, when I don't 
take responsability for telling the truth. 
47 Lacan, J., 'lcrits, A selection', trans. Alan Sheridan, Norton & Company, New York-London, 1977, p. 4. 
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AS-How are you going to do that? 
SS-I do not know yet, but I think it will be against something and 
about something at the same time 
AS-You saw Serrano's exhibition didn't you? 
SS-Yes... Objects of desire (kuger 22 Long Kifle Mark II Target 2) 
1992, it pushes you so close to the gun that you cannot but see its 
beauty, it is no longer a gun, I want the viewer to see things from 
where I see them, does this mean that I am imposing a viewpoint , am 
I in a position of power? 
Faint 
Joy 
Sadness 
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I think that this somehow schizophrenic practice is very much implied in the methodology 
of the research I have conducted, and therefore I trained myself to be in such a condition, 
in order to be able to pursue my goals. As well as the relation with the viewer of one of my 
pieces, by putting myself in that very position in order to look the work from the outside, I 
also have had to detach my analytic self from the subjective self. 
The word "individual" comes from the Latin Individuum: that which cannot be 
divided, but it becomes increasingly difficult to constitute oneself as an individual 
when one's perception of one's self is split and shattered. '49 1 remember very well 
when I first experienced that ` split'. It was in 1985, and I was going back home from 
art school. I saw my own reflected image in a shop window and would not recognise 
it as me. I think I was experiencing a split between my perception of myself and the 
look of myself, the way other people would see me. I think that this was the 
beginning of a series of attempts at the time to match my own image with an 
idealised one. More recently I have aimed to know better the perception of my own 
image from the outside, also through my research. 
4' From my diary notes. 49 Brunon, B., Autoportraits, Here's Looking at Me, catalogue of exhibition at Espace Lyonnais d'Art Contemporain Ville de Lyon, 29 Jan- 30 Apr. 1993. 
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Martin Jay's writes that what Lacan called `the Imaginary', 50the dimension or realm 
of images, perceived or imagined, conscious or not, is a constant dimension of the 
human psyche, sl which can never permit unimpeded access to `the Real', the realm 
of raw fullness prior to the organisation of the drives. But there is a difference 
between normal and psychotic behaviour that depends on the partial transition from 
the Imaginary to a further stage, which Lacan termed ` the Symbolic. '52 
Coincident with the resolution of the Oedipus complex, the Symbolic meant the child's 
entry into language. 53 In Jay's view, for Lacan, only when the illusory dyadic specularity 
of the Mirror Stage is surpassed by the triadic interaction of the Oedipal drama can a non- 
narcissistic inter-subjectivity become possible, one in which the alterity of the nonself is 
preserved rather than destroyed. `The creation of the superego through the introjection of 
the prohibition of the father against incest creates a secondary identification, which 
supplants the primary identification based on specular projection. '54 
Jay writes that the splitting of the ego helps to defuse the aggressive potential in the Mirror 
Stage which is still evident in paranoid psychosis, because the split self is no longer in 
danger of projecting its ideal of wholeness onto another, which it confuses with itself. 55 
S0 An account can be found in the seminars grouped under the rubric `The Topic of the Imaginary' in The 
Seminar ofJacques Lacan, Book 1. 
s' Jay's reading of Lacan's Imaginary. `By connecting the unconscious to conscious life through a variety of invisible joins, 
the Imaginary places affective value on Symbolic order conventions and thereby infers a heterogeneity into discourse. As 
the purveyor of active albeit repressed, representations and identificato y `knowledge, ' the Imaginary judges people and 
experiences 
-intuitively, ' in light of invisible resonances. Like the moi, the Imaginary also functions to blot out the 
unconscious knowledge to which its very existence gives silent witness'. p., 351. 52 Ibid., p. 352. 53Jay, M., Downcast Eyes, the Denigration of Vision in Twentieth 
-Century French Thought, University of California Press, 1994, p. 349. 54Ibid. p. 25 1, ` Only when the desire for fusion is replaced by the acceptance of the prohibition of that desire, 
represented by the father's "no, " can a healthy subject replace the "misrecognized" subject of the mirror stage. Because the father's "no" is a speech act, and one which in French is conveniently homophonic with his name the introjection is a fundamentally linguistic phenomenon, which is why entrance into the Symbolic is related to the Oedipus complex. The healthy subject thus produced, however paradoxical it may seem is thus split, decentered'. ss Jay continues by stating that only when the unconscious functions like a language and not like a mirror can the 
mature subject, split and injecting the other rather than projecting itself onto it, be achieved. 
41 
Jay suggests that the problem of remaining hostage to the Mirror Stage, as explained 
by Lacan, is a problem that characterised Western philosophical ocularcentrism as a 
whole. This is due precisely to its inflation of the role of the eye at the cost of 
recognising that of the Gaze (its complexity will be illustrated at a later stage). In 
Jay's view, it fails to register what Merleau-Ponty had pointed out: `that we are 
beings who are looked at, in the spectacle of the world. That which makes us 
consciousness [sic] institutes us by the same token as speculum mundi'. 56 This 
failure can also be understood if we contrast waking and sleeping experience. 
Whereas awakened consciousness only operates with a looking eye, in our dreams, 
images show themselves to our unconscious. 57 
The function of the picture' states Lacan ` in relation to the person to 
whom the painter, literally, offers his picture to be seen 
- 
has a relation 
with the Gaze. [... ]I think there is a relation with the Gaze of the 
spectator, but that is more complex. The painter gives something to the 
person who must stand in front of this painting [... ] he gives something 
for the eye to feed on, but he invites the person to whom this picture is 
presented to lay down his Gaze there as one lays down his weapons [... ] 
Something is given not so much to the gaze as to the eye, something that 
involves the abandonment, the laying down of the gaze. 58 
56 Lacan, op. cit. p. 75. 57 Ibid. ` In the fmal resort, our position in the dream is profoundly that of someone who does not see. The subject does not see where it is leading, he follow. ' 58 Lacan, J., The four Fundamental Concepts ofPsycho-analysis, p. 101. 
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L2. Reflection and representation 
Rodolphe Gasche gives an explanation of the etymological roots of the verb to 
reflect, in the Latin verb re-flectere. In his view this will suggest some of the more 
formal characteristics of the movements that compose reflection, as well as some of 
the fundamental imagery associated with this concept. Reflectere means `to bend' or 
`to turn back' as well as `to bring back'. Gasche states that this turning back is 
significant for understanding reflection only if one recalls that in both Greek and 
Latin philosophy the term has optic connotations, in that it refers to the ` action' of 
mirroring surfaces in throwing back light, and in particular a mirror's exhibition or 
reproduction of objects in the form of images. Reflection signifies the process that 
takes place between a figure or object and its image on a polished surface. Gasche 
points out that from the beginning self-consciousness, as constituted by self- 
reflection, has been conceptualised in terms of this optical operation and perception, 
with the effect that self-consciousness has come to suggest a beam of light thrown 
back upon itself after impact with a reflecting surface. He concludes by writing that 
in this sense reflection is the structure and the process of an operation that implies 
that the mirror is mirroring itself, by which process the mirror is made to see itself. 59 
Bernard Brunon writes that the visual vocabulary of Western artists has been ordered 
and codified through a set of rules that have been invented, implemented and in turn 
rendered obsolete throughout the centuries. One of the codes that ruled the process of 
image making for the majority of our history, and until the early years of this 
century, was that of visual representation. It offered the theoretical ground on which 
39 Gasche, R., The Tain of the Mirror, Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection, Harvard University Press 1986, 
1997 S'h printing, p. 16. 
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images could be built 60 Brunon writes that one of the aspects of representation 
relevant to self-portraiture is the characteristic straightforward gaze looking outward. 
This specific gaze is at the very centre of the major system of representation 
introduced in painting during the Thirteenth and Fourteenth centuries and carried 
through the Renaissance to the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries and beyond. 
This system, called `one view point perspective' or `single vanishing point 
perspective', for centuries fixed the painter's position in front of the model. 1 
In my own artistic experiments the relation with the spectator is investigated through 
considering his/her position offruition62 (fig. 12). 1 adopt a system of analysis 
devided into three stages: production, perception and fruition. In considering the 
fruition stage: the spectator here occupies a space which can be considered as 
symmetric to that occupied by the artwork, it is a minor composition. This stage is 
realised when the artist produces an artwork leaving a gap to be filled by the 
presence of audience. In this situation an exchange between the piece and the 
spectator takes place as visualised in the diagram in figure 12. In order to examine 
this concept in more detail I shall illustrate various discussions regarding the painting 
Las Meninas, painted in Madrid in 1656 by Diego Veläsquez. I believe this work can 
be understood in relationship to my three stage concept and that this painting can be 
a parallel to my own artistic research, where the condition of fruition is a prerequisite 
for enabling an interchange with the spectator to happen. 
60 Brunon, B., Autoportraits, Here's Looking at Me, catalogue of exhibition at Espace Lyonnais d'Art Contemporain Ville de Lyon, 29 Jan- 30 Apr. 1993. 
61 Brunon, op. cit. He writes that this place occupied by the artist is the very same one defined by the lens of the 
camera obscura, with regards to the Jonathan Crary's concept that the camera obscura was not reserved to the 
exclusive use of the artists but available to a larger audience. Brunon points out that Crary underestimates the 
similarities between the optical system and that of the camera oscura and the geometrical system of one point perspective constructions. Both systems required a single fixed observation point, looking out in a given direction 
and dictating a very specific view of reality. However one of the advantages the artist had over Crary's observer 
w 
62 as 
the ability to manipulate and finely tune the images he was producing. The term fruition is used to signify the verb of perceiving and becoming part of the work. It has been so far part 
of my artistic intention to incorporate the spectator's response, in various ways and at various levels, at the Perceptual stage. His/her presence is complementary to the meaning of the work. 
44 
0 
Artist; creative Spectator; Spectator; 
production perceptual stage fruitional stage 
figure 12. Stages of artist and spectator production of 
spatial context in relation to their activity 
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figure 11. Las Meninas by DiegoVeläzquez 
It is not my intention here to give a new reading of this painting, but to illustrate where a 
critical model for interpretation may arise. This will be used at a later stage in order to 
draw a parallel between the observation on the relationship viewer/painting within a spatial 
perspective construction in this painting and the undertaking of a similar investigation in 
some contemporary artworks and in my own practical research. 
In the painting Las Meninas, the issues of representation and self-portraiture overlap to 
become one and, as Burton very well illustrates, the interpretation of the composition 
and subject matter of this painting has been discussed by various art historians and 
writers such as John R. Searle, George Kubler, Leo Steinberg, Martin Kemp and 
Jonathan Brown. 63 The non-scientific application of perspective by the Diego Veläzquez 
as suggetsed by Martin Kemp, leaves `space' for the spectator's subjective interpretation. 
The straightforward look in self-portraits does not necessarily coincide with the single 
focus perspective for its spatial construction. This means that when, as it happens in Las 
Meninas, the perspective construction is not scientifically based on the position of the 
viewer and artist, then it no longer coincides with the painter's viewpoint either. 
Martin Kemp interpreted the construction of the space in Las Meninas aiming to find 
how scientifically Velazquez applied perspective rules that he might have been aware 
of because of his contacts with Italian painters. Kemp says: 'The setting of the 'action' 
is quite specific 
- 
this is not the least original of its aspects 
- 
and can be identified as 
a long room in the Alcazar, adjacent to the painter's own suite of rooms'64(fig. 13). In 
63 Some sources: Searle, J. R `Las Meninas and Paradoxes of Pictorial Representation', in Critical Inquiry, University of Chicago, Spring 1980; Kubler, G., ` Three Remarks on Las Meninas', in The Art Bulletin, New York, June 1996; Steinberg, L., `Velasques Las Meninas' in October 19, winter 1981. Kemp, M., The Science of'Art Optical Themes from Brunelleschi to Seurat, Yale University Press, New Haven 
and London, 1990, p. 107. 
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his view the perspectival clues are less obvious than they might be in Italian 
Renaissance painting, but they are definite enough. 
The vanishing point lies close to the central point of the door opening 
[fig. 14]. The visual axis thus runs asymmetrically down the room along 
a line between two of the doors. The painter's own position in the picture 
can be determined as straddling the central axis of the room. Given the 
viewing axis, the centrally-placed mirror cannot but reflect a relatively 
narrow vista which lies almost exclusively to the left of the central axis. 
The line of vision from the mirror would almost certainly have been 
intercepted by the large canvas. The painting would, therefore, represent 
a double portrait of the King and Queen. This interpretation corresponds 
to that of Palomino and is confirmed by the pictorial device of a red 
curtain visible in the mirror reflection. Velazquez would not have 
required advanced optical planning to achieve this effect, but simply his 
first-hand knowledge of what was visible in the room from a certain 
standpoint and what was (or would be) reflected in that mirror[... ]. 6s 
6s Kemp, M., op. cit. p. 108 
47 
figure 13. from Kemp, M., The Science ofArt Optical Themes from Brunelleschi to Seurat, Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, 1990, p. 107 
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figure 14. from Kemp, M., The Science of Art Optical Themes from Brunelleschi to Seurat, 
Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1990, p. 107. 
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Martin Kemp questions whether Velasquez did precisely recreate the view according 
to optical principles. He supposes that Veläsquez could determine units 
corresponding to squares in the ground plan using the width of the end wall as the 
side length to show that the picture plane is situated somewhat more than three-and- 
one-quarter units from the rear wall (fig. 14); it would nearly coincide with the plane 
of the opposite wall of the room. 
However, this would not be consistent with the scales of the uprights [sic] 
canvas and Las Meninas itself, which is over three meters tall. To produce the 
proper scaling, the picture plane would need to be located at PP in pl. 202 [fig. 
13]. 1 interpret this discrepancy to mean that there was probably not a directly 
geometrical relationship between the setting and the perspective of the 
painting. The setting and the painting would therefore stand in a different 
relationship from that in the standard construction. 66 
Kemp suggests a reading of the design procedure in the following terms: ` Velazquez 
took his basic view of the room as framed by the upright edges of the door from 
point E. This would mean that the plane of the door aperture acted as the Albertian 
'window'[... ]'. In Kemp's view, this was directly recorded 'by eye' without a precise 
scaling of all the architectural forms ` in depth in the Piero [della Francesca] manner' 
and given Velazquez' s access to perspective science, this would represent a 
conscious choice. Kemp states that according to this interpretation he would be 
openly challenging the perceptual limitations of the Italians' geometrical mechanics. 
67 
66 Kemp, M., op. cit., p. 108 
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In Kemp's view, one instance of Veläzquez' s desire was to give a wider sense of the 
subtle processes of vision and how these can be magically evoked or paralleled in the 
medium of paint, thus achieving more than was possible with the drier mechanisms 
of linear perspective and geometrical shadow projection. `No painting was ever more 
concerned with 'looking'-on the part of the painter, the figures in the painting and 
the spectator. '68 
He also writes that 'Velazquez' s art is a special kind of window on the world-or a 
perceptual mirror of nature-or perhaps even more literally in this instance his 
personal door to the subtle delights of natural vision and painted illusion... ' Kemp 
states that artists of high intelligence like Velazquez, concerned at this time with 
questions of visual representation, could set their understanding of perspective into a 
broader context of seeing and representation to fall into subjective interpretation 
based on their appearance to the viewer rather than theoretical constructs. 
In my opinion the fascination of the painting rests in this non scientific construction 
of the space that, while giving the illusion of spatial engagement, also allows 
subjective interpretations where the fruition aspect of the work may be realised. 
Brunon69 refers to Michael Foucault' s Chapter 1 of the Order of things, published in 
France in 1966 and translated into English in 1970, as an important contribution to 
the study of the painting, for his own discussion of it. The explanation given by 
Foucault of the scene in the painting is that a framed mirror on the back wall 
represents a reflection of the king and queen posing for their portrait. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Brunon, B., Autoportraits, here's looking at me, catalogue of exhibition, Espace Lyonnais d'Art Contemporain Ville de Lyon, 29Jan- 30th Apr. 1993, p. 15. 
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[... ]what [the mirror] is reflecting is that which all the figures within the 
painting are looking at so fixedly [... ] the mirror holds in its glow the 
figures that the painter is looking at [... ] the two personages serving as 
model to the painter are not visible, at least directly, but we can see them 
in a mirror, and they are King Philip IV and his wife Mariana. 7° 
Brunon criticises Foucault' s interpretation by constructing diagrams showing the paradox 
of his theory. Brunon states that it is impossible that the royal couple stand in front of the 
painting generating the attributed reflection on the back wall of the composition. The 
mirror situated on the back wall of the painting is not positioned in the centre and does not 
represent the focus of the applied perspective. Brunon again suggests that the supposed 
reflection of the royal couple may well be in fact the portrait of the couple that Veläsquez 
painted around the same time. If this theory was right `if all the characters represented are 
facing a mirror, if the scene as it is in the painting were viewed in a mirrored wall, then it 
all makes ense [... ] and the painter enjoys the full view of the back wall reflected as well 
in the mirror providing a reversed image of the royal portrait. 
When I saw the painting at the Prado Museum in Madrid, the perception of the depicted 
space seemed to be the same in which, as the viewer, I was positioned. And then a closer 
look suggested adifferent perception of that space: although I was part of it, something not 
that easily explained kept me attracted to it The impression was that the painting really let 
me into its space, but not literally: this happened rather at a more conceptual level. 
70 Foucault, M., The Order of Things, New York, Vintage Books, Random House, 1970, p. 8.9 
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Jonathan Miller writes that ` Veläsquez developed the paradox of the reflection 
[which] in addition to the represented mirror he teasingly implies an un-represented 
one, without it is difficult to imagine how he could have shown himself painting the 
picture we now see, Las Meninas. For to reflect the appearance of the otherwise 
invisible self is one of the mirror's best functions'. 71 
Veläsquez, by setting this composition in front of a mirror, realised a self portrait: he looks 
straight ahead in the position that we occupy at the time of its fiuition. This particular 
painting, with the spatial illusional quality and the visual engagement of the viewer, 
synthesises two issues central to my thesis: on the one hand the Gaze, the look for the 
viewer engagement; on the other hand the reflection of the self as constituting a self 
portrait It is in their superimposition that viewer and artist meet on the painting surface. 
Steinberg sees the main effect of Las Meninas as creating an encounter `and as in any 
living encounter, any vital exchange, the work of art becomes the alternate pole in a 
situation of reciprocal self-recognition [... ]. [Confronted with the mirror] we are, 
polarised selves, reflecting one another's consciousness without end, partaking of an 
infinity that is not spatial but psychological, an infinity not cast in the outer world, 
but in the mind that knows and that knows itself known' 72 
H. 3. The represented and performative self in the history of art. 
Although instances of self representations have been recorded throughout Western 
Art history, starting in the fifth century BC when sculptor Phidias represented 
himself among the figures of the Battle of Amazons, I shall focus on a few 
71 Miller, J., On Reflection, National Gallery Publications Limited 1998, London, p. 12. 
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contemporary artists whose work has been inspirational for my own production and 
that I think is one relevant to my theoretical debate. 
The relationship with one's own reflection is a major factor for artists. To follow the 
desire of its investigation implies a discussion on the relationship of the represented 
image with oneself, but also with others. 
We may look more closely at this issue in terms of the artistic process. Two stages 
may be defined: one stage is the relation between artists and their own image, often 
taking place in a private context; the second stage is that of the presentation of the 
artist's self through the work, and it takes place in a public arena 
- 
in performance art 
the two are often simultaneous. The exposure of the image in a public arena suggests 
artists' intention to reduce the distance between artists' private and public persona, 
the distance between artist and viewer. 
I think that the distinction between action and photography within an artist's work 
(and also in my own practice research) presents two different stages of the creative 
process. Here the position of the artist, as well as the conditions for the perception of 
the work by the audience, change. I shall examine the context of these in what is 
often known as Body Art. I identify two moments: action, being carried on with (or 
without) an audience, within a context of an intention to be accomplished inside a set 
frame of time and space; photography (and video) documenting the action, 
illustrating the work as it happened becoming something different from it. Self- 
portrait photography, therefore, is here understood as representing the final result of 
the action/performance of relating to the artist's own reflected image. 
72 Steinberg, L., `Velasquez Las Meninas' in October 19, Winter 1981, p. 54. 
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A brief historical account73 will give a structure within which to locate the evolution 
of the concept of performance art and Body Art as a format for self-portraiture in the 
arts, to show how performance art developed as an hybrid art form within a broad 
range of art expressions and in relation to other art practices. 
H. 3.1. Historical references for performance and Body Art 
I take the origins of `live art' of the twentieth century to be found in the Futurist 
Movement, although their use of it was mainly for propaganda purposes. In 1909 
Marinetti's Futurist Manifesto was also published in Russia. There young poets and 
painters Burlyuk, Mayakovsky, Livshits and Khlebnikov also published their 
manifesto titled A slap in the face to public taste in 191274. Dada's performance 
activity began at the Cabaret Voltaire in Zurich in 1916 around the founders Emmy 
Hennings and Hugo Ball, although they had already been in contact in Munich, 
where Tzara, Arp, Kandinsky and many others met and worked. 
The development of performance in the Twenties in Germany was due largely to the 
pioneering work of Oskar Schlemmer at the Bauhaus. 75 Oskar Schlemmer, took over the 
stage workshop from Lothar Schreyerm, presenting his programme in The Figural 
Cabinet I, which reflected the Bauhaus spirit. His refusal to accept he limits of art 
categories resulted in performances becoming a major focus of Bauhaus activities. 
Schlemmer's theory of performance was a unique contribution to the Bauhaus and was 
based on the relation between theory and practice. Moholy-Nagy worked at the Bauhaus 
73 Some of the following historical references are found in Goldberg, R., Performance Art From Futurism to the Present, first published 1988, reprinted Singapore, 1999. 74 As illustrated in Goldberg's account, p. 31. 
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for five years and the concept of a the total work of art that he based his work on, refers 
back to the Richard Wagner's concept of the Gesamtkunstwerk. 76 The early Bauhaus was 
also marked by this idea, and the Bauhütten was more than anything else the invocation of 
a romantically transfigured holistic synthesis of artistic production and social life. 77 
Performance in the US began to emerge in the thirties, with the arrival of European artists 
fleeing from the rising national socialist regime, to become a recognised practice after 
1945. Black Mountain College directed by John Rice, including Josef and Anni Albers, 
John Cage, and Merce Cunningham, was the centre of attraction for artists, writers, 
playwrights, dancers and musicians. Cage's extention of the basis of music to include 
sources of sound beyoud conventional musical instruments influenced younger artists and 
particularly dance performance by Cunningham78 
Cage began to teach at the New School of Social Research in New York in 1956 where 
amongst the students, Allan Kaprow considered environments as spatial representations 
of a multileveled attitude to painting. Claes Oldenburg's production extended from 
sculpture to performances and Jim Dine saw performances as an extension of the 
everyday life. Kaprow's 18 Happenings in 6 Parts at the Reuben Gallery in New York 
in 1959 was one of the earliest opportunities for a wider public to attend the live events 
that artists had performed more privately. The general term, happenings, used to include 
a range of art performances including various artists, often connected to the fluxus 
"where, among others, Paul Klee, Ida Kerkovius, Johannes Itten, Gunta Stölzl, Wassily Kandinsky, Lyonel 
Feininger, Alma Buscher, Laszlo Moholy-Nagy were working. 76 Richard Wagner wished to regenerate his Fatherland, after 1848 revolution, at his Bayreuth Festival by means 
of an aesthetic myth which combined words, music, architecture in an artistic synthesis. Though he was from then target of mordant criticism by Friedrich Nietzsche because of his incipient sanctimoniousness, Wagner's total 
work of art became a paradigm for modernism in general. The most diverse tendencies within the avant-garde 
were united, aesthetically, philosophically and politically, by the desire to spearhead a social, national, political 
regeneration with a new image of the whole of society as a unified total work of art. n Fiedler, J., Feierabend, P., Bauhaar, K6nemami, Cologne, 1999, Cxrnany, p. 302. Mcholy's `total artwork' raunot, however, be simply equated with Wagner's Gesamth. mrzwerk, the ultimate implications of which led to the total 
aestix icization of politics, as described by Walter Benjamin On the contrary, Mcholy wished to dissociate himself rom such illusion of universal regeneration. He saw the aesdietics as a source of the solution to the social problems. 
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movement. Figures such as Names Dick Higgins, Bob Watts, Al Hansen, George 
Macunias, Jackson MacLow, Richard Maxfield, Yoko Ono, La Monte Young, Alison 
Knowles, at the Cafe A Gogo, all contributed to the development of concepts that linked 
space, time, music, film and performance into a less ` bounded' form of art that now 
represents the basis of contemporary performance, Body Art and installation art 
. 
'' 
II. 3.2. A new awareness of the perception of the body: Body Art. 
Henry Sayre suggests that Body Art can be seen as a way of understanding 
portraiture in its theatricali: ation of the seit'. Whilst Amelia Jones distinguishes 
Body Art from performance on the basis of theatricality. In relation to this concept 
and some of its implications in my own work, after the having performed AIorning 
Toilette, Video Live Installation at Tate Modern, I wrote: 
[... ] My own experience as performer was such that I decided 
that I will not perform for a while. This was also what I 
said to the audience soon after I finished. The reason is 
because I did not feel comfortable in that environment, but 
most of all because I felt I was lying to my self and to 
the audience because I was acting. 
Performance to me is a symbolic and cathartic action which 
can be read at different levels, but the result of which 
depends on its genuinety... The artist has the 
responsibility to give an image that the audience can 
reflect into with their own experience. 
Although it can be argued that art is representation and, 
in that sense any action repeated in front of an audience 
7' Goldberg, R.. Pe rförmance Art l"'rom Fiantris"m to the Present, first published 1988, reprinted Singapore. 19'$), pp. 123-126. 
79 The common denominator of these events was New York City: its downtown lotis, alternative galleries, cafes and 
bars that housed the performers of the early sixties. In Europe Robert Filiou, Ben Vautier, Daniel Spoerri, Ben Patterson, 
Joseph Beuys, Emmett Williams, Nam June Pailc, Tomas Schmit, Wolf Vostell and Jean-Jacques Lebel. More festival 
programmes were organised throughout New York, from Central Park to 09th street Armory were performances by 
Cage, Rauschenberg and Whitman were held. Dancers like Simon Forti, Yvonne Rainier, Trisha Brown, Lucinda 
Childs, Steve Paxton, David Gordon, Barbara Loyd and Deborah Hay found in the art world a more responsi%e 
audience and interesting ground to be included in their approaches. Concerns such as body and space \%ere shared by 
dancers and visual artists. The view of dance as a way of life had its historical origin in Isadora Duncan and Rudolf von 
Laban, thread picked up by Ann Halprin in 1955 with a company formed just outside Chicago. Collaborators were 
dancers Trisha Brown, Simone Forti, Yvonne Rainier and Ste%e Paxton and musicians Terry Riley, La Monte Young. 
Warner Jepson. By 1963, many artists involved in live events were participating in the Judson Dance Group concerts. Simone Forti worked for many years with Robert Morris. Moms created performances as an expression ot'his interest in the ` body in motion' (e. g. Site l%X>5). R0 Literature on the matter: Willoughby Sharp. 'Body Works' Avalanche, n. I (Fall 1970), pp 14-17, Cindy Nemser, 
'Subject-Object Body Art' Arts magazine 46" nI (September- October 1971), pp 38-42, Lea Vergine Ii corpo come 
lingua, glo (La body Art e storie simili), Milan, Gianpaolo Prearo Editore 1974, Francois Pluchart. Y. 'art ('orporel ', 
Paris, Galerie Stadler 1974, Ira Licht, ' Bodyworks' in Bodyworkc, Chicago, Museum of Contemplorarv Art, 1975. x' As can be found in Henry Sayre chapter I 'The Rhetoric of the Pose: Photography and the Portrait as Performance', in The Object o/Performance, The American Advani-Garde Since 1970, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1989. 
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cannot be the spontaneous action of the everyday life but, 
as much as in a ready made, the artistic context or simply 
the intention of the artist to express him/herself in a 
particular context makes the action become an artistic 
action. 
My everyday own experience of washing the face and putting 
make up on is usually performed at home, and the piece 
morning toilette DVD installation is composed by a 
collection of the shots of those intimate events where I am 
both the audience and the performer in front of the 
camera's reversed screen. 
I do not act, it is myself. By the fact that I am 
recording, I am more focused on what I am actually doing. 
The repetition of a performance so far has always been a 
different experience for me who was interacting with a 
different environment or audience, but while performing I 
was also detaching myself from the environment and getting 
in touch with my inner side. As a consequence, the 
performance worked to me because I felt that it had an 
effect on myself and therefore the audience[... ]' 
82 
According to Amelia Jones, Body Art asks us to interrogate not only the politics of 
visuality but also the very structures through which the subject takes place through the 
inevitably eroticised exchange of interpretation. 113 She argues that to a certain extent the 
coincident movements of minimalism and conceptualism engaged in similar questions of 
the relationship between the body and the thought, the object and the space it inhabits. 
Roger Marcel Mayou writes in the essay Portrait of'7he Artist as a work (? I 'Art, 
Body Art or Permanence and Continuity in Self- Portrait: 
Body art is the culminating point in the relationship between the artist 
and his work; the union of the two to form-a-single whole. The artist 
does not introduce himself into a created work, he is art, and his 
personality is no longer subjected to passive treatment, it is shown as 
real. 
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In his view, Body Art is a pure humanistic movement that at this level does not represent a 
break with tradition, but on the contrary, expresses all the psychological aspects implied in 
it through an explosion of the self. Furthermore: ' [... ]because they insist on the 
immediacy of the "making", body artists have removed what separated them and the 
spectator and created an immediate visual relationship with their audience. A4 
In historical terms, the period of the late 1960s and early 1970s was the most 
productive moment in the history of Body Art. Body artists participated in this 
dislocation of normative subjectivity, reconfiguring identity politics and the very 
parameters of subjectivity itself. 
In Europe artists like Yves Klein, Piero Manzoni, and Joseph Beuys additionally felt 
responsible for raising political issues in discussion. In Milan Piero Manzoni 
believed that it was necessary to reveal the process of art to demystify pictorial 
sensibility. His work is centred on the everyday reality of his own body as an 
expression of personality. 
Many artists of this period questioned the accepted premises of art and attempted to 
re-define its meaning and function. Moreover, a number of artists took it upon 
themselves to express these new directions in lengthy texts, rather than leave that 
responsibility to the art critic. The gallery was attacked as an institution of 
commercialism and other outlets were sought for communicating ideas to the public. 
Performance was an expression of the concept that art should not be sold and was 
82 From my diary 10th April 2001 83 Jones, A., Body Art, Performing the Subject, University of Minnesota Press, 1998, p. 23. 84 Mayou, R. M., `Portrait of The Artist as a work of Art, Body Art or Permanence and Continuity in Self- Portrait', in Billiter, E., Self-Portrait in the Age of Photography, Photographers reflecting their own image 
catalogue of Exhibition Musee Cantonal des Beaux-Arts Lausanne Benteli Verlag Bern, 1985, p. 20 
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also seen as reducing the element of alienation between performer and viewer, since 
both audience and performer experienced the work simultaneously. 
The involvement of the viewer was also actuated by a strategy which relied on the 
presence of the artist in public as interlocutor to the viewer. Some artists gave 
instruction to the viewers, suggesting that they enact the performances themselves. 
Some early conceptual actions were more written instructions than actual 
performance, as proposals for the reader to perform or not. Audiences were provoked 
questioning the boundaries of art. 
Amelia Jones, in her book Body Art, Performing the Subject, explores the ways in which 
Body Art radically negotiates the structures of interpretation that inform our 
understanding of visual culture, as well as an exploration of Body Art as a profound shift 
in the conception and experience of subjectivity. She refers to artists Caroleen 
Schneemann and Yayoi Kusama and writes that their projects `make clear that the 
Cartesian `7 think therefore 1 am " [... ] is transcended through pure thought or creation, 
is no longer viable in the decentering regime of postmodernism [... ]'. 85 Jones turns to 
Body Art and phenomenologically inflected feminist post-structuralism (Merleau-Ponty 
as read by Simone de Beauvoir, Judith Butler) to re-embody the subject of making and 
viewing art, she returns to the phenomenological bases of poststructuralism. Jones does 
not see poststructuralism as having caused the death of the centered subject nor as being 
any of its effects, but as a dynamic mode of speaking of a new experience of 
subjectivity. In her view `Body art is one of the most dramatic and thorough cultural 
productions to initiate the dispersal of the modernist subject. ' 
25 Jones, A., Body Art, Performing the Subject, University of Minnesota Press, 1988, p. 10. 
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M. 3.3. Presence, absence, documentation 
According to Amelia Jones, works by Kusama, Schneeman, Vito Acconci, Yves Klein, 
Hannah Wilke, which `take place through the enactment of the artist's body', are 
documented to be experienced subsequently through photography, film, video and text. 86 
In my own work, the live event (in a public or private context) is just the starting point for 
a number of different ways of presenting the work. To see the presentation of the 
documentation as part of the work, is to rethink the meaning of the work in order to add a 
new understanding to it. In many cases Body Art mutated into either performative 
photographic work, such as the film stills of Cindy Sherman, or large-scale semi-narrative 
performance, such as Laurie Anderson's theatrical United States. 
Amelia Jones introduces Laurie Anderson's practice by illustrating her decision to 
document her work. Jones explains that in 1975 Anderson was invited to give a 
performance in conjunction with the Bodyworks exhibition at the Museum of 
Contemporary Art in Chicago. She noted at the time that she was struck by the term 
Body Art although the show, as she wrote `consisted of pieces of paper on a wall, 
photographs, notes, tapes. Artists putting their bodies on the line, on the shelf, 
dressing in drag, assuming alter egos, putting themselves through various exercises, 
contortions, exorcisms. 
... 
But in fact, no bodies were there. Only paper %87 
Debunking the myth of presence circulating around Body Art at the time, Anderson's 
comments suggest hat the body is both insistently ` there' and always absent (never 
knowable through vision). Anderson who was initially strongly opposed to 
documenting her own work in photographs, film, or video, wanting to avoid the 
86 Jones op. cit., p. 13, her italic. 87 Anderson, L. `What is body Art? ' from `Confessions of a Street Talker' 1975, reprinted in Anderson, L., 
`Stories from the Nerve Bible: a retrospective 1972-1992, Harper Collins, New York, 1994, p. 109, collection of 
writings and performance documentation, in Jones op. cit., p. 32. 
60 
appropriation and commodification of her work, subsequently realised that ` people 
[don't] remember them very well'. 88 The assumption that Body Art or a performance 
event is only `real' once, or that it remains itself only through the memories of 
people who were present during its live performance, is undermined by Anderson's 
own experience of having people ask her about elements of performances she never 
did, or never remembered doing. Anderson thus claims that she began documenting 
her performances to ensure their accurate existence in history. 
Jones suggests that most early accounts of these practices made heroic claims for 
Body Art's status as the only art form to guarantee the presence of the artist. 89 
Art historian Kathy O'Dell90 has argued that, precisely by using their bodies as 
primary material, body and performance artists highlight the `representational status' 
of such work rather than confirming its ontological priority. The representational 
aspects of this work 
- 
its ` play within the arena of the symbolic' and as Jones argues 
`its dependence on documentation to attain symbolic status within the realm of 
culture'91- expose the impossibility of attaining knowledge of the self through bodily 
proximity. Body Art, shows that the body can never be known `purely' as a totalisable, 
fleshy whole that rests outside of the arena of the symbolic. 92 
go ibid. 
89Jones explains that, thus, in the catalogue for the 1975 Chicago Bodyworks exhibition, Ira Licht tproclaims that bodyworks go away with the ` intermediary' mediums of painting and sculpture to `deliver 
... 
information directly 
through transformation. ' And, also in the 1970's, Rosemary Mayer claimed Body Art to be a direct reflection of 
the artist's life experiences, while Cindy Nemser described the ` primary goal of body art' as `the desire to bring 
the subjective and objective self together as a totally integrated entity', which is then directly projected to the 
audience. In 1982, Chantal Pontbriand privileged performance by arguing that it `presents; it does not re-present'. Rosemary Mayer, ` Performance and Experience', Arts Magazine 47, n. 3, Dec 1972-Jan 1973, pp 33-36. Cindy Nemser, ` Subject-object Body Art', Arts Magazine 46, n. 1, Sept-Oct 1971, p. 42. Chantal Pontbriand, `The eye Finds No Fixed Pointon Which to Rest', Modern Drama 25,1982. Jones. A., op. cit. p. 33. 90 Kathy O'Dell, Toward a Theory of Performance Art, An investigation of Its Sites, thesis, City University of New York, 1992, as referred to by Amelia Jones, in the opus cited, p. 248. 91 Jones, op. cit., p. 33. 92 `Having direct physical contact with an artist who pulls a scroll from her vaginal canal does not ensure 
"knowledge" of her (as individual and/or artist and/or work of art) any more than does looking at a film or picture of this activity, or looking at a painting that was made as a result of such an action. ' Jones states, in op. 
cit. p. 34. 
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Jones states that Body Art tells us that the self is inexorably embodied, and yet she 
argues that the works suggest that this does not mean that the performed body/self is ever 
completely legible or fixed in its effects. `Body art, through its very performativity and 
its unveiling of the body of the artist, surfaces the insufficiency and incoherence of the 
body/self (or the body-as-subject) and its inability to deliver itself fully (whether to the 
subject-in-performance herself or himself or to the one who engages with this body). '93 
Jones explains94 that the unique body of the artist in the Body Art work has 
meaning by virtue of its contextualization within the codes of identity that accrue to 
the name/body. Thus, this body is not self-contained in its meaningfulness; it is a 
body/self, relying not only on an authorial context of `signature' but also on a 
receptive context in which the interpreter or viewer may interact with it. This context 
is precisely the point at which the body becomes a `subject'. 95 In Jones view, 
documents of the body-in-performance are just as easily contingent in that the 
meaning that accrues to the image of the body is open-ended and dependent on the 
ways in which the image is contextualized and interpreted. Seemingly acting as a 
`supplement' to the ` actual' body of the artist in performance, the photograph of the 
Body Art event or performance could in fact, be said to expose the body itself as 
supplementary, as both the visible proof of the self and its endless deferral. 
Jones argues that the sequence of supplements initiated by the Body Art project 
- 
the 
body 'itself', the spoken narrative, video, and other visuals within the piece, the 
video, film, photograph, and text documenting it for posterity 
- 
announces the 
93 Ibid., p. 34. Op cit., chapter I, pp. 33-37. 95 Live performance, in fact, makes the intersubjectivity of the interpretative exchange even more pronounced and 
obvious since the body's actions can be interfered with and realigned according to other bodies/subjects. 
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necessity of `an infinite chain, ineluctably multiplying the supplementary mediations 
that produce the sense of the very thing they defer: the mirage of the thing itself, of 
immediate presence, or originary perception. Derrida notes that `the indefinite 
process of supplementarity has always already infiltrated presence, always already 
inscribed there the space of repetition and the splitting of the se1F. 6 
The relationship between issues of presence and representation addressed in my pieces 
through the use of documentation is also imbedded in my own production methodology. 
Particularly, the synchronic way of working in different media (photographic, video, live) 
has led me to conceive a form of presentation of my work, which contains them all 
simultaneously. The type of format of work that I define as video live installation97 includes 
the elements of performativity (that because of its nature gives the character of the 
temporary every time the piece is performed); the involvement of the audience because their 
presence complete its meaning, the question of the relation between the real and the 
representation in the present time, from the viewpoint of the audience, of the piece's 
apprehension and from my own, of its delivery. The most significant point is that the 
documentation of the event is produced during the event itself, becoming part of it, and this 
process is therefore witnessed by the audience. It is precisely by witnessing the production 
process that the audience participate, and at this stage the chiasmatic intertwining 
takes place in the phenomenological and conceptual space of the event. In the pieces 
BluX, Morning Toilette performance, and Public Private Perceptions 02 the physical 
% In Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl 's Theory of Signs, Derrida explicitly examines why 
the body must be excluded from determinations of meaning within the idealistic regime of signification and Cartesian subjectivity posited in Western metaphysics. The impure and supplementary body must be opposed to the soul, where the will is lodged and meaning is generated: 'Visibility and spatiality as such could only destroy the self-presence of will and spiritual animation which opens up discourse. They are literally the death of that 
self-presence' Derrida's insight explains the equivocal position of the body in modernist and postmodernist art discourse. Within the modernist logic of formalism, the body of the artist-in its impurity-must be veiled, its 
supplementarity hidden from view. The formalist insists upon the "disinterestedness" of his interpretations, and 
such disinterestedness i  predicated upon a pure relation between the art object and its supposedly inherent 
meaning. The supplementarity of the body corrupts this logic. Derrida, J., ' That Dangerous Supplement, ' in Of Grammatology, tr Gayatri Spivak, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 163. 97 Used for the pieces illustrated: B1uX, Morning Toilette performance, Public Private Perceptions. 
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presence of myself performing is mirrored by the video represented image (live recording of 
the action); in this way my own body presence is never understood unless a re-presented 
image is also simultaneously there to shift the attention towards the symbolic. 
Thus the multiplied represented image of myself in the video live installation format, as 
well as the production of the subsequent resulting artistic outcomes (video documentation, 
video stills or text), are all based on conceptual compositions of the ontology of the 
mirrored image, which is projected and repeated. In this sense the enactment of the self in 
Body Art generating the supplementary representations of the self and encompassing time 
and movement, not only contributes to, but also reinforces the questioning of the 
ocularcentric discourse posed by the mirrored self in self-portraiture. 
Particularly in Body Art works, the meaning emerges in between the split and 
multiplied selves, thus taking away the attention from a united and fixed self. 
II. 3.4. Enactment of the self through mirror photographic media 
For my research, Body Art represents the starting point of a creative process based on a 
symbolic and conceptual ction, and where it exists, the documentation becomes a work 
of art itself. Roger Marcel Mayou states that for many of the Body Artists in the 
production process `the photograph is the work of art itself and unites all the semantic 
aspects of an action undertaken to produce it. The photograph is a print which, apart 
from presenting apermanent record, has no `raison d'etre... This is where the self- 
portrait takes on its full meaning'. 98 
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Or, I may say, takes away the meaning of the action to generate a new one. Butler 
writes that to photograph oneself is unavoidably something of a schizoid 
undertaking. For it implicitly acknowledges the division, the difference between 
one's own self-perception and an external self perceived by others. This brings into 
play the consciousness of self as other 
- 
not I, not first person, but second or even 
third- he/she, appearing as an element in the visual and perceptual field of others, 
displaced from the centre of the universe amidst their myriad of glances. In her view, 
as an instrument of observation controlled by someone else, the camera reproduces 
the looks of others upon us, congealing in the photograph the impression of an instant, 
translating it into varying contexts of identity. But when the person photographed also 
controls the camera, converting it into an instrument of self-projection, there is the means 
of creating an image that represents the self in its own terms, as it would be seen, as it 
would affect others. `And if the photographer is a woman 
- 
customarily the object of male 
look, and especially so in the realm of photographic looking, from fine art through to 
pornography 
- 
than the implications of this relation through the camera of self to self and to 
the outside world are redoubled [... )'. Butler states that for a woman to use the camera is a 
kind of theft of this power, `an assertion of the right to value her own capacities of 
observation and judgement, rather than simply sustain someone lse's exercise of these 
functions [... ] shift in her thinking, to conceive of how she looks more nearly in the senses of 
how she sees rather than of how she appears [... ]'. 99 She concludes by writing that the 
woman photographs herself in a position to marshal all the resources of self-presentation 
(dress, setting, pose) and to ally them with the ` power of active looking to create 
images that put into question the dominant conventions of both'. 100 
98 Mayou, K M., `Portait of the artist as a work of art' in SelfPortrait in the age ofphotography, Photographers Reflecting their own Image, p. 15 
"Butler, S., `How do I look, Women Before and Behind the Camera', Staging the Sell, SelfPortrait Photography 1840s-1980s, catalogue of Exhibition National Portrait Gallery, 3 Oct 1986-11 Jan 1987op. cit, p. S 1. 100 Ibid. 
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figure 15. Florence Henry, Self porfruu 
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Florence Henry' s self-portraits (Self portrait 1928 in fig. 15) ` fully embrace and assert 
the conscious role of looking'. Rosalind Krauss has recently suggested the phallic 
symbolism of her use of the narrow, upright mirror in her self-portrait of 1928: 
Gazing at herself in the mirror she fills this ` male' space of looking with both 
her on looking and her reflection, with both traditionally male and female 
roles, with observing as well as posing the two metal balls balanced against 
the edge of the mirror may be seen as completing the male symbolism, but 
equally they might be a female sign counterpoised 
- 
in any case they are 
reflected, redoubled in appearance and perhaps in meaning as well. 101 
Krauss describes the composition as pristine and highly geometric and she argues 
that the machine-made objects reflect Florence Henri's affinity with the Bauhaus 
aesthetic of Moholy-Nagy, with whom she had studied. `Through an abstract 
symbolism she manages to allude to the body without picturing it. 'lo2 
Katy Kline gives a precise account of the difference in the representation of the self 
by Claude Cahun and Cindy Sherman, particularly due to Cahun' s startling 
Autoportraits, lost to view for several decades, which came to light in the late 1980s. 
In her view the audacity of these unusual personae led a number of critics to classify 
them as prescient harbingers of the staged self-representations of Cindy Sherman. 
The two women both created a large body of photographic work in which they 
functioned as both subject and object, staging affective scenarios with scrupulous 
attention to pose, lighting, costume and backdrop. 
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Although Kline notices that the scale used by the artists is just one difference 
amongst others between their works: `After all, Cahun' s spare and concentrated 
black-and-white statements are surprisingly intimate, often the size of a page from a 
personal diary. Sherman's exaggerated size, colour, and theatricality, on the other 
hand, align themselves with the ambitious reach of painting. ' 103 
Her essay looks closely at Cahun's work, selecting singular and representative images to 
evaluate both in the context of their historic moment and in relation to some of Sherman' 
s later images. I here refer particularly to the 1928 Self-portrait by Cahun and Untitled 
Film Still, #2 by Sherman, where the theme of the mirror is more explicitly engaged. 
As Kline discusses, in the essay In or out of the picture Claude Cahun and Cindy 
Sherman, 1920s Cahun producted an astonishing number of self-portraits in various 
guises. She describes that the figure generally occupies a good deal of the frame, 
with background details and stage props kept to a minimum, compressing an 
enormous psychological weight and affect into the figure. In these photographs she 
presents herself as coquette, body builder, skinhead, vamp and vampire, angel, and 
Japanese puppet. She reworked most of these images several times, playing with 
slight variations in size, focus and point of view. `Her many female variations make 
no attempt to seduce. She both parodies flirtatiousness and ridiculously exaggerates 
the facial makeup of a vamp (emblazoning "Do Not Kiss Me: I Am in Training" on 
her chest). 
101 Butler, S., op. cit., p. 54, the reference included by the author is to Krauss, R, `The photographic conditions of Surrealism', October 19, Winter 1981, pp 3-6. 1°Z Ibid. 
103 Kline, K., `In or out of the picture Claude Cahun and Cindy Sherman' in Chadwick, W., Mirror Images, Women, Surrealism, and Self-representation, MIT Press 1998, p. 67. 
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figure 16. Claude Cahun Autoportrau 
(Self-Portrait), 1928 
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Ihlll c 
Untitled 1'11m stillt # 2,1977 
She also puts herself forward as a variety of male types. ' In Kline's view, these early 
figures refuse to play to any preconceived relation of subject to viewer and return the 
viewer's inspection with an uncompromising, even confrontational, gaze. 
She also states that, though the mask is generally considered a tool of evasion or 
concealment, Cahun's many masks and manoeuvres reflect rather than deflect, here 
the artist and the individual are present within each disguise, any one of which 
represents an aspect of an extraordinarily complex self. `It is in their degree of 
participation in, or removal from, the world that Cahun and Sherman will be seen to 
diverge. ' 04 `Cahun's Autoportrait of 1928, a three-quarter-length view of the artist in 
a masculine tailored jacket standing close before, and reflected in, a mirror. The artist 
depicts herself as startled and slightly uneasy; she clutches the geometrically 
patterned, costume close around her neck as if in response to a sudden draft. '105 In 
Kline's view, the mirror almost reads as a window onto some external plane. `The 
"real" figure registers the presence of the viewer and does not flinch from eye 
contact. Her other half, the mirror image, however, averts her eyes gazing glassily 
into the unknown. The brittle gleam of the glass refracted onto the faces cranks up 
the emotional pitch. ' Kline describes the presence of the viewer in the piece: `The 
two [mirrored] faces register a shock; they have been interrupted by some intrusion 
from the outside world in the midst of a private exchange'. 106 
Kline then compares the Cahun portrait with Cindy Sherman's Untitled Film Still #2 
in which the artist is seen in a narrow three-quarter view reflected in a steamy 
bathroom mirror. She notices that her nubile body occupies the prominent 
foreground of the picture plane, but all attention, is riveted upon the closed circle of 
1°4 Kline, op cit., p. 68. 105 lbid 
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eyes engaged in the mirror. Although also apparently surprised in the act, this water 
nymph has eyes only for herself. In her view, the viewer/voyeur representing the 
outside world is effectively closed out of the self-absorbed conversation. 
Rosalind Krauss focuses her observation on the relationship with the viewer and she 
writes about it in Untitled Film Still, #2 of 1977: 
[... ] Sherman sets up the sign of the unseen intruder. A young woman 
draped in a towel stands before her bathroom mirror, touching her 
shoulder and following her own gesture in its reflected image. A door 
jam to the left of the frame places the viewer outside this room. But what 
if the viewer is constructed as a hidden watcher by means of the signifier 
that reads as graininess, a diffusion of the image that constructs the 
signified 
- 
the concept of distance 
-a severing of the psychic space of 
the watcher from that of the watched and of the camera's concomitant 
construction of the watcher for whom it is proxy. 107 
Krauss discusses the same issue in Untitled Film Still #81 of 1978 (fig. 18). She finds a 
remarkably sharp depth of field, which causes a sensation that she expresses by `such/ 
distance/is gone', despite the fact that doorways are once again an obtrusive part of the 
image. This would imply that the viewer would Gaze at the woman from outside the space 
she occupies. Krauss writes that also here the woman appears to be in a bathroom and once 
again she is scantily dressed, wearing only a thin night gown. Yet, in her view, the 
continuity established by the focal length of the lens creates an unimpeachable s nse that 
her look at herself in the mirror reaches past her reflection to include the viewer as well. 
106 Op cit., p. 68. 
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107 Krauss, R., Cindy Sherman 1975 
- 
1993, Rizzoli Internationals Publications, Inc., New York 1993, p. 55. 
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She suggests that, as opposed to the idea of distance, there is here ` the 
signified/connection, and what is further cut out as the signified at the level of 
narrative is a woman chatting to someone [... ] in the room outside her bathroom as 
she is preparing for bed'. 108 Kline points out that both Cahun and Sherman predicate 
their elaborate mice-en-scenes onthe notion of unstable subject, but whereas Sherman posits 
multiple roles, Cahun posits multiple selves, and that Cahun' s surrealism was defined by the 
unknowable at the bottom of her own reality. 109 
Another series of work by Cahun is the photomontage as in Avenux non avenus (1930) (f. 
19). `Cahun photomontages are frequently elaborations on her own photographic self- 
portraits. In one photomontage from Avenuz non avenur, Cahun includes among the self- 
portraits a column of overlapping heads showing only eyes or mouths, with the inscription: 
Under this mask, another mask. I shall never finish stripping away all these faces. '1 10 
The multiple self discussed above is just one of the issues arising from embracing 
concepts of reflection and wirroring. My own concern with the discussion of 
enactment of the self through self-portraiture and the use of mirrors is here discussed 
through a revision of various artists's strategies. My understanding is that the mirror 
idea was used in conceptual art and performance art ontologically and concerned the 
ideology of representation. This use shifted the attention from the object to the 
condition of artistic production, to its presentation and perception and also in this has 
contributed to the erosion of the ocularcentrism. 
108 Krauss, R, op. cit., p. 55. 109 Kline, op. cit., p. 79. 11oAdes, D., ` Surrealism, male-female', in Surrealism, Desire Unbound, edited Mundy, J., catalogue of exhibition 
at Tate Modern, London 20 Sept-1 Jan, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 6 Feb-12 May 2002, Tate Publishing 2001, p. 194. 
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Bruce Nauman, Dan Graham, Vito Acconci, are some of the artists who directly 
inspired my own artistic production in terms of strategies, content or composition. 
Their work is investigated, among that of others, by Jaroslav Andel in the catalogue 
A travers le miroir de Bonnard ä Buren for the exhibition at the Musee des Beau- 
Arts de Rouen (October 2000-January 2001). In his view self-reference, symbolising 
the theme of an image within an image, is expressed by artists also through the 
concept of reflection and the juxtaposition of mirrors and windows. 111 
Bruce Nauman, worked in San Francisco between 1965-1966, at the time he stated 
that anything done in the studio is art. The simple quotidian gestures were recorded in the form 
of video, photography, holograms. More than an object he produced an activity. The portfolio 
Eleven colour Photographs (1966-1967) was realised after the retrospective of Man Ray in 
Los Angeles in 1966. He produced anumber of self-portraits documenting a plurality of forms 
including performance, writings amongst them Self-portrait as a Fountain, Finger Touch n° 1 
and Finger touch with mirrors (f. 20). These last two pieces provoke a spatial ambiguity by 
using the mirror and photographic space. 
In the sequences of Art Make-up nos 1,2,3 and 4 (1967-1968) (f. 21), a form of self- 
portrait, where he was facing the camera-mirror, Nauman covered his face and body 
with colour 
- 
white, pink, green. 112 1 relate my activity of applying make up in my 
own piece Morning Toilette, later discussed, to Nauman's and understood how 
different his approach was towards the same activity. In his piece the make up does 
not constitute the mask, instead the flat screen constitutes the mask. In this piece 
thus, the screen's flatness has cancelled subjectivity. 
111 Andel, J., ` Miroir et autoreflextion' in Ä travers le miroir de Bonnard d Buren, Editions de la Reunion des Musees Nationaux, Paris, 2000, p. 85-86 (my translation from French). 112 As discussed by `Miroir et autore lextion' in `Ä travers le miroir de Bonnard d Buren', Editions de la Reunion des musees nationaux, Paris, 2000, p. 226. 
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figure 2U. Bruce Nauman, Seil-Portrait as u fold II ,t:: aIiki I IiI iIII tit itItit iltlrI(tfs, i `iii, 
ligure 21..,..,.. , r'.! ý1.2,3,4 (I46'-6ti) 
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Bruce Nauman says that the film `[... ] which was also later a videotape 
- 
has a rather 
simple story behind it. About 20 years ago 
- 
this was in'66 and '67 
-I was living in San 
Francisco [... ]'. Nauman describes the process of production of the piece: `Of course, 
you put on makeup before you film in the movies. In my case, putting on the makeup 
became the activity. I started with four colours. I just put one on over the other, so that 
by the time the last one went on it was almost black. I started with white. Then red on the 
white, which came out pink; then green on top of that, which came out grey; then 
something very black on top of that'. He states that while making the film, he noticed 
that when one takes a solid colour of makeup it flattens the image of the face on film. In 
his view The flatness itself was another kind of mask'. '" 
II. 4. The mirror experience through the observation of the shifting 
position of the artist as viewer in the creative process 
This section traces the process of my practical experiments and presentations 
. 
It 
includes a number of diary descriptions and diagrams, some of which were done at 
the time of production and some subsequently as analytical tools. 
On the relationship between artist and camera in self-portraiture, Chadwick states: 
The self-portrait turns on the staging of the self (the model) for the self (the 
artist) [... ] while the image itself remains fixed, a complex of looks 
- 
those of 
the artist, the camera. The image the spectator 
- 
produces multiple subject 
positions, and distinction between the seer and the seen, subject of the gaze and 
object of it, artist and model, begin to break down [... ]. Photographic mise en 
13 Bruce Nauman, exhibition catalogue, Hayward Gallery, London, 16 July- 6 September 1998, the South Bank Centre, 1998, p. 111. 
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scene, the staging of a scene for the camera, encourages the production of 
intricate fictions, diverse selves, dramas of fantasy and desire ["""]"h14 
In my practical understanding of self-portraiture, the position of the artist in relationship to 
the represented image, functions like a mirror surface. The following account is an attempt to 
analyse the process involved in the shift of the position of the artist in relation to the viewer, 
in both the moments of making and perceiving the work, and in the light of the above 
discussion concerning the perceptual and psychological implications of the concept of the 
mirror. This is to be linked to the idea of mirrored space of representation in the tradition of 
perspective in painting, particularly to the concepts often implied of the spectators' 
perceptual involvement 
One common element in self-portraiture in works of different media whether painting, 
photography, video or performance, is the artists' desire to explore their own perception of 
themselves by portraying their own image. All self-portraits have psychological implications 
brought about by the coinciding roles of artist, viewer and model. In my work, this 
relationship is transitional: the audience represents an `open end' in the work, to which their 
presence is complementary. This relationship will be described and referred to as a spatial 
one. Here the physical space is the arena where the relationship takes place in the creative 
process, and also the symbolic space where the psychological roles are played. 
At the start of the research I assumed that a portrait made through photographic media 
would achieve the mirror-like result and, in a way, would leave less space for the 
subjective element. In fact, when engaged with taking photographs of myself, I 
experienced how I could shape the result through the medium. 
114 Chadwick, W., `How do I look? ', in Ridel, L., MirrorMirror, Self-portraits by Women Artists, catalogue for 
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figure 22. Myme series, detail 1999 
figure 23,2(K)I 
ý ý' 
the exhibition at the National Portrait Gallery from 24 October 2001 to 24 February 2002, National Portrait 
Gallery Publications 2001, p. 14. 
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1. My image is reflected 
2I recogn iae It, I see it refleceted 
Through various experiments, I realised that factors such as use a timer or not, the 
type of camera, the arrangement of lighting, the spatial context, my own mood and 
thoughts, all affected the outcome and meaning of the work. From these experiments 
I finally selected a small number of photographs, five of which constitute the Myme 
(fig. 22) series (January 1999). 
In Myme the intention behind the action of taking a photograph of my body was to 
gain control over its representation and re-establish freedom from the other's Gaze. I found 
that when another person took the photos, as subject of the photographs, I would respond 
to the person taking the picture and become the ` object' of that person's Gaze. That person 
automatically took a position of power over me. On the contrary, when I used the timer, 
no-one else's Gaze was involved in the process, and so the photographs how the result of 
the relation between myself and the camera. There was no `power game' involved and I 
felt I had re-gained control over my own image. 
Of course, in the practice I was aware that the spectator's Gaze was already, in a sense 
implicit in the act of photography. But in my view, by not sharing the same space and time 
with the spectator, I keep a distance. They remain outside what I consider my private and 
creative space. 
Susan Sontag discusses the ` power to kill' that the act of making a picture involves. She 
says that is like taking life away from the subject, to become something different as subject 
in the photographic medium. She also discusses how the act of photographing someone 
establishes aviewpoint that that person is otherwise not able to adopt. This implies a kind 
of possession of the subject transforming her/him into an object. 111 
115 Sontag, S., ` Sully fotografra, Realtä e immagine nella nostra societb', Einaudi Torino, 1978 and 1992. 
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In my research I found the diagrams in figures 24 and 25 very useful to clarify the concept 
of the two different creative and perceptual moments, to stimulate a reflection on the shift 
in the position of artist and viewer in spatial terms. This allowed me to define a 
`performative space' as the space occupied by the artist in the process of making the work 
and a `perceptual space' as the space occupied by the audience's fruition of the work 
A distinction between the two above defined spaces does not necessary imply that 
they are exclusive to the artist or the audience. But it is by questioning this 
exclusivity or inclusivity that I was able to relate my work to the two-way direction 
of a mirror reflected image (fig. 23). 
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Diagams of the space of action 
model camera 
Stage 1' the camera take a shot of myself 
1- 
. PhDtDWaph vift*r 
Stage 11 look at the image of myself in the position of the camera 
step out of the posion of model for the canwra to become viewer of the image of myself 
figure 24. Diagrams for analyses of the space of action in my own 
creative process. a. 2001 
'a i amst model camera 
Parton twe space 
Stage I the camera take a shot of myself 
Photograph artist O em 
PPICe tr e SQofP 
Stage 2: 1 look at the image of myself in the position of the camera 
photograph ViaN6r 
Periepft e :{ xe 
Blage 3 the viewer is in the position of myself in the percepbe space 
figure 25. Diagrams for analyses of the space 
of action in my own creative process, b, 2001 
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I believe my work at this stage included the complexity of shifting roles of artists and 
viewer, as a `problematic issue' rather then as a resolution to it. 
As it appears in the diagram in figure 25, in the work Myme the artist also becomes the 
viewer of the produced work To step into the position of the viewer is the condition that 
enables the artist to see the work (and his/her image) critically from the outside. In my own 
production process a continuous shift between the two positions takes place. Within it, I 
have identified two functions: the first, of a conceptual nature, enables me to create 
compositional constructs where the viewer will participate at a perceptual and fruition (and 
later at a more active) level; the second function, of a methodological nature, provides me 
with a position for an analytic investigation. 
Madrid (2000) (fig. 26) is a digital video which was taken by another person I asked 
to operate the camera videoing my own reflected image in the shop windows around 
the city. The piece represent an attempt to picture myself in the social environment. 
The piece Morning Toilette directly addresses the concept of the mirror. It raises the 
question of recognition of the self and its identification with the constructed image. 
The DVD installation (June 2000-January 2001) is the result of the development of 
the basic idea of making use of the video camera to document aspects of my 
everyday life. 
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figure 26.4Iadrid, digital video 1'30", still, 2' tft 
`020600 
To do a video with my camera as a mirror while I get ready 
to go out. To wash my face, brush my teeth, put make up on. 
I will look at myself mirrored in the video-camera screen... ' 
II( 
The first of recordings were done on 7 July 2000 and the last on 30 August 2000. 
When I started this piece I expected a shift in the role of artist and audience. By 
turning the camcorder's screen around I was able to see what was being recorded: I 
could see myself. This screen functioned like a mirror surface reversing my gestures. 
My understanding of the shifting process is traced by adding the character of the 
space to my diagram convention in the represented way. In relation to the content of 
the piece in some of my notes I wrote: 
`240600. Thinking about myself washing the face. The habit 
(habit is not repetition) of getting ready every morning. 
To wash the face and than put make up thinking about the 
other's gaze. I want to be beautiful and feel attractive to 
him. When we are upset about something we feel relieved 
in taking care of ourselves in order to then feel loved. It 
is a need of love. 
The intention is to repeat the action few times, depending 
on the mood which will make me use different kinds of make 
up. I will have a number of similar videos. I would like 
to project all of them while performing the same action in 
public. (though of the song "I love you babe... ") In the 
composition of the installation the modularity suggests the 
thought of a mirrored image which repeats itself to the 
infinite. 
060700 dopo la spagna e dopo tutto: ohhhhhhhh! 
170700 video # 4: 1 have a new toothbrash! 
300800 video # 5: nice tan 
140900 I have being thinking 
installation of the 5 videos. 
about the composition for the 
091000 
to start to work on composition of installation based on 
the concept of repetition. 
117 
161bid, p. 
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figure 27, Diagram for analyses of Morning Toilette, 2002 
figure 28, One of the charts of analyses for Morning Toilette videoclips, 
November 2000, #1 recorded on 7 June 2000 
117 Notes from my diary. 
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In this work, the action of washing the face and applying make-up is seen as a ritual in a 
woman's daily routine. I documented the action on five mornings and, although I have not 
timed myself, the shots are similar in length, between 12 and 14 minutes. 
I then started to look at the recordings and noticed the little differences in the same pattern of 
the acts constituting my quotidian morning toilette. The first set of acts are washing the face, 
applying tonic lotion and moisturising cream, brushing teeth; the second set of acts are 
applying make-up on the skin, eyes and mouth. Focusing on such ordinary actions repeated 
every day in front of the mirror 
- 
here replaced by the camera 
- 
made me consider the 
relationship between myself and the image of myself that I see mirrored while applying the 
mask and also what repeting an action means. 
Lacan states that ` the place of the real from the trauma to the fantasy is never anything more 
than the screen that conceals omething quite primarily, something determinant in the 
function of repetition [... ] Whatever, in repetition is varied, modulated, is merely alienation 
of its meaning'. 118 In the art making process and in my conceptual compositions repetition is 
a device that disrupts the very idea of the self contained work. Henry M. Sayre states that 
`there is always, in the repeted occurence of a thing, a reference to some former occurrence, 
and in the sustained repetition of a thing, a growing awareness that duration alters it'119 
Differences occur when an action is repeated (for example: the tone of voice in repeating a 
word, the different expression on our face when we wash in the morning due to our different 
mood). Morning Toilette focuses and highlights these differences. Through the act of 
mirroring, I see differences in the other's image of myself that changes day after day. A 
difference that depends on the context I am preparing myself for. I became aware that 
difference is also what saves me from being trapped by repetition. This is maybe a kind of 
118 Laean, J., Ecrits, A selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, Norton & Company, New York-London, 1977, p 60. 
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di f ferance in Derridas terms, neither a din-erence nor a deferal. `I)itj&ance is the systematic 
play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the syxrcing by means of which elements are 
related to each other. ' 120 
From observing the material recorded, I defined two stages in the action: the action 
of cleaning the face and that of applying make-up. This can be seen as a staging of 
two different relationships. In the first stage, I look at myself on the camera screen 
and relate to the image of myself in relation to society, heritage and conventions. In the 
second stage I choose which mask I will wear. Here I meet the other image of myself. 
The image that would soon come to coincide with the other's (uze. 
The videos that make up the installation Morning 7 toilette are entitled: to get over it, I luve 
you babe..., clop() la spagnu e dopo tulto: ohh hhhhhh!, 1 have a new toothhrush!, nice on. 
... 
Meaning that my life experience becomes inevitably 
incorporated in between one repetition of the ritual and the 
next. These have become part of me and added new layers to my 
experience, and when I look at myself in the mirror I see them 
in me, or behind me, or parallel to me. It is as if, even 
though I appear to be mechanically repeating the ritual 
documented in the videos, in fact the changes occurred make 
each repetition different from the previous ones. The morning 
thoughts may be characterised by intentions for the day or 
thoughts on facts that happened or again people I met. This 
will be reflected in the composition of the installation, on 
which I am working at present, that will focus on a modular 
rhythm in which little differences will appear. ' 
121 
It was my initial idea that the composition of the installation in space would have had 
a central position for its fruition, as visually explained in the diagram in figure 29-h. 
But, in fact, it was presented as part of the exhibition In Between at the Lethaby 
119 Sayre. M. H., The Object of Performance, The University of Chicago Press, 1989, p. 116. 120 Derrida, J., Positions, trans. Alan Bass, The University of Chicago Press, 1981, p. 27. 121 Dated November 2000, from in,,, personal artistic diary. 
88 
Gallery in May-June 2002 (f. 30), and the arrangement in the space was different 
from how I had previously thought. 
figure 29 a. DVD installation, cover, 2001 
viewing 
Audience 
T 
I................,...,...............................,...............................,........: 
figure 29 b. Installation in space. N ieýýin audience, 2001 
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figure 31. Morning Toilette video live installation, Tate Modern, 2001 
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Morning 7oileile was first presented in a format that I defined as Video Live 
Installation (fig. 3 1), at Tate Modern, in the context of a 'Fine Art Research 
Network' (FARN) event: 'Experience of Space' on 19 `h March 2001. In some notes I 
wrote in preparation for the event: 
 Institution eye on myself-myself in the environment 
 Myself in relation to the audience 
 Perception as interaction 
 Influence of the context for the artistic event on 
interaction (context's connotation) 
Virtual or real: the presence of the artist through her 
representation is non-presence. The installation is 
composed by two projections. 
The first is showing the action happening live in a 
different room of myself and my reflection in a real 
mirror. 
The second is the projection of Video n°3 out of the 5 in 
DVD. I will have 3 images of myself one of which is looking 
at the audience and therefore compositionally relating to 
them. 
122 
After my experience at Tate Modern I understood how the context could affect the 
way I performed and therefore the interchange with the audience. The 
context/place/space in which this relationship takes place influences our mutual 
perception. As a consequence the result of the event depends upon the connotation of 
the space as well as each individual's experience of it. ''3 
My own experience of repeating my morning ritual in a public context made me 
understand the element of fiction involved in performing. The cathartic effect that 
performing a symbolic action usually has on me, was in this case, not present. I was 
surprised and at the same time a little disappointed by this absence. Though this 
122 Dated March 2001, from m}" personal artistic diary. 123 The video live installation Mornin Toilette is composed g by a (hiasmus structure (already referred to in the video 
performance BIuX in 2000). Chiasmus might be called 'reverse parallelism', since the second part of a grammatical 
construction is balanced or paralleled by the first pari. only in reverse order (this happens also in a mirrored image). The 4 
terms, in 2 couples, refer to each other. In the performance the presence of spectators looking at the projections is one of the 
terns of the relation. A gap of significance is filled with perception. Spectators look at the image of myself looking at 
them. Simultaneously the projection on the side shows the action happening next door. 
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feeling was actually a confirming factor of the influence of the environment on the 
delivery and fruition of the work 
- 
that also depend on drawing a boundary between 
private and public aspects of myself. These thoughts that also address the element of 
theatricality implicit in performance can be found in some of my diary notes written 
shortly after the event that I referred to earlier on: 
10th April 2001 Glasgow Prestwick Airport 
Thinking back at some of the implications of the 
performance Morning Toilette at Tate Modern on the 19th of 
March. 
[... ]I felt I was lying to my self and to the audience 
because I was acting. [... ] Although it can be argued that 
art is representation and, in that sense any action 
repeated in front of an audience cannot be the spontaneous 
action of the everyday life but, as much as in a ready 
made, the artistic context or simply the intention of the 
artist to express him/herself in a particular context makes 
the action become an artistic action. [... ]I do not act, it is 
myself. By the fact that I am recording, I am more focused 
on what I am actually doing. 
The repetition of a performance so far has always been a 
different experience for me who was interacting with a 
different environment or audience, but while performing I 
was also detaching myself from the environment and getting 
in touch with my inner side. As a consequence, the 
performance worked to me because I felt that it had an 
effect on myself and therefore the audience[... ) 
124 
As a consequence, I started to work on the effect of public and private contexts and I 
produced the pieces Public Private Perception in London and Bologna and the series 
of photographs Public Private published at www. insight. org website. 
Furthermore, the information I collected after the performance took place, using 
sheets like the one in figure 32 b, made aware that adopting a composition where my 
own image prevails over the rest, was possibly taking away the attention from the 
conceptual element I wanted to deliver. The audience feedback were about any image 
and not the event as a whole. 
124 From my srtistic diary. 
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figure 33. Public Private Perceptions, Foy nbee Studios. London 2001 
Each of the projects investigates different aspects of the same issue: how 
environments affect the delivery of a piece and therefore its fruition. Public Private 
Perception was performed twice in London and Bologna, but it being site-specific, 
the performance at Neon Gallery in 02 was different from the previous one, as later 
discussed. After the event in Bologna, I wrote: 
'130302 PUBLIC PRIVATE PERCEPTIONS 02 Reactions 
I built up a lot of tension due to the various unexpected 
events happened before the opening that Elisa and Andrea 
helped me to solve. The dark of the night was falling to 
allow the video projections to fill the gallery space. I 
went downstairs, where my stage was all set, the camera on, 
the right shot, and I started to relax and feel the wall 
through the sense of touch with my eyes blindfolded. 
After I did this for nearly one hour, I thought that the 
cathartic effect of the performance on myself, together 
with the tension of the live action must have had some sort 
of impact on the audience. I played back the video of the 
action and went upstairs where I noticed that the audience 
was very respectful of the intimate atmosphere created by 
the two projections in the space and listened carefully to 
my recorded voice. The loud ones were in the street 
opposite the gallery entrance. I felt that people 
understood the work. ' 
125 
125 Notes from my diary. 
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Part III. A DISCUSSION OF VISION, THE LOOK AND THE GAZE. A 
METHODOLOGY FOR THE ARTIST'S INTERCHANGE WITH 
AUDIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT 
`The relation to the self, the relation to the world, the relation to the other: all are 
constituted through a reversibility of seeing and being seen, perceiving and being 
perceived, and this entails a reciprocity and contingency for the subject(s) in the 
world [... ]', 126states Amelia Jones in her book Body Art, Performing the Subject, 
referring particularly to the phenomenological concept of intertwining by Merleau- 
Ponty. This is one of the notions that I investigated and related to in my theoretical 
debate that derived from psychology. My theoretical and practical research though 
has lately been led towards a much greater understanding of some of the scientific 
aspects of vision and the other senses, in parallel with, and as a consequence of, the 
already discussed concerns with the self and the ontology of the mirror image. 
Together with the discussion on the Gaze by Lacan developed in relation to Sartre's 
position on the same topic and Merleau-Ponty's concept of Chiasm, various positions 
on alternatives to the scopic regime of Western culture are here revised in order to 
form the context for my own artistic account. The art pieces Public Private 
Perceptions (focusing particularly on the investigation of the relation between artist- 
environment through touch and non-vision) and Drawing Scents (investigating 
similar issues in relation to smell and vision), represent two different ways to attempt 
an alternative to the primacy of vision, thus becoming my own response to the anti- 
ocularcentric discourse. The cross-modal association of senses, synaesthesia referred 
to in the works, is based on the concepts of rebound, multi-linearity and interaction. 
This dynamics of the neurological condition can be regarded as a scientific parallel 
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of the concept of the mirror. The following theoretical discussion, grounding the most 
recent works I produced, will possibly reveal the overlapping of the ontology of the 
mirror, synaesthetic dynamics and performative/interactive practice as all contributing to 
the formation of my position in respect of the anti-ocularcentric discourse. 
IH. 1. Vision-visuality: discussion of alternative scopic regimes 
In his introduction to a symposium held at the Dia Art Foundation in New York in 
1988, on the critique of the ocularcentric tradition, Hal Foster makes the following 
distinction between the terms vision and visuality: 
Although vision suggests sight as a physical operation, and visuality sight 
as a social fact, the two are not opposed as nature to culture: vision is 
social and historical too, and visuality involves the body and the psyche. 
Yet neither are they identical: here, the difference between the terms 
signals a difference within the visual 
- 
between the mechanism of sight 
and its historical techniques, between the datum of vision and its 
discursive determinations 
- 
and difference, many differences, among 
how we see, how we are able, allowed, or made to see, and how we see 
this seeing or the unseen therein. With its own rhetoric and 
representations, each scopic regime seeks to close out these differences: 
to make of its many social visualities one essential vision, or to order 
them in a natural hierarchy of sight. 127 
126 Jones, A., op. cit., p. 41. 127 Foster, H., Vision and Visuality, New York, Dia Art Foundation 1988, New Press Printing 1999, p. ix. 
97 
The text published after the symposium contains a number of scripts by various 
authors. This included a discussion of the physiological substrate of the discourse by 
Jonathan Crary and on the psychic one by Jacqueline Rose and Rosalind Krauss. All 
the authors tried to indicate the part that vision has played in the production of 
subjectivity and its part in the intersubjective, as addressed by Norman Bryson, 
particularly with reference to the Gaze. A historical account of modern vision 
specifying its dominant practices and its critical resistances was given by Martin Jay. 
Martin Jay proposed the following critical variants to the scopic regime and 
Renaissance perspective : the art of describing in seventeenth century Dutch painting 
and the madness of vision developed in baroque art. 128 Although there is much literature 
on perspective, 129 as an introduction to my argument I will refer to the historical account 
by Jay. He traces a map starting with the Italian Quattrocento with Brunelleschi as the 
inventor and Alberti as the theoretical interpreter. Jay writes that in relation to the 
metaphysical implications of light (as divine lux rather than perceived lumen), linear 
perspective came to symbolise mathematical regularities in optics and God's will. Jay 
reminds us that the three-dimensional space of perspective could be rendered on a two- 
dimensional surface by following all the transformational rules in Alberti's De Pittura 
and later treatises. The transparent window that was the canvas in Alberti's metaphor, 
could also be understood as a flat mirror reflecting the ` geometricalized' space of the 
scene depicted back onto the space radiating out from the viewing eye (static 
monocular vision looking through the peephole at the scene in front of it). 
128 Jay, M., `Scopic regimes of modernity' in Foster, H., Vision and Visuality, New York, Dia Art Foundation 
1988, New Press Printing 1999, pp. 3-23. 129 William M. Ivins, Jr., On the Rationalization of Sight, New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1938; Panofsky, Die Pcrspektive als 
-symbolischen Form; Richard Krautheimer, Brunelleschi and Linear Perspective', in Brunelleschi in Perspective, comp. Isabelle Hyman, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1974; Samuel Y. 
Edgerton, Jr., The Renaissance Discovery ofLinear Perspective, New York, Basic Books, 1975; John White, The Birth and Rebirth of Pictorial Space, 3rd ed., Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1987; Michael Kubovy, The 
Psychology of Perspective and renaissance Art, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, Kemp, M., The Science ofArt Optical Themes from Brunelleschi to Seurat New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1990. 
98 
The abstract coldness of the perspectival Gaze meant the withdrawal of 
the painter's emotional entanglement with the objects depicted in 
geometricalized space. The participatory involvement of more absorptive 
visual modes was diminished, if not entirely suppressed, as the gap 
between spectator and spectacle widened. 130 
According to Jay, the moment of erotic projection in vision 
- 
what St. Augustine had 
anxiously condemned as ocular desire, was lost as the bodies of the painter and viewer 
were forgotten in the name of an allegedly disincarnated, absolute eye. Although such a 
Gaze could still fall on objects of desire, it did so largely in the service of a reifying male 
look that turned its targets into stone. According to Jay, despite important exceptions, 
such as Caravaggio's seductive boys or Titian's Venus of Urbino, the nudes do not look 
out at the viewer, radiating no erotic energy in the other direction. He contends it is only 
with the nudes in Manet' s Dejeuner sur 1'herbe and Olympia, that the crossing of the 
viewer's gaze with that of the subject finally occurs, but, when the rationalised visual 
order of Cartesian perspectivalism was already coming under attack in other ways. 
In Jay's view Cartesian perspectivalism `in addition to its de-eroticizing of the visual 
order, had also fostered what might be called de-narrativization or de-textualization'. 
Here as abstract, quantitatively conceptualised, space became more interesting to the 
artist than the qualitatively differentiated subjects painted within it. 
Cartesian perspectivalism has, in fact, been the target of a widespread 
philosophical critique, which has denounced its privileging of an a- 
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historical, disinterested, disembodied subject entirely outside of the world it 
claims to know only from afar. The questionable assumption of a 
transcendental subjectivity characteristic of universalist humanism, which 
ignores our embededness in what Maurice Merleau-Ponty liked to call the 
flesh of the world, is thus tied to the ` high altitude' thinking characteristic of 
this scopic regime. In many accounts, this entire tradition has thus been 
subjected to wholesale condemnation as both false and pernicious. 131 
Jay points out that it is possible to discern internal tensions in Cartesian 
perspectivalism itself to suggest it was not quite as uniformly coercive as is 
sometimes assumed. This is done by mentioning John White's distinction between 
what he terms artificial perspective, in which the mirror held up to nature is flat, and 
synthetic perspective, in which that mirror is presumed to be concave, thus producing 
a curved rather than planar space on the canvas. 
The subject position in the Cartesian perspectivalist epistemology is seen by Jay as 
problematic. For the monocular eye at the apex of beholder's pyramid could be 
construed as transcendental nd universal 
- 
that is, exactly the same for any human 
viewer occupying the same point in time and space 
- 
or contingent; solely dependent 
on the particular, individual vision of distinct beholders, with their own concrete 
relations to the scene in front of them. Finally, the Cartesian perspectivalist tradition 
contained a potential for internal contestation in the possible uncoupling of the 
painter's view of the scene from that of the presumed beholder. 
130 
`Scopic Regimes of Modernity, Jay, M., in Foster, H., Vision and Visuality, New York: Dia Art Foundation, New Press Printing 1999, p. 8. 1311bid., p. 10. 
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Norman Bryson identifies this development with Vermeer, who represents in his 
view, a second state of perspectivalism, even more disincarnated than that of Alberti. 
Jay makes an observation to suggest an alternative scopic regime that may be understood 
as more than a variant of Cartesian perspectivalism. He includes the Dutch seventeenth- 
century art: a visual culture very different from what we associate with a Renaissance 
perspective, one which Svetlana Alpers has called The Art of Describing. 132 
According to Alpers, the hegemonic role of Italian painting in art history has occluded an 
appreciation of a second tradition, which was nourished in the seventeenth-century Low 
Countries. She argues that Italian Renaissance art, for all its fascination with the 
techniques of perspective, still held fast to the storytelling function for which they were 
used. In the Renaissance, the world on the other side'of Alberti' s window was a stage on 
which human figures performed significant actions based on the texts of the poets. It is a 
narrative art. Northern art, rejecting the privileged, constitutive role of the monocular 
subject, emphasises instead the prior existence of a world of objects depicted on the flat 
canvas, a world indifferent to the beholder's position in front of it. This world is not 
contained entirely within the frame of the Albertian window, but seems instead to 
extend beyond it. 
Summarising the difference between the art of describing and Cartesian 
perspectivalism, Alpers posits the following oppositions: 
attention to many small things versus a few large ones; light reflected off 
objects versus objects modelled by light and shadow; the surface of 
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objects, their colors and textures, dealt with rather than their placement in 
a legible space; an unframed image versus one that is clearly framed; one 
with no clearly situated viewer compared to one with such a viewer. The 
distinction follows a hierarchical model of distinguishing between 
phenomena commonly referred to as primary and secondary: objects and 
space versus the surfaces, forms versus the textures of the world. 133 
Merleau-Ponty's Eye and the Mind begins with a comparison between science and 
painting. Whereas the former looks on things from above, the latter immerses the 
viewer in the world on view. 134 He uses the expression narcissism of sight because 
the world is made of the same stuff as the body and yet, although at one with the 
world, the painter is also apart from it, which is the paradoxical, enigmatic madness 
of vision: `Painting awakens and carries to its highest pitch a delirium which is 
vision itself, for to see is to have at a distance; painting spreads this strange 
possession to all aspects of Being, which must in some fashion become visible in 
order to enter into the work of art'. 
In his view, it is precisely the revelation of the oneness and multiplicity of Being that 
makes painting so remarkable. Merleau-Ponty concluded, by drawing on modernists 
like Cezanne, Henri Matisse and Paul Klee and also on Dutch art. 135 Merleau-Ponty 
extended `this "defenestration" of the painter's eye to the philosopher's as well. Eye 
and Mind in fact, turns directly from a consideration of Dutch painting to an analysis 
132 Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century, Chicago University Press, 1983. 
133 Ibid., p. 44. 
134 Merleau-Ponty states: `The painter does not depict representations in his mind, but rather paints with his body, which is mingled with the perceived world. The self revealed by painting is thus ` not a self through transparence, like thought, which only thinks its object by assimilating it, by constituting it, by transforming it into thought. It is a self through confusion, narcissism, through inherence of the one who sees in that which he 
sees. ' In Eye and Mind, Translated by Michael Smith. In The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, edited by Galen Johnson, 121-149, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993, pp. 162-163. 
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of Descartes's Dioptrique: the latter failed to appreciate the ontological importance of 
painting. Merleau-Ponty described Dutch art by writing that in it `the mirror appears 
because I am seeing-visible, because there is a reflexivity of the sensible; the mirror 
translates and reproduces that reflexivity'. 136 The curved mirror was especially 
powerful in this regard because its tactile dimension helps collapse the seemingly 
unbridgeable distance between the Albertian painters disembodied eye and the scene 
before him on the other side of the window-like canvas. 
Merleau-Ponty explains that Descartes' mistake `was to erect it into a positive being, 
outside all points of view, beyond all latency and all depth, having no true thickness'. 137 
Merleau-Ponty insisted that in our post-Euclidean world, we are now aware that space is 
no longer what it seemed to Descartes, with his geometer's eye outside and above the 
scene it surveyed. `It is, rather, a space reckoned starting from me as the zero point or 
degree zero of spatiality. I do not see it according to its exterior envelope; I live it from the 
inside; I am immersed in it. After all, the world is all around me, not in front of me. ' 138 
Martin Jay states that if there is a philosophical correlate to Northern art, it is not 
Cartesianism with its faith in a rationalised concept of space, but rather the more 
empirical visual experience of observationally oriented Baconian empiricism. The 
non mathematical impulse of this tradition accords well with the indifference to 
hierarchy, proportion and analogical resemblances characteristic of Cartesian 
perspectivalism. Instead, it casts its attentive eye on the fragmentary, detailed and 
richly articulated surface of a world it is content to describe rather than explain. In 
135 Merleau Ponty Eye andMind, p. 186. 
136 Merleau-Ponty, M., Eye andMind, p. 168. 
137 Merleau-Ponty, Eye and Mind, p. 174. 
1381bid p. 178. 
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two significant ways, the art of describing can be said to have anticipated later visual 
models, however much it was subordinated to its Cartesian perspectivalist rival. 
Jay suggests that both scopic regimes can be said to reveal different aspects of a 
complex but unified phenomenon, just as Cartesian and Baconian philosophies can 
be said to be consonant, if in different ways, with the scientific world view. 
Martin Jay then posed a third model of vision that he also refers to as `the second 
moment of unease in the dominant model' where he sees the possibilities for an even 
more radical alternative: the Baroque. Since1888, art historians have been tempted to 
postulate a perennial oscillation between Renaissance and Baroque in both painting 
and architecture. In opposition to Renaissance, or as Heinrich Wolfflin later called it, 
the classical style, the Baroque was painterly, multiple, and open. Derived from the 
Portuguese word for an irregular, oddly shaped pearl, `the baroque connoted the 
bizarre and peculiar, traits which were normally disdained by champions of clarity 
and transparency of form' Jay esplains. 139 
In the recent work of the French philosopher, Christine Buci-Glucksmann, La raison 
baroque of 1984 and Lajolie du voir of 1986,140 the explosive power of baroque 
vision is seen as the most significant alternative to the hegemonic visual style of 
Cartesian perspectivalism. She emphasises its rejection of the monocular 
geometricalization of the Cartesian tradition, with its illusion of homogeneous three- 
dimensional space seen with a God's-eye-view from afar. `She also tacitly contrasts 
the Dutch art of describing, with its belief in legible surfaces and faith in the material 
139 Jay, op. Cit., p. 10 Buci-Glucksmann, C., La raison baroque: de Baudelaire a Benjamin, Paris, Editions Galilee, 1984 and Lajolie du voir: de 1 'esthetique baroque, Paris, Editions Galilee, 1986; referred to by Jay, M., `Scopic regimes of 
modernity' in Hal Foster, Vision and Visuality, p. 17. 
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solidity of the world its paintings map, with the baroque fascination for opacity, 
unreadability, and the indecipherability of the reality it depicts'. '4' 
For Buci-Glucksmann, the Baroque self-consciously revels in the contradictions between 
surface and depth, disparaging as a result any attempt to reduce the multiplicity of visual 
spaces into any one coherent essence. Jay specify that, the mirror that it holds up to 
nature is the anamorphosistic mirror, either concave or convex, that distorts the visual 
image 
- 
or, more precisely, `reveals the conventional rather than natural quality of 
`normal' specularity by showing its dependence on the materiality of the medium of 
reflection. ' 142 
III. 2. Anamorphosis in relation to the Gaze 
in Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Lacan 
I think that the practice of anamorphosis can be considered an alternative for the 
production of space on a two-dimensional surface, a variant'scopic system distinct 
from the Cartesian perspective, not aiming to represent reality, but to distort it and 
give way to imagination. This was understood while experimenting with it through art 
practice in 1997, with pieces like `Seeing Through', before I started this research project. 
The scultural piece was constituted by a structure providing the coordinates for the 
stretched anamorphic image on its surface, referring to the illusional status of vision. 
In the following section a historical introduction of anamorphosis forms the 
background for a following discussion. This will illustrate how Lacan's account of 
vision and the concept of the Gaze (coming from the Merleau-Ponty's notion of 
141 Jay, M., `Scopic regimes of modernity' in Hal Foster, Vision and Visuality, p. 17. 
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interchange) refer to anamorphosis, particularly as used in the painting The 
Ambassadors by Hans Holbein as a metaphor for Lacan's psycho-analytic concepts. 
Art historian Martin Kemp explains that the idea of anamorphosis appears to have 
arisen for the investigation of oblique images and wide-angle views by Piero della 
Francesca and Leonardo da Vinci. At the end of his treatise, Piero della Francesca 
considers the special case of how to paint an illusion of a solid body that is to appear 
in relief on a plane surface which is above or below the spectator and is viewed 
obliquely. The examples he illustrates are those of a ball, a hanging ring, and a 
`drinking goblet on a stem which is to appear elevated' above the plane of a table (pl. 
416 in fig. 34). ` The construction is achieved by the projection of the relevant rays of 
the visual pyramid past the contours of the object and on to the plane behind it, much 
as if an adjacent source of light is casting a shadow. When the oddly dislocated 
outlines are viewed obliquely from the point of projection, they convey the effect of 
the goblet standing out from the plane surface of the table. ' 
Kemp writes that Leonardo's awareness of the difficulties caused by wide-angle 
perspective had led him to experiment with elongated designs, which turned the problems 
to his advantage. Although his major demonstrations of anamorphosis made in France 
have disappeared, Kemp suggests that it was his example that inspired the sudden wave of 
anamorphic designs in Northern Europe. It was in the North, most especially in the work 
of Erhard Schon, that one of the major potentials of these picture-puzzles began to be 
realised as symbolic compositions. Schon may have been the first to give the frontal, 
distorted image a coherence of its on by the transformation of the otherwise 
142 ibid. 
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incomprehensible outlines into the contours of a landscape peopled by tiny figures (p1417 
in fig. 34). 143 
Kemp explains that the classic phase of anamorphosis, during which it came to relate 
vitally to a series of scientific and theological concerns, occurred in France and 
Rome in the 1630s and 1640s, with theorist Jean-Francois Niceron. `The second part 
of his Thaumaturfus Opticus (1646) is dedicated to a comprehensive treatment of 
anamorphic images and related varieties of'artificial magic' to use his own term [... ] 
He provides lucid accounts of how to project anamorphic images using a 
perspectivally distorted grid [pl. 419 in fig. 34], of the kind that had probably 
underlaid the most optical of the earlier images, such as those by Schon and 
Holbein. ' Kemp writes that he also gives mathematical instructions for the design of 
other forms of anamorphosis: on surfaces which are pyramidal or conical [pl. 420 in 
fig. 34]; and curvilinear images which are designed to be viewed in cylindrical or 
conical mirrors. The curvilinear types became particularly popular as optical toys 
during succeeding centuries. 
144 
'a' Kemp, M., The Science ofArt Optical Themes from Brunelleschl to Seurat, Yale University Press, New Haven 
and London, 1990, pp. 208. 144 Kemp, M., pp. 208-210. He continues by writing that there is an element of sheer entertainment in such images. The Chateau d' Esonnes of Ludovic Hesselin owner of a Cigoh perspectograph, was a treasure house of illusions and curiosities, designed to astonish even a sophisticated observer like Queen Christina of Sweden who 
was treated to such visions as burning cities and vast caverns. But there were also serious sides to these visions - theologically and scientifically. Just as Pozzo was concerned to place extreme illusionism in the service of 
reverence, so was Nicer. 
107 
41(. Pmpcäta' l pt"p:: u. m ut r l. ohlrt :. rt't. 1 k . i, to 
. 
hlýnr I', ui Ilia 
in. craw 
,, A, 1 )ý Prt; r. t 
4 
jr. ttº 
.i "s t. " yira1. rr 
eýý 
-i X19 1..; ß-y 
.. 
rT: ý 
ý- .. - 
.".. 
. ý 
ý, z. c: .. " 
t lSNI' rwý; "jo,. S;. ýn .. .ý-. e:. p.. ý"z, ýl 
441 
31 I rhard Sch(in, 
.P .It lrplnr 1'; I 'I <I/ F. alr Por(rarr:: ("h:. rlrs V. I ("Idi I. 1'upr I'. lu. III and Frarc 1% 11 
figure 34. Tables on anamorphosis from Kemp, M., the Science of Art Optical 1 hemes from Brunelleschi to 
Seurat, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1990. 
108 
419,1 hnupK for the m)mrxphx distortion UI lacaý Irom Niccr. wr'% 
4211, Ihstgn for a amaai aoal, o. 4nw,. louts lýiirrým'ý llwwwwnogw 
-I', 
figure 35. Hans Holbein, The Ambassadors, 1533 
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Kemp explains that Hans Holbeins The Ambassadors of 1533 represents the classic 
early example of anamorphosis `[... ] exploited at the highest level of seriousness for 
symbolic purposes occurs in the two Frenchmen, Jean de Denteville and Georges de 
Selve, stand in front of a table loaded with the paraphernalia of various aspects of 
human learning which relate to practical mathematics [... ]. Kemp then by illustrating 
the significance of the anamorphic skull. This, `smeared diagonally across the 
perspectival floor', assumes full coherence when `viewed from a particular position 
to the right of the picture at the level of the ambassador's heads, at about one picture's 
width from the edge of the painting, and at a short distance from the plane of the 
picture surface'. He also suggests that this position could have been one of the axes 
along which the viewer would have approached the picture in its original setting, through 
a door abutting on the end of the wall on which the picture was hung. Kemp suggests 
that the semi-concealed skull relates to the other partly-concealed symbol, the sculpted 
crucifix half-hidden by the curtain in the upper right corner. In his view, if the skull 
serves to remind us of the ultimate triumph of death over all human pursuits the silver 
crucifix represents our only legitimate chance of salvation in the next life. 
Lacan's reading of the function of the skull in the painting is for him a useful 
example for what he defines as the objet-a in relation to the Gaze. Lacan suggested 
that anamorphosis corresponded to the Cartesian subject's geometrical mapping of 
space, a geometricalisation that could be based, as Diderot had noted in his Letter on 
the Blind, on a sightless man's touch. 
Such a rigid and linear reduction of vision invited comparison, Lacan suggested, with 
an erect penis, that which appeared as the lack-fulfilling phallus in the mother's 
Imaginary: ` How can we not see here, immanent in the geometral dimension 
-a 
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partial dimension in the field of the gaze, a dimension that has nothing to do with 
vision as such 
- 
something symbolic of the function of the lack, of the appearance of 
the phallic ghost? ' 145 
Lacan, in the series of seminars published in The Four Concepts ofPsycho- 
analyses, developed his argument of the Gaze in relation to anamorphosis in 
Hans Holbein's The Ambassadors. In the painting, the Gaze of the dominant 
Cartesian perspectivalist scopic regime was challenged by another, which was 
expressed by the distorted skull at the bottom of the canvas, a skull whose 
natural shape could be restored only by an oblique glance from the painting's 
edge. In Lacan's view, such an object expressed the desire of the Symbolic 
realm in which the subject is decentered, split, and comes to terms with its own 
incompleteness. `Holbein makes visible for us here something that is simply 
the subject as annihilated 
- 
in the form, that is, strictly speaking the imaged 
embodiment of the minus phi [(- 0)] of castration, which for us, centers the 
whole organization of the desires through the framework of the fundamental 
drives[... ]' 146 Lacan explains that rather than an image in the phallic eye of the 
geometricalized subject, the anamorphic skull thus is to be found in the 
impersonal, diffuse ` gaze as such, in its pulsatile, dazzling and spread out 
function, as it is in this picture'. '47 
145 Lacan, J., The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsycho-Analysis, p. 88. 146 Ibid., p. 89. 147 Ibid. 
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As Jay puts it, `the eye is that of the specular, Cartesian subject desiring specular 
plenitude and phallic wholeness, and believing it can find it in a mirror image of 
itself, whereas the gaze is that of an objective other in a field of pure monstrance'. 148 
*** 
In order to fully understand Lacan's reference to anamorphosis as used in Holbein's 
painting, I think it is necessary to introduce the broader discourse within which this is 
located. Furthermore, the links I will illustrate within the cultural context, will 
contribute to present Lacan and Merleau-Ponty's thoughts influencing each other, 
particularly in relation to the concepts of Gaze and Chiasm. I can see that also in my 
artistic research the same reciprocal influence of related notions allows me to find 
space for the creative imput in the transitional position, a position in constant 
development as it will be illustrated at a later stage. 
Martin Jay in his book Downcast Eyes, the Denigration of Vision in Twentieth 
- 
Century French Thought' suggests that many contributors to the denigration of 
vision, such as Lacan and Foucault, cannot be understood without recognising the 
residues of Sartre's critique in theirs. 149 Particularly, although diverging on many 
148 Jay, M., Downcast Eyes, the Denigration of Vision in Twentieth 
-Century French Thought, University of 
California Press, 1994, p. 363. 149 The nature of that critique took many forms. Although Sartre was deeply indebted to Husserl's 
phenomenology, he immediately detected problems with the idea of a transcendental ego, which he interpreted in 
visual terms. In Sartre's first major work, The Transcendence of the Ego, written in 1936, he complained that 
Husserl's strong notion of an `I' introduced opacity into consciousness. Instead, true consciousness was pure 
translucence, unburdened by positivity. Pure consciousness were understood as transparency rather than opacity, 
but a more anti visual position appeared in his next two works of philosophy, which dealt with the issue of images and the imagination, Imagination: A Psychological Critique (1936) and The Psychology of Imagination (1940). Here Sartre posited a radical difference between sense perception and the imagination. He criticised the 
belief that images were only likenesses of external objects reflected in consciousness. For Sartre, although images 
may draw on analogies with objects of perception, they themselves are unreal. In fact, imagination is precisely the 
active function of consciousness that transcends or nihilates the reality of the perceived world. As such, it serves 
as a model for the negation and lack that Sartre would soon identify with the'for"itself in Being and Nothingness. What is vital for understanding his larger argument is that Sartre distinguished images from 
perception, visual or otherwise, and identified them with the intentionality of action instead. As a result, he was 
able to describe consciousness less in terms of visual transparency than in those of pure nihilating action. 
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basic points, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty shared a suspicion of the Cartesian 
perspectivalist gaze, which often extended to the primacy of vision itself. For their 
generation the main inspiration came from the movement known as phenomenology, 
in particular the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. ISO 
In Jay's view, Sartre's critique of ocularcentrism was especially powerful because he 
conflated many of the complaints expressed by other critics into one relentless, 
overwhelming indictment. ` Not only' he claimed `does the hypertrophy of the visual 
lead to a problematic epistemology, abet the domination of nature, and support the 
hegemony of space over time, but it also produces profoundly disturbing 
intersubjective relations and the construction of a dangerously inauthentic version of 
the self. 051 Sartre's interrogation of the eye in the social, psychological, existential 
dimensions, was described in the most negative terms. 152 He was very sensitive to the 
Invisibility of non-perceptual images suggests a critical link to human freedom, as Sartre interpreted it. In short, 
the Sartre who could escape from the play of mirrors and the defining power of adult gazes by immersing himself 
in words-'imaginary child that I was, ' he wrote in his autobiography, `I defended myself with my 
imagination's'- now posited a radical break between sight and consciousness, which directly challenged the 
ocularcentric traditions equation of the `I' and the `eye'. Before Sartre spelled out the full ontological 
implications of this new view of consciousness in Being and Nothingness, he anticipated certain of its arguments 
in Nausea, the literary work published in 1938. Here too visual themes play a prominent role, Sartre contrasted 
tactile with visual experience. iso As explained by Jay, M., Downcast Eyes, the Denigration of Vision in Twentieth 
-Century French Thought, University of California Press, 1994, p. 276, in works like Cartesian Meditatlons, 1931, Husserl defines 
phenomenology as a kind of neo-Cartesianism, concerned with the scientific investigation of ideas in all their 
conceptual clarity and distinctiveness, and needing to purify philosophy of the psychological residues, he found 
in Descartes a path for it to become transcendental. Phenomenology should be what he called "eidetic science", 
able to gain intuitive insights into essences. Intuition could reveal more than the interior experience of lived 
temporality. The phenomenological `reduction' (epochb) led back to the source of existence and meaning. In Jay's view the fact that Husserl chose to call eidetic intuition a Wesenschau (a look into essences) may suggest 
the persistence of ocularcentric premises in his thought. This central role of vision in Husserl's thought has been 
the target of certain French critics: Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida, Marc Richir. In Jay's view, Husserl's thought influenced Merleau-Ponty and Sartre for the following reasons: although Husserl's retained a visual bais in the idea of Wesenschau, he radically undermined the spectatorial distance between viewing object and viewed object in the Cartesian epistemological tradition. Although his early work sought to defend the concept of the transcendental ego, (residue of the Cartesian cogito) his later work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology of 1936, put the stress on the pre-reflective Lebenswelt (lifeworld) instead. Here both the cultural/historical variations of everyday life and the lived body played a central role. Merleau-Ponty 
was able to seize on it as a means to strip phenomenology of its Cartesian residues, also thanks to the critic of 
visual primacy present in Heidegger's phenomenology, entered in the French debate in the 30's. 151 Jay, M., op. cit. p. 277. 1,2 Sartre was profoundly curious in the sense of that term defined by Heidegger in Being and Time. He 
passionately wanted to penetrate the world's secrets and reveal them to his pitiless gaze. 
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dangers of visually incited curiosity, both for the gazer and the object of the gaze. 
The result was a personal and intellectual dialectic of attraction and repulsion. 153 
Martin Jay identified three main manifestations of Sartre's critique of sight. The first is 
his rejection of an opaque transcendental ego intruding into the translucency of pure, 
active consciousness. The second is his radical separation of perception, visual or 
otherwise, from the nihilating imagination, which proves in Nausea not to be so radically 
pure after all. And the third is the failed attempt of vision to impose concepts and ideas 
on the recalcitrant meaninglessness of the material world, which is more directly 
available to our other senses, or better put, `is a primordial reality prior to the very 
differentiation of the senses'. Vision is thus insufficient as a means to conceive the 
subject, or what he will call the ` for-itself, and no less problematic in its attempts to 
conceptualise the object, or the 'in-itself 
. 
154 Sartre distinguishes between the eye as the 
object of a look and the look itself (a distinction repeated by Lacan), between perception 
and imagination, which he had examined in The Psychology oflmagination. '55 
Jay's introduction of Merleau-Ponty's thought states that his `version of 
phenomenology maybe called a heroic attempt to reaffirm the nobility of vision on 
new and firmer grounds than those provided by the discredited Cartesian 
153 Jay, M., Downcast Eyes, The Denigration of Vision in Tewntieth 
-Century French Thought, University of 
California Press, 1994, p. 276. 154 Jay illustrates that the opposition between 'for-itselfand `in-itself was most clearly developed in Being and 
Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (1943), where Sartre reprised all of these themes and 
fleshed them out by offering the detailed ontology absent from his earlier work In addition, he provided a 
profoundly troubling discussion of inter-subjective and intra-subjective interactions based on the exchange of 
gazes. For Sartre, the domination of the object world by a distant subject, facilitated by the hegemony of sight, 
became a model as well for inter-subjective relations. Departing from Husserl, whose treatment of interpersonal 
interaction depended on reciprocal empathy, Sartre emphasised the hostile contest of wills between competing 
subjects. 
iss perception is understood as an act in the sense that it transforms the object of the gaze, whereas imagination is 
identified less with derealising freedom than with the paralysing internalisation of the other's gaze. The non 
reciprocity between look and eye, between being the subject and object of the gaze, is in fact related to a fundamental struggle for power. For the one who casts the look is always subject and the one who is its target is 
always turned into an object. Or at least, objectification is the telos of the look, even if it comes up against the 
ultimate barrier of the ` for-itselfs' constitutive nothingness. That fundamental property of the subject is, however, 
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perspectivalist tradition'. 156 By registering the collapse of the dominant scopic 
regime, he attempted to defend an alternative philosophy of the visual, which would 
have beneficial social implications as well. Jay divides the development of his 
thought in two major phases. The first, were the Structure of Behavior, published in 
1942, and Phenomenology of Perception published in 1945, expressed his hopes in a 
possibility of post-Cartesian philosophy grounded in perception. The second part in 
The Eye and the Mind of 1961 and the incomplete manuscript known as The Visible 
and the Invisible, that I will refer to more specifically. 
Merleau-Ponty insisted that the structural dimension of perception was fully 
compatible with the meaningfulness that we perceive in the world. He believed that 
at least in the human order formal structure and subjective meaning were intertwined. 
Merleau-Ponty reached several arresting conclusions about its visual component in 
The Structure of Behaviour. 157 Among them, he contended that the Gestaltist nature 
of non-scientific perception meant that a continuum existed between them, science 
grew out of natural perception, rather than being its antithesis or corrective. As Jay 
illustrates, Merleau-Ponty discussed the implications of the inevitably perspectivalist 
dimensions of all seeing. 158 `Perspective does not appear to me a subjective 
deformation of things', he argued, `but, on the contrary, to be one of their properties, 
perhaps their essential property'. '59 
threatened when the self identifies with the other's look. Here the Cartesian self-reflecting cogito is replaced by a 
self that is constituted by the gaze of the other. In Martin Jay, op cit., p. 285 
156 Ibid., p. 298. 
157 Where he began with an account of the distinction between the scientific understanding of light, which he 
called `reallight' and which the medieval world knew as lumen, and the qualitative experience of light in naive 
consciousness, which he termed `phenomenal light' and the medieval thinkers lux. The seeming inconsistency 
between two notions of light did not mean that vision was self-contradictory and even in some sense "irrational, " 
but rather that subjective visual experience and its scientific description were ultimately part of the same order of 
signification. 
15 He followed Husserl in arguing that multiple profiles (Abschattungen) indicated the existence of an actual 
"thing" in the world transcending all of its aspects. 
159 Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, p. 186. Nontranscendental perspectivalism reunited humans with 
the objective world. He continues by stating `Far from introducing a coefficient of subjectivity into perception, it 
provides it on the contrary with the assurance of communicating with a world which is richer than what we know 
of it, that is, of communicating with a real world. ' 
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Merleau-Ponty became suspicious of some of Sartre's thought implications. Whereas 
Sartre, as previously stated, separated imagination from perception, Merleau-Ponty 
refused to separate the two realms so categorically. 160 Jay states that in Merleau- 
Ponty's thought, perception was intertwined not only with the scientific and rational 
intellect, but also with the artistic imagination. 161 In Merleau-Ponty intersubjective 
relations are not constituted by a duel of objectifying gazes and they cannot be 
reduced to their visual component alone. Sight for him had to be integrated with the 
other senses in order for us to `make sense' of our experience of the world. In 
Phenomenology ofPerception, 162 Merleau-Ponty conceptualised perceptual experience. 
In this work, by criticising both empiricist and intellectualist, because factoring out the 
actual phenomenon of perception itself and for whom the world was construed as a 
spectacle to be observed from afar by a disembodied mind, he intended to place the 
experience of perception prior to the constitution of the body as object and the cogito as 
rational subject. This was done by investigating pre-reflexive phenomenal field he called 
`being in the world'. 
163 
In Phenomenology of Perception as much as in the book The Structure of Behavior, 
he frequently emphasised the imbrication of the senses, each of which creates its own 
perceived world and at the same time contributes to an integrated world of 
experience. In Jay's view he sought to level the traditional sensual hierarchy and 
question the elevation of sight above the other senses. In particular, the role of touch 
160 Ibid., p. 305. 
161 In his essay on Cezanne, for Merleau-Ponty, the great artist does not negate perception; he or she renews it by returning 
us to that primordial experience before the split between imagination and sensation, expression and imitation. 162 Amongst the publications commenting on Merleau-Ponty's work: Monika M. Langer, Merleau Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary, London, 1989. Other useful treatments can be found in Gary Brent Madison, The Phenomenology ofMerleau-Ponty: A Search for the Limits of Consciousness, Athens, Ohio, 1981; Remy C. Kwant, The Phenomenological Philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty, Pittsburgh, 1963; Garth Gillan, ed., The Horizon of the Flesh: Critical Perspectives on the Thought ofMerleau-Ponty, Carbondale, 111., 
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needed emphasis, Merleau-Ponty going so far as to claim that it even played a role in 
our perception of colour, which was dependent on light cast on the textured surface 
of objects in the world. 164 `The senses, ' wrote Merleau-Ponty, ` translate each other 
without any need of an interpreter, and are mutually comprehensible without the 
intervention of any idea. ' 165 
If the phenomenal field linking, but not fully uniting, lived body and natural environment 
was based on the communication of the senses, so too the human Lebenswelt entailed 
reciprocity rather than conflict. Indeed, the very bodily experience of being at once 
viewer and viewed, toucher and object of the touch, was an ontological prerequisite for 
that internalisation of otherness underlying human intersubjectivity. 
This concept was by Merleau-Ponty defined as the Chiasm or intertwining: `Chiasm, 
instead of the For the Other: that means that there is not only a me-other ivalry, but a co- 
functioning. We function as a one unique body'. He continues by stating: `The Chiasm is 
not only a me other exchange, it is also an exchange between me and the world, between 
the perceiving and the perceived: what begins as a thing ends as consciousness of the 
thing, what begins as a "state of consciousness" ends as a thing. ' 166 
In contrast with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty posited a co-operative, complementary world of 
intersubjectivity in which mutual regard is a visual as well as emotional phenomenon. 
What he would call tele-vision167 meant a kind of transcendence of the isolated subject 
and a sympathetic entry into the subjectivity of others. The objectifying look of the other 
1973; Samuel B. Mallm, Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy, New Haven, 1979; Albert Rabil, Jr., Merleau Ponty: 
Existentialist of the Social World, New York, 1967. 
163 Jay, M., op. cit., p. 308. 
164 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 209. 165 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 235. 166 Merleau-Ponty, M., The Visible and the Invisible, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968, p. 215 (my italic of Chiasm). 
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was unbearable, he insisted, only `because it takes the place of possible communication, ' 
but ` the refusal to communicate... is still a form of communication. 168 
After Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty returned to his initial 
formulations about the primacy of perception and was in the process of a major 
revision of his thought when his work was abruptly interrupted in May of 1961.169 In 
1960, Eye and Mind presented what appeared to be a preliminary statement of his 
general conclusions. After his death, Claude Lefort collected the first part of his 
manuscript and the notes for the second as The Visible and the Invisible. 
Fragmentary, uncompleted, and often obscure, this body of work is not easy to 
interpret in an unequivocal way; Jay argues that Merleau-Ponty continued his search 
for a redemption of sight, even for a new ocularcentric ontology. Rather than talking 
of perception in general, with its implicit levelling of the hierarchy of the senses, he 
now concentrated on the sense of sight more than any other. 
In the later stage of my research, this process of thinking became an important 
reference in that, similarly, as I started to approach the subject of all senses, aiming 
to go beyond the primacy of vision, I found my own investigation going back and 
focusing again on vision through investigating the consequences of the absence of it. 
Merleau-Ponty's account on the enigmas of visibility and invisibility was the 
privileged avenue of entry into the question of Being and he did so while still 
defending the special role of painting as opposed to other arts like music. The text 
167 Term he used in various places throughout his work e. g. in Visible and the Invisible, p. 273. 168 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology ofPerception, p. 361 169 The earliest effort to realise his project, the unfinished manuscript written before 1952 called The Prose of the World, produced one lengthy article entitled In directLanguage and the Voices of Silence, published in his lifetime. 
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that best supports this interpretation is Eye and the Mind, which begins with a 
comparison between science and painting. Jay suggests170 that Eye and Mind would 
seem like an apotheosis of vision and in three ways, Merleau-Ponty's later work can be 
interpreted as anticipating some of the themes of later contributors to the anti-ocularcentric 
discourse. First, his new emphasis on the flesh of the world' rather than the lived, 
perceiving body meant that the notion of vision itself began to assume a post-humanist 
inflection. Second, Merleau-Ponty' s increasingly sympathetic interest in psychoanalysis, 
especially the work of Lacan, meant that he came to acknowledge certain of the 
problematic implications of the visual constitution of the self. And finally, his growing 
fascination with language would introduce a potential tension between perception and 
expression, which later thinkers would explicitly develop in anti-ocularcentric directions. 
The post-humanist implications of Merleau-Ponty's concept of the, flesh of the world were 
anticipated in several ways before The Visible and the Invisible. 
Philosophers have at times thought o account for our vision by the image or reflection 
things form upon our retina. This was because they presupposed a second man behind the 
retinal image who had different eyes and a different retinal image responsible for seeing 
the first. Merleau-Ponty added in The Visible and the Invisible that ` the analytic of Being 
and Nothingness is the seer who forgets that he has a body and that what he sees is always 
beneath what he sees, who tries to force the passage toward pure being and pure 
nothingness by installing himself in pure vision, who makes himself a visionary, but who 
is thrown back to his own opacity as a seer and to the depth of being'. 171 Jay states that 
Merleau-Ponty's dethroning of the observing subject, whether Cartesian, Sartrean, 
Husserlian, or Marxist, went so far that at times he seemed to deny not only the link 
170 Op. cit., p. 316 
171 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 88. 
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between vision and the mind, but also between vision and the lived body. 172 In The 
Visible and the Invisible he would write: 
There is here no problem of the alter ego because it is not/who sees, not 
he who sees, because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a 
vision in general, in virtue of that primordial property that belongs to the 
flesh, being here and now, of radiating everywhere and forever, being an 
individual, of being also a dimension and a universal. '73 
It is precisely because of this remarkable anonymity that Merleau-Ponty began to 
talk of `the visible and the invisible', `those utterly impersonal phenomena, rather 
than the viewer and the viewed'. He thus contested the assumption that 
representation by itself could adequately capture the world, and contended that ` what 
I want to do is to restore the world as a meaning of Being absolutely different from 
the represented, that is, as the vertical Being which none of the representations 
exhaust and which all 'reach, ' the wild Being'. 174 
Wild Being, the flesh of the world, thus became the fundamental category for Merleau- 
Ponty, grounding both subject and object, viewer and viewed, mind and body. But 
although ultimately one, thus allowing the narcissism of vision, the flesh is not a specular 
unity or Idealist identity. Instead, it contains internal articulations and differentiations, 
which Merleau-Ponty struggled to capture with terms like dehiscence, separation, latency, 
reversibility, and circularity. 175 Neither purely transparent nor completely opaque, the flesh 
is an interplay of dimensionalities of light and shadow. Consciousness can never have a 
172 Jay, op. cit. p. 318. 
173 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 142 174 Merleau Ponty, Visible and the Invisible, p. 253 175 Jay, op. cit., p. 319. 
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completely positive vision of reality as full presence, because it inevitably has a blind spot 
(punctwn caecwn): 
What it does not see is what makes it see, is its tie to Being, its corporeity, are 
the existentials by which the world becomes visible, is the flesh wherein the 
object is born. It is inevitable that the consciousness be mystified, inverted, 
indirect, in principle it sees the things through the other end, in principle it 
disregards Being and prefers the object to it. 176 
Being was the larger context in which the object was situated. Being is in the 
interplay of the visible and invisible, which no humanist subject can ever truly see. 
If Merleau-Ponty's meditations on the flesh of the world thus undermined traditional 
notions of a coherent viewing subject and raised invisibility to the same ontological 
status as visibility, so too did his cautious embrace of psychoanalysis. Particularly, 
Merleau-Ponty took from Lacan the recognition that the Mirror Stage could well be 
the source of an alienate self and conflict between visually constituted selves. 177 
On the other hand, Lacan referred to Merleau-Ponty, particularly to the notes on the 
glove stating that they correspond : `[... ] very exactly to the schemata [... ] for 
example, the note concerning what he calls the turning inside-out of the finger of a 
glove, in as much as it seems to appear there-note the way in which the leather 
envelopes the fur in a winter glove-that consciousness in its illusion of seeing itself 
seeing itself, finds its basis in the inside-out structure of the gaze [... ]'. 178 
176 Merleau Ponty, Visible and the Invisible, p. 248. In He began to appreciate its substantive contribution to the philosophical problems he so obsessively explored. One aspect of the unconscious which Merleau-Ponty found especially congenial complemented his earlier interests in the cognitive development of children, the role of the so-called mirror stage in creating the knowing 
self. 
172 Lacan, J., The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho Analysis, p. 82 
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Lacan investigated the theme of vision when he integrated the concept of 
scotomization into his analysis of psychosis and when he critically appropriated 
Merleau-Ponty's chiasmic ontology of the visible and the invisible, which he 
redescribed in terms of the eye and the gaze. 
Lacan specifically referred to Merleau-Ponty's concept of the chiasmic intertwining 
of the eye and the gaze in four seminars he gave in 1964 in the collection called The 
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho Analysis under the rubric, Of the Gaze as 
Objet Petit a. Lacan began the first seminar The Split Between the Eye and the Gaze 
by paying tribute to Merleau-Ponty's pioneering interrogation of vision, in particular 
the recently published The Visible and the Invisible. 
This work, Le Visible et l'invisible, may indicate for us the moment of arrival of 
the philosophical tradition- the tradition that begins with Plato with the 
promulgation of the idea, of which one may say that, setting out from an 
aesthetic world, it is determined by an end given to being as sovereign good, 
thus attaining a beauty that is also its limit And it is not by chance that Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty recognised its guide in the eye. In this work, which is both an 
end and a beginning, you will find both a recapitulation and a step forward in 
the path of what had first been formulated in Merleau-Ponty's La 
Phenomenologie de la perception [... This] brings us back, then, to the 
regulation of form, which is governed, not only by the subject's eye, but by his 
expectation's, his movement, his grip, his muscular and visceral emotion 
- 
in 
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short his constitutive presence, directed in what is called his total 
intentionality. 179 
For Lacan, Merleau-Ponty was right in dividing the scopic field, but he was mistaken in 
interpreting it as a Chiasm of visibility and invisibility, that which Lacan conceptualised in 
terms of the eye and the Gaze. Lacan by stating `I see only from one point, but in my 
existence I am looked at from all sides', indicates to us the pre-existence of a gaze. 180 
To explore the implications of the scopic drive, Lacan turned, in the next seminar to the 
theme of anamorphosis through Holbein's painting of The Ambassadors. Before treating it 
directly, he began by commenting on Paul Valery's La Jeune Parque, in which the main 
character talks of seeing himself seeing. The problem with this formulation, Lacan 
suggested, was that it still remained indebted to a Cartesian notion of the subject as 
constituted by the eye alone: `The privilege of the subject seems to be established here 
from that bipolar reflexive relation by which, as soon as I perceive, my representations 
belong to me. ' 181 Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological lternative, according to Lacan, 
lacked the courage to take its Chiasmic conclusions to their nonreciprocal end. Merleau- 
Ponty, he charged, had fallen back on an alleged substratum prior to reflection: `For him, it 
is a question of restoring 
... 
of reconstituting the way by which, not from the body, but 
from something that he calls the flesh of the world, the original point of vision was able to 
emerge 
... 
what I would like to call the function of seeingness (voyeur). ' 182 
Psychoanalysis searches for a primordial voyeur, anterior to the split between the eye and 
179 Lacan, J., The four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, translated by Sheridan, A., Penguin Books 
London first published 1979,1994, p. 71. This is how Lacan talks about Merleau Ponty's thought to show the dependence of the visible on that which places under the eye of the seer. The eye is only the metaphor for 
something that is prior to the eye, the pre-existence of the Gaze: `I see only from one point, but in my existence I 
am looked at from all sides'. 
180 Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsycho-Analysis, p. 72. 181 Lacan, op. cit., p. 81. 
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the Gaze and it does so because it regards consciousness as irremediably limited, and 
institutes it as a principle of idealisation and meconnaissance. The importance of 
construing vision as a scopic drive is that it then must seek an erotic object outside of itself 
for fulfilment: this is the role of the Gaze. For Lacan, the object of drives cannot be 
realised, which is why the eye and the Gaze are shown in perpetual disharmony. 
Lacan reintroduced the visually inflected not merely as an explanation for psychosis, 
but as a dimension of the psyche per se. Blind spots, he implied, were incurable. The 
misprision of visually constituted consciousness operates, as Lacan had earlier 
claimed with reference to the mechanism of foreclosure, by seeking to overcome its 
sense of incompleteness through identification: `The interest the subject takes in his own 
split is bound up with that which determines it
- 
namely, a privileged object, which has 
emerged from some primal separation, from some self-mutilation induced by the very 
approach of the real, whose name, in our algebra, is the objet a'. 1ß3 Martin Jay explains 
that ` the objet a (object small a) was Lacan's term for the object of lack or the missing 
object that will seemingly satisfy the drive for plenitude, "a" being the first letter of the 
French word for "other" (1'autnü)'. 184 
To explicate his assertion that in scopic relations the Gaze functions as the objet a, Lacan 
turned to Sartre's Being and Nothingness in which the reifying power of the Gaze was 
explored. Although he challenged Sartre's claim that the eye cannot see the eye that looks 
at it, he agreed that the Gaze had the quality of being unseen: `The gaze I encounter 
- 
you 
182 Lacan, op. cit., pp 81-82. 
183 Lacan, op. cit., p. 83. 
184 Jay, op. cit., p. 36 1. He also explains that at its most fundamental level, it is the phallus which the child (of whatever 
sex, according to Lacan) wishes to be in order to make up for the mother's alleged lack, her apparent castration. It can then be transformed into the Symbolic register as the metonymic object of desire which motivates the split subject's interminable search for a unity it can never achieve. But it operates as well in the realm of the Imaginary, where `the 
object on which depends the phantasy from which the subject is suspended in an essential vacillation is the Gaze.... From the moment hat this Gaze appears, the subject ries to adapt himself to it, he becomes that punctiform object, that point of vanishing being with which the subject confuses his own failure'. 
124 
can find this in Sartre's own writings, not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the 
field of the Other. ' 185 
In his seminar, entitled The Line and the Light, Lacan reformulated and expanded his 
argument of the Gaze, using triangulated schemas to illustrate the chiasmic intertwining of 
eye and Gaze (fig. 36a). The first, that of the eye, signified Cartesian perspectivalist vision, 
in which the viewer's monocular eye was at the apex and the object at the far wall of the 
triangle. The image was on another line parallel to that wall, but halfway between it and 
the eye/apex. The second schema, that of the Gaze, put a point of light at the apex, the 
picture at the far wall, and what Lacan called the screen halfway between. Here the 
subject is placed not at the apex, but at the midpoint, as if it were an image on a screen in 
a generalised perceptual field, not a seeing eye. This subject, Lacan contended, `is 
caught, manipulated, captured in the field of vision'. 186 
185 Lacan, op. cit., p. 84. 
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186 Lacan, op. cit., p. 92. 
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Developing his argument in relationship to anamorphosis, Lacan understood that 
Holbein's anamorphosed skull with its invocation of the nothingness of death expresses 
this subject trapped in a visual field it cannot master. 
The figure of the dihedron (fig. 36b), introduced by one of Lacan's friends, Roger 
Caillois, resurfaced in his attempt to clarify the relation between eye and Gaze: the 
intersection of two planes. Lacan used the dihedron to superimpose his two visual 
triangles in inverted form. The chiasmic interposition of the two planes created a 
new figure in which the middle sections of both triangles, the image in that of the 
eye, the screen in that of the Gaze, coincided in the form of a divided subject. At its 
centre was an opaque line that as Jay suggests was very different from the 
transparent window typical of the Albertian subject's view on the world. 187 
To clarify its implications, Lacan offered the anecdote, which he claimed was true, of 
himself fishing in Brittany. A friend pointed to a sardine can in the water and said 
laughingly, `You see that can? Do you see it? Well, it doesn't see you! '. Ruminating on 
the lesson his friend had drawn from the floating can, Lacan concluded that it was 
mistaken, for the can `was looking at me, all the same. It was looking at me at the level 
of the point of light, the point of light, the point at which everything that looks at me is 
situated 
- 
and I am not speaking metaphorically'. 188 Lacan, in other words, felt that he 
was indeed in the centre of a conflictual visual field, at once the eye looking at the can 
and the screen in an impersonal field of pure monstrance. 
1: 7 In jay, op. cit., p. 365. 188 Lacan, op. cit., p. 95 
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Jay explains that his subjectivity was thus split between the apex at the end of the 
triangle of the eye and the line in the middle of the triangle of the Gaze. He was both 
the viewer of Holbein's painting and the smeared skull in its visual field. 
Norman Bryson discusses189 the same anecdote in relation to The Ambassadors: 
`What is the source of this strangely empowered look back Lacan's account depends, 
not on the irruption of another personal viewer but the irruption, in the visual field, of 
the Signifier'. 190 Bryson suggests that for human beings collectively to orchestrate 
their visual experience together it is required that each submit his or her retinal 
experience to the socially agreed description(s) of an intelligible world. Vision is 
socialised, and thereafter deviation from this social construction of visual reality can 
be measured and named, variously, as hallucination, misrecognition, or `visual 
disturbance' Between the subject and the world is inserted the entire sum of 
discourses which make up visuality, that cultural construct, and make visuality 
different from vision, the notion of unmediated visual experience. Between retina 
and world is inserted a screen of signs, a screen consisting of all the multiple 
discourses on vision built into the social arena. This screen casts a shadow: 
sometimes Lacan calls it a scotoma, sometimes astain. For when we look through 
the screen, what we see is caught up in a network that comes to us from the outside. 
Bryson argues that when we learn to speak, we are inserted into systems of discourse 
that were there before we were, and will remain after we will be gone. Similarly, 
when we learn to see socially, that is, when we begin to articulate our retinal 
experience with the codes of recognition that come to us from our social milieu(s), 
we are inserted into systems of visual discourse that saw the world before we did, 
189 Bryson, N., `The Gaze in the Expanded Field', Foster, H. ed., Vision and Visuality, New York, Dia Art Foundation 1988, New Press Printing 1999, pp. 87-108. 190 Bryson, N., op. cit., p. 89. 
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and will go on seeing after we see no longer. Into our visual field something cuts, 
cuts across, namely the network of signifiers. 
In refferring directly to Lacan's example from Holbein, Bryson states that Lacan's 
analysis of vision unfolds in the following terms: the viewing subject does not stand at 
the centre of a perceptual horizon, and cannot command the chains and series of 
signifiers passing across the visual domain. Vision unfolds to the side of, in tangent to, 
the field of the other. And to that form of seeing Lacan gives a name: seeing in the field 
of the other, seeing under the Gaze. `In Lacan, something cuts across the space of sight 
and darkens it: the Gaze. ' Bryson questions the paranoid coloration given to the Gaze by 
Lacan's account of vision and painting. 191 He compares it with Eastern painter Ch'an's 
examples that point to regimes of visuality in which the decentering of the subject may 
be thought in terms that are not essentially catastrophic. Bryson then insists: `if, in 
certain "alternative" scopic regimes, decentering is unaccompanied by the sense of 
menace or persecution, why does Lacan provide only one model of vision and of 
painting, that of the negative or terrorizing gaze? ' Bryson gives two answers. The first 
concerns a rather deep uncertainty in Lacan concerning the role of cultural variation in 
the construction of subjectivity. 192 Bryson continues by illustrating the second answer as 
an extension of the first ` [... ] Lacan's portrayal of the Imaginary gives a centrality to his 
argument that is culturally specific, not universal [... ]'. 193 
191 Although in the discussion after the presentation Martin Jay says `I think his early discussion of the "mirror 
stage" as the source of a false notion of the integrity of the ego does reflect a general hostility to the Gaze as a 
source of ideological notions of selfhood. But in the later Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho Analysis, a very 
difficult text, Lacan perhaps moves away from an idea of vision as strictly paranoid and terroristic, and this 
maybe why he draws on Merleau-Ponty to nuance the problem[... ]' in Hal Foster, op. cit. p. 110. 
'92 In Bryson's view, Lacan's description of how the subject is formed unfolds in terms of culture: it is in the 
irruption of the symbolic order and of signification that human subjectivity is precipitated, and since the 
composition of the symbolic order and of the codes of signification are historically and culturally variable, the 
subject in Lacan is given by culture and history, not by nature. In Bryson's view, we are invited to think of Lacan's terms, the Symbolic and the Imaginary, as operating in all of these adult arenas (workplace and the family, in the institutions of education, medicine, law, property, religion, government), and not only at the stage 
of the subject's initial formation (in childhood). Yet Lacan's descriptions tend to privilege the genetic and formative moment, not the long and diverse elaborations of adult life. This concentration on subjective genesis 
makes it difficult to think through the question of cultural variation. 193 Ibid., p. 104. 
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Lacan turned to the realm of painting particularly in the seminar What Is a 
Picture? 194 when he argued that in pictures, something of the Gaze is always 
manifested, but the spectator is invited by the artist to `lay down his gaze there as one 
lays down one's weapons. This is the pacifying Apollonian effect of painting. 
Something is given not so much to the gaze as to the eye, something that involves the 
abandonment, the laying down, of the gaze'. There is, however, a certain duplicity in 
all of this, which Lacan suggested with the concept of the lure. In trompe l'oeil 
paintings in particular, the Gaze in fact triumphs over the eye. 
Martin Jay suggests that the discourse on the Gaze is similar to the negative dialectic 
of lovers described by Sartre: `When in love, I solicit a look, what is profoundly 
unsatisfying and always missing is that 
- 
You never look at me from the place from 
which I see you. Conversely, what I look at is never what I wish to see.... The 
relation 
... 
between painter and the spectator is a play of trompe I'oeil, whatever one 
says. ' The defeat of the mastering eye in trompe-l'oeil art Lacan dubbed "dompte- 
regard". 195Jay summarising Lacan's complicated dialectic of the eye and the Gaze 
suggests that his thinking had moved beyond his early discussion of the Mirror Stage 
196 The objet a Lacan called the Gaze is not a mirror image of the subject: it is 
Chiasmically crossed with the subject's eye. The dyad of specular projection is 
replaced by a dual and inverted triangulation. ` Not only have we moved beyond the 
Imaginary realm of specular doubling into that of the disjunction between desiring 
subject and its unattainable object, but we are also now on the threshold of explicitly 
194 It was by looking at the art of painters like Cezanne, he reminded his audience, that Merleau-Ponty had 
overthrown the traditional identity of Eye and Mind, in op. cit. p. 101. 195 Jay, M., op. cit. p. 366. 196 Jay., op. cit., p. p. 366-368. 
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intersubjective relations. ' 197 
I believe that in my own work, as much as in this discussion, vision may be 
understood as a conflictual field in which the looker is always a body to be observed. 
Even though on one level the impersonal Gaze is a function of the split subject's 
internal dynamics, his/her desire for the objet a as a way to compensate for a lack, on 
another level, it expresses the unsublated dialectic of inter-subjective gazes, that 
dihedron of superimposed visual triangles. As such, vision necessarily enters the 
realm of the Symbolic. 
HI. 3. From Gaze to Chiasm in the artist's work 
The relationship of the understanding of theory of the Gaze to my practical work was 
first approached in the piece Stretched Mirror exhibited at the Centre for Sculpture 
of the Yorkshire Sculpture Park as part of the exhibition A Ritentiva'98 (September 
1997) undertaken before this research project. 
Having designed a project for an installation '3D Mirror' based on a crossed 
perspective composition, and having discussed it with an art critic, I realised I had 
designed a 3D model appropriation of the Lacanian concept. 
I started to understand the implications of this in my intention in making the piece, 
which was also very much grounded in the phenomenological concept of 
Kinaesthesia (knowing space through movement) of the spectator's perception of it. I 
197 ibid., p. 368. 
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then worked on it with the intention of eliminating the symmetry of that design by 
stretching one of its sides, so that the inhabiting viewers entering from different sites 
would have a different view of the illusory inside depth. What I think came out was 
an appropriation and interpretation of that concept where the Gaze was outside, but 
also very much in the eyes of the other. 
The aim of the piece was to investigate the relationship between the viewer and the 
spatial aspects of my work, particularly his/her experience of it through movement, 
but when exhibiting the work I noticed mostly how people interacted with each other 
when inside the built environment, but divided by a transparent screen. In a way each 
viewer became the other person's mirrored image. 
On the other hand the partition stopped the viewer from walking through it, the 
desire to walk through the other half of the piece seen from the outside remained 
unfulfilled. It is the desire emerging from the lack of that experience that involves the 
viewer physically and conceptually, since he or she can only imagine what the view 
would be like, if he or she were in the position of the other. 
198 Cologni, E., A Ritentiva, exhibition catalogue, September 1997, was published on paper and also on the internet online http: //www. pinkink. net/newart/clena. htm 
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My own understanding of the concept of the Gu: e developed through this earlier work 
completed after my Masters Course at Bretton Hall College, University of Leeds, and was 
more recently investigated through the piece, previously referred to as Mirroring. 
`24tr' of May00 
12.30 to go out with my video camera 
no specific plan apart from that of asking unknown people 
to take an image of myself; after having done a couple of 
attempts I can see that: I take a shot of the environment I 
am in; I focus on one particular person and then ask 
him/her to take a picture of myself. ' 
`MIRRORING THE PROCESS 
Given context 
observer screen observer 
myself each of us image the other 
71wzue he ajjal tf ºtprutnlefim 
There are here two concepts involved in the process of 
making: 
*one regards the action of meeting the other and 
communicating to them referring to the Lacan's concept of 
the gaze. 
*The second is the selection process. I choose one image 
of myself and one image of the person I relate to. To 
collect images and select out of them the most interesting. 
In these two processes what changes is the position of 
myself in relation to the other, who was before involved in 
the making as much as me, and then present with the 
produced material for me to be used. 
The two concepts are applied to the two different 
chronological stages in the work. In these the relationship between the positions of artist and viewer change. 
135 
1 stage. An exchange of role between artist and viewer is 
involved in the happening of the creative act in present 
time in the shared context. Intentionality is what 
distinguishes that of the artist. In the first stage we 
act in order to communicate through the production of each 
other's images literally projecting each other's images 
onto the camera screen 
. 
We meet at the midpoint, the 
screen onto which both images are captured. The screen 
functions as both partition and filter for communication. 
...... 
.... 
I ........... 
. 
.................... Cý 8 
Myself with Viewer, other Myself, other 
videocamera 
2"d stage. It is the artist who acts in present 
the documentation of a past action- in relation 
Other as memory. The viewer is not involved at 
a. b. 
Viewer with 
vidcocamera 
time on 
to the 
this stage. ' 
a. 
199 
_H__ Selecting and Collecting stills from shots 
A similar composition concept was applied to a different format in the production of 
the piece Ancora Cerca (performed at National Portrait Gallery, NPG, London 12-14 
March 1999 and presented as an 8-monitor video installation at the Pinacoteca Tosio 
Martinengo in Brescia, Italy, between the 6 and 24 April 2002). 
19' From my diary 24` May 2000. 
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For this piece I worked with the existing video security system of the gallery. After 
having done some research on the ideal location for the performance within the 
space, I looked at the monitors to which the video-cameras would send the captured 
video information and made notes. This enabled me to visualise the space from the 
viewpoint of the cameras 
- 
the space I would physically enter while performing. As 
an example here is an extract from my diary notes at the time. The performance took 
place on the 12th of March, the recording of it from the documentation on the 14 `h 
`... room 17-cam. 24 
-coming from18-sop between sculpture and 
entrance-watch camera 
room 19- cam25 
- 
stop watch camera between glass case and 
sculpture 
room2l-cam26 
- 
standing behind sculpture watching camera 
room 22-cam 28- walking from 21 in the middle and out 
room 18- sitting on sofa... ' 
200 
I think that as the piece took place, I was aware that I was working on a moltiplicity 
of viewpoint from which I could see myself in the gallery as well as on a number of 
different role I was playing in the Gallery. 
200 Ibid. 
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To illustrate the project better I have analysed the event in the stages of relationship 
between the artist/ the institution/the audience, as described in the following 
diagrams which are plan views. 
Diagram a. (fig. 40) 12 March 
- 
performance: I would stage an encounter 
with the warden watching the surveillance monitors in the NPG, by walking towards 
and watching the video-camera of each chosen room. As I address the camera in each 
room, I become a `picture' in the gallery, yet the camera, fantasised as the Gaze of 
the Other is also, as it were, `pictured' as the spectator sees me imaging what it is 
seeing and giving myself the things I lack and are looking for. 
2. Diagram b. ' (fig. 41) 14 March 
- 
video recording: I went back two days after 
(as required by the gallery for security reasons) and played back the tapes that were 
stored. I was surprised to find that the system reduced the footage by half, so that not 
all frames were kept. As a result the quality of the recording was poor. However, I 
placed the video camera in front of the screen to record the half an hour of the 
performance: the recording of the action went through a number of filters. 
3. Diagram b. In the resulting video, the viewers see the evidence of the 
performance through the `eye' of these surveillance cameras, that have videoed me 
walking from room to room barefoot, clad in a beige dress, and evoking a romantic 
spirit of the gallery by carrying a red rose. The spectators, at this stage positioned as 
the camera when watching the surveillance video or see stills from it, are pictured by 
myself as I look at the camera. The spectators project what I might have seen from 
my vantage point in the gallery space. In this gallery dedicated to the construction of 
identity through picturing it, this performance makes the deep structures of that 
identity construction emerge, so we all become aware of how much both the artist 
and the spectator never fully or comfortably, inhabit the illusory space of 
identification. 
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In this project the process evolved beyond the initial intention at the end of the 
performance, which took place in one frame of time and context (that of the N. P. G. ) 
with one audience, was then put into a different time and context and perceived by a 
different audience (the Pinacoteca Tosio Martinengo in Brescia, Italy). 
June 1999. `I took the video from the security system's 
monitors in the control room on March the 14th. Every 
camera recorded the half hour of the performance reduced by 
the National Portrait Gallery system in half. I wanted to 
bring the real time back by slowing the motion in order to 
have the correspondence between real time of the 
action(then) and fruition time of the observes (now). This 
operation suggests that there is something in the middle, a 
partition, a screen which the Institution represents. The 
image that the eight security system cameras fixed of me, 
are projected onto walls at a human size scale in order to 
give to real space that screen image of myself. The 
observer looks for my image who is looking for her/him and 
dissolves. The multi-portrait of myself relates to the 
person who looks. The eight projections show the half-hour 
performance in which I walk barefoot carrying a red rose in 
the gallery. ' 
201 
By looking back to this piece I can see that an interchange was taking place with the 
audience, and partially in a phenomenological sense. This approach can be found 
throughout my research, particularly developed through performative art practice. 
Here the idea of intersubjectivity as formulated by Merleau-Ponty, also the source for 
Lacan's conception of the Gu: e, becomes the main reference. I would trace a brief 
development of this concept already mentioned earlier, through other commentators 
and in relation to my own artistic understanding of it and as a fundamental notion in 
Body Art dynamics. James Schmidt suggests202 that for a description of the relation 
between self and other, Merleau-Ponty drew on Paul Valery's account of the 
`exchange' of regards (before Lacan did). `Once gazes interlock, there are no longer 
quite two persons and it's hard for either to remain alone. This exchange... effects 
201 From my diary notes. 202 James Schmidt, 'Maurice Merleau-Ponte, Between phenomenology and structuralism', Theoretical traditions 
in the Social Sciences, MacMillan Publishers London, 1985, p. 91. Schmidt addresses the definition of the Other throught Merleau-Ponty's philosophy and in relation to other philosophers and %Nriters, pp. 59-99. In my own investigation the issue of other is not addressed, instead my aim is to understand the dynamics for interchange 
with what I targeted (my own image, the audience, the environment). 
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a transposition, a metathesis, a chiasm of two `destinies', two points of view. You 
take my appearance, my image, and I take yours. You are not I, since you see me and 
I don't see myself. What is missing for me is this `I' whom you can see. And what 
you miss is the "you" I see. '203 
In Valery, the crossing of regards initiates a process of `simultaneous, reciprocal 
limitation' which yields a `decentering', not an 'annihilation' 
. 
204 Schmidt's makes a 
parallel with Sartre and states that he knew only `a me-other rivalry' whereas in 
Valery's notion there is a `co-functioning' of self and other. In Schmidt view, Valery 
confirmed Merleau-Ponty's misgivings about Sartre's description of the `regard 
d'autrui'. Valery's use of the term ('hiasm, ` 05reciprocal interpenetrations, and 
crossings was adopted by Merleau-Ponty to suggest an alternative to Sartre's 
panoramic vision. 206 
Schmidt explains that Merleau-Ponty had been groping towards an understanding of 
dialectical thought which would free itself from the standpoint of a `spectator 
consciousness' by stating that there is dialectic only in that type of being in which a 
junction of subjects occur, which is the place of their exchange and of their 
reciprocal interpenetration. To remain faithful to this conception of the dialectic, he 
went on to argue in The Visible and the Invisible, that the dialectic was above all else 
the refusal of panoramic thinking'. This was conceived, according to Schmidt, by 
drawing on Valery, as he suggested in one of the working notes for The Visible and 
the Invisible that the dialectic must be grasped as a ('hiusm, a 'reversal'. 
203 Paul Valery, 'Analects', trans. S. Gilbert, Collected Works, vol. 14, Princeton. Princeton University Press. 1970, p26. 204 Just as Sartre's panoramic vision had overlooked the interweaving of being and nothingness, so too it had been blind to the ('hiasm in which self and other were tangled. Sartre viewed the regard, as a 'look that kills'. 205 Schmidt description of it is the following: 'a word which denoted X-shaped configurations of the sort frequentl% encountered in anatomy (for example the interweaving of optic nerves) and by extension referred to all those interweavings', op. cit. p. 90. 206 Ibid., p. 91 
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Merleau-Ponty conceived tangible touchers and visible seers in this way 
transforming the problem of the other. The philosopher describes what occurs when 
one hand touches the other hand while this other hand is touching something else. 
This is particularly helpful in attempting to fathom the implications of the notion of 
the ('hiasm for his philosophy. In Schmidt's view, as early as the PhenomenologTy'? f 
Perception, before his first recourse to Valery's `chiasm of regards', Merleau-Ponty 
had discussed this example. 207 He returned to it once again in the last two years of his 
life, after having made the ('hiasm the central metaphor in his new ontology'. 
My own position in respect of the problem of the other is close to Merleau-Ponty's in 
The Visible and the Invisible. The other represent a problem only to a philosophy 
which operates with a set of categories separating mind and body, consciousness and 
world, subject and object. This vocabulary was abandoned by Merleau-Ponty in i/u' 
Visible und the Invisihle. 2° In my own investigation, the issue of other is thereibre 
not addressed, instead my aim is to understand the dynamics for interchange with 
what I targeted: my own image, the audience, the environment. 
I believe the concept of Chiasm was embodied in the video /3/u (2000), then 
presented as video live installation B/uX (2001). The latter was presented at the 
Conference Exchange 2000, organised by University of West England in Bristol, as 
video live installation at the Watershed Media Centre, Bristol. The function of the 
chiasmatic composition was to incorporate the audience's presence and fruition. In 
some of my notes I wrote: 
'190900 on the plane to Italy 
207 Schmidt, op cit., p. 92. 20' The other is not a problem because it is not I who sees, not he who sees'- instead an 'anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a vision in general, in virtue of that primordial property that belongs to the flesh'. 
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Referring to the chiasmus composition of blu and blux, 
where there are four terms, I feel that what perceptually 
tends to happen, in case one of the terms were missing, is 
that the perceiver wants to fill the gap. As much as the 
fruition of the video blu demands that participation as the 
4th term in the chiasmatic relation, in the performance 
bluX I was the forth term closing the composition and 
therefore leaving out the audience. Both of them are valid. 
I think that the concept of chiasmus overlaps with a mirror 
composition: it is a crossed mirroring composition. 
Thinking about the concept of chiasmus one can think 
visually at a parallelism referred to a plane, in this 
particular case, both the video perceived by a viewer and 
myself performing in front if it, the static flat 
composition becomes that intersecting mirroring 
composition. We can state that physical depth has been 
applied to it. Therefore my question is: how to act in the 
space? 
.............................. 
Derrida's concept on 
mirror- reflection RE-FLECTERE' 
209 
I illustrated the project in the paper published after the Conference: 
The video blu shows the artist in an intimate action which was done in 
front of a camera without spectators. The action of caressing and then 
scratching the belly symbolises the coexistence of extreme opposite 
feelings in relation to love. The scrolling written text relates to the action 
on the video, while the sound text expresses an opposite meaning. This is 
to say that a Chiasmatic composition is used here. ('hiasmus, a rhetorical 
figure whose name derives from the Greek letter CI-11 and visually 
expressed with the equivalent of the English letter X, might be defined as 
reverse parallelism, [ 
... 
] Only three of the terms of the ('hiusnius are 
included in the space of representation of the work, the actual video. The 
forth term is outside that space and is represented by the spectators 
looking at the video. Their involvement comes into play because of that 
gap of significance which they fill with their individual perception of, 
and response to, the work. 2 111 
209 Diary notes published in Cologni, E., In Between, catalogue of the exhibition at the Lethaby Gallery, London 28 May-3 June 2002 
210 
'Interaction as a research data collecting system: the chiasmus', presentation and 'BluX' %"ideo performance, at 
conference: Exchange 2000: %ncilitating research in Art, Design and t echnology, Watershed Media Centre, University of West England, Bristol- 2/3 Nov. 2000, published in H'xhange on line Journal at http //Nv-v w. media. uwwwe. ac uk/exchange online 
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Chiasmus composition of performance 
words pronounced by wetten text scrolling in 
myself in me video the video 
yowmrkmi ,. r tike cars 
bell y. aru y. eai. cm 
.r fk t1ri m. rcanaw 
I 
-Y be* aces Illy lend 
It centck ft 
lion happening action shown in the video 
in present time screening' blu 1993-2000 
figure 44 a. Composition for performance Blu. \'. 2000 
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fi2ure44 h. Mu \, -', stiffs from , idea documentation. 1'c rformed at \\ atershed Media 
Centre, Bristol. 2000, London Biennal, 2000, Camberwell College, 2000. 
B1uX is the video performance211, which takes place when it is myself that fills the 
gap. In relating to the sound text I complete the Chiasmatic composition myself. 
Here, the present dimensions of space and time in a public space relate to the 
representation on video of the same action that happened in the past and in an 
intimate place. 
III. 4. Inter-subjectivity in Body Art 
In my own practical work the inter-subjective element has been the basis for the 
exchange with the viewer whose active presence in the live pieces, as well as in the 
perception of the performative video and photographic `documentation', 
complements their meaning and interpretation (as already illustrated through my 
artistic research). I believe performative actions have enabled me to experience the 
philosophical phenomenological ground offered by Merleau-Ponty, in relation to 
which the senses are investigated in the work. Particularly in the projects Senses- 
Drawing Scents and Public Private Perceptions the cross-modal association of the 
senses ynaesthetic phenomena have been investigated. 
In order to understand the use of the Body Art in my work I have found it necessary 
to review the theoretical positions of Amelia Jones and Lea Vergine. 
According to Amelia Jones, Body Art places the body/self within the realm of the 
aesthetic as a political domain. It provides the possibility for radical engagements 
that can transform the way we think about meaning and subjectivity (as artist and 
211 It was performed on 1 June 2000 at Camberwell College London, on 21 June 2000 as part of the London Biennial and at the screening session at the Conference Exchange 2000, Watershed Centre in Bristol, on 2 November 2000. 
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spectators). Body Art proposes the art `object' as a site where reception and 
production come together: a site for inter-subjectivity. Jones explains that Body Art 
confirms what phenomenology and psychoanalysis have taught us: that the subject is 
constituted by the relationship with others and that the locus of identity is always 
elsewhere. Body Art, she states `demonstrates that meaning is an exchange and 
points to the impossibility of any practice being "inherently" positive or negative in 
cultural value. '212 
The concept of interchange is discussed in terms of intersubjectivity in Amelia 
Jones' account on Body Art, which has also drawn upon Martin Jay's thought, by 
stressing the importance of Merleau-Ponty's concept of intertwining in the 
development of Body Art in challenging the Cartesian subject. I will draw parallels 
with an earlier account on Body Art written in the 70's by Lea Vergine: Body Art 
(1974). In the book Vergine sees the origin of the interchange with the audience in 
the effect of catharsis typical of Greek tragedies, mainly read through 
psychoanalysis. 
Lea Vergine gives a reading of performance as ritual and spectacle, where the 
audience is mainly involved at a perceptual, psychological level, based on the 
concepts of projection and transference. She states: 
... 
the relationship between the artist and the other is a question of being 
close to or distant from objects. And this leads to the self-satisfied 
cohabitation of a certain group with itself as well as to a situation of 
affectionate self-observation for the spectator. We observe the 
212 Jones, A., op. cit., p. 14. 
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recuperation of the love object and we also observe the refurbishment of 
this image in the external world as a kind of compensation for the 
charges of affective energy that have remained deluded within us... 213 
Vergine also defines the projection of the audience as : `[... ]a kind of comfort (or 
even self-complacency) in the control of specular identification which is to say in 
one's motorial co-ordination in a mirror [... ]. Narcissus projects himself outside of 
himself in order to be able to love what is inside of himself. The search for another 
self is the search for a partner, and vice-versa[... ]'. In her view projection expels an 
internal menace that has been created by the pressure of an intolerable impulse to be 
transformed into an external menace that can be more easily handled. So doing, the 
artists shift their problem from the ` subject to the object', or from `the inside to the 
outside'; Vergine suggests that in this way feelings that artists do not want to 
recognise as their own, are projected away from the ego and situated elsewhere 
outside in other things or other people. 14 
She states that the extension of psychoanalytic awareness has opened the road to a 
better understanding of the notion and functioning of catharsis, referring to 
Aristotle's phenomenon of purification, which allows the self to establish a control 
that has been endangered by censured instinctual needs. She describes the important 
role of this phenomenon for the artist and audience: 
We are also allowed an intensity of reaction that many individuals would 
be hard put to allow themselves without the protection of an aesthetic 
213 The references are from Vergine, L., II corpo come linguaggio (la "Body-art "e stone simili), trans. Inga Pin, L., Giampaolo Prearo Editore, Milano 1974, p. 15 214 ibid., p. 33-34 
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situation. We know that in many cases this reluctance is due to the 
pressures of education that tend under certain cultural conditions to 
devaluate the expression of intense emotion and to allow it to exist only 
if it is ordered within schemes and institutions. And art is precisely such 
a socially approved occasion for intense emotional reaction. 215 
In her view, thus, the public must be involved in a collective experience that leads it 
to reconsider its quotidian existence and the rules if its ordinary behaviour, their role 
is no more that of passive contemplation. The relationship between public and artists 
becomes a relationship of complicity. The artists offer their hand to the spectator and 
the success of the operation depends upon how and how much the spectator is 
willing to accept it. The gesture of the artists who make the proposition acquires 
significance only if their actions are met by an act of recognition on the part of the 
spectator. The artists need to feel that others are receptive to them, that they are 
willing to play the game of accepting their provocation and they will give them back 
their `projections'. The behaviour of the spectator is a gratification for the artist just 
as the behaviour of the artist is a gratification for the spectator. 
Vergine's text was crucial in the seventies, in that she actively took part in creating a 
context for debate of performance and Body Art. 
Vergine's very important argument of catharsis was influential on of much Body Art. 
However, in my own production I am very aware of the limitations of such a 
215 Ibid, p. 37. 
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direction. Whilst the concept of catharsis remains valid, this does not form a 
significant aspect of my work. 216 
Amelia Jones, on the other hand, reads Body Art as dissolving the metaphysical 
idealism and the Cartesian subject embedded in the conception of modernism 
hegemonic in Europe and the United States in the postwar period. 217 Descartes' s 
dualistic conception of consciousness or cogito opposed to the brute object of the 
body dominated Enlightenment and, in her view, then modernist (nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century) ways of conceiving the subject. 218 In her view, art history and 
criticism have long taken their direction from this conception 
- 
with I, the eye/I of 
the artist, closely paralleled by the eye/I of the art critic or historian, who takes her or 
his authority from a close identification with the transcendent `vision' of the original 
creator. 
Jones suggests that body artists, often drawing on phenomenological models, began 
to enact their embodied subjectivities in relation to audiences with this 
intersubjective exchange constitutive of the work of art. `Working in concert with the 
216 I acknowledge the importance of Vergine's in the general context and kn cage of Body Art and 
performance. I review here some of the key artists contributing to this history. Heimann Nitsch explains the 
effect on the audience in the following way: `This growing activity of the whole sensorial apparatus can be 
compared to psychoanalytic analysis. [... ] The events which actually happen on the stage of this ` theatre of 
orgies and mysteries' are reflected in the soul of each spectator, favoring access in all its totality, ofthe lived 
existential mystique, this time, not individually but collectively'. Gina Pane as well as Nitsch provide two 
examples upporting the concept of catharsis outlined by Vergine. Pane explained her way of expressing 
herself using her body: `The body and its support for a non linguistic communication [... ]', furthermore in her 
view `The Visual Communication remains of the "universal" type because it reintroduces the fundamental 
social relationships'. In SentimentalAction (1974) the psychoanalytic aspect ofthe subject matter is very 
strong as she describes the piece: `Projection of an "intra" space in which what is lived by the sentiments between two women is intercalated by the magic mother/child relationship, which death symbolises. This infra 
space is stated by an exchange-mirror close circuit: Woman/Women identifying themselves in the process of 
primary emotive phenomenon: mother/child, asymbolic relationship and one which can discover different and 
emotional solution by introjection of one's own conflicts. ' 217 Although alternatives to the Cartesian philosophy can be found earlier on and it can be argued that, since the beginning the XXth century, a number of attempts were expressed in the avant-garde art. 
In her view, predicated on vision (the `I' of the subject was a disembodied `eye' turning all bodies into objects), Cartesianism had a special force within artistic modernism, which was first dominated by French artists and writers 
embedded in the Cartesian tradition, then borrowed by the United States from France after World War H. Descartes's dualism soul-body is highlighted in Discourse on Method. 
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major shifts in philosophical thought and in the social realm, where the normative 
subject was being profoundly challenged by the various rights movements, body art 
dissolves the opposition informing the Cartesian conception of the self [... ]'219 
Cindy Nemser quotes Merleau-Ponty linking Body Art and phenomenology in the 
1971 article Subject-Object Body Art: 
Our body is not in space like things; it inhabits or haunts space. It applies 
itself to space like a hand to an instrument, and when we wish to move 
about we do not move the body as we move an object. We transport it 
without instruments as if by magic, since it is ours and because through it 
we have direct access to space. For us the body is much more than an 
instrument or a means; it is our expression in the world, the visible form 
of our intentions. Even our most secret affective movements, those most 
deeply tied to the humoral infrastructure, help to shape our perception of 
things. 220 
Jones states that Body Art, does not illustrate Merleau-Pontian conceptions of the 
embodiment of the subject and theories of the decentered self that we are now familiar 
with from post-structuralist theory; rather, it enacts or performs or instantiates the 
embodiment and intertwining of self and other. 221 `Body art is one of the many 
manifestations or articulations of this contingency or reciprocity of the subject that we now 
recognize as post-modem. ' In her view it is productive to explore Body Art through a 
219 Jones, A., op. cit., p. 38. 220 Merleau-Ponty, from Primacy of Perception; 221 Jones, A., op. cit., p. 38. 
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phenomenological nd feminist framework, as the phenomena re interrelated in their 
compulsion to dissolve and/or interrogate the modernist subject222 
In 1959 the US sociologist Erving Goffman published a book entitled The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, which discusses the self as a performance in 
relation to others, a negotiation involving complex intersubjective cues and 
behaviours. The self, Goffman argues, 
does not derive from its possessor, but from the whole scene of his action.... 
A correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to impute a self 
to a performed character, but this imputation 
- 
this self- is a product of a 
scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it The self, then, as a performed 
character, is not an organic thing that has a specific location 
... 
it is a 
dramatic effect arising diffusely from a scene that is presented. 223 
Goffman's book links together the theoretical exploration of the self and the performative 
bodies of Body Art (especially in its US manifestations). Jones states that in the 1960s, a 
number of artists in the United States read Goffman's book, as well as some of the work of 
Merleau-Ponty. Goffman's instrumentalized version of French existentialist phenomenology 
along with Merleau-Ponty's own writings, among other texts, provide a model for a younger 
generation artists, such as Vito Acconci, who came of age after the heroic era of abstract 
expressionism, and within the explosive social changes in the 1960s. 224 The philosophical 
222 Ibid. 
Erving Goffman, The Presence of Self in Everyday Life, Garden City, NY, 1959, pp. 252-253. 224 Kate Linker discusses Acconci's interest in the work of Merleau-Ponty and Goffman as well as that of 
psychologist Kurt Lewm, in Vito Acconci (New York: Rizzoli, 1994), 30 46-47. Maurice Berger briefly mentions Robert Morris's interest in Merleau-Ponty in Labyrinths: Robert Morns, Minimalism and the 1960s. (New York: Icon, 1989), n, 12,65. It is Rosalind Krauss elaborated the links between phenomenology and minimalism, in Passages in Modem Sculpture (Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1977), 239-40, and, especially, in Richard Serra: A Translation, `The Originality of the Avant-Garde', 260-74. This latter essay argues that abstract 
expressionism adopted the existentialist dimension of French phenomenology without its deeper implications in terms of perception and inter-subjectivity and that it was only with minimalism that these implications began to be explored fully. According to Amelia Jones, Krauss is one of the few US art historians, along with Michael Fried, who did not ignore the Merleau-Pontyan axis of 1960-5 practices, although Krauss had largely turned to 
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notion of the self as an embodied performance was expanded and developed through Body 
Art's radical opening up of the structures of artistic production and reception. 
According to Jones the performative self, whose meaning and significance is not 
inherent or transcendent but derived ` from the whole scene of his action', 
dramatically overturns the Cartesian self of modernism, which construes the body 
not as enacting the self but ` as a brute object or hollow vessel given meaning only 
through the animating force of the consciousness that presumably can thus transcend 
it'. The lived body, Merleau-Ponty observed in his 1945 Phenomenology of 
Perception, is not discrete from the mind as vessel but is, in fact, the ` expressive 
space' by which we experience the world. Unlike other objects in the world, the body 
cannot be thought as separate from the self, nor does it signify or `express the 
modalities of existence in the way that stripes indicate rank, or a house-number a 
house: the sign here does not only convey its significance, it is filled with it'. 225 
Jones suggests that Phenomenology interprets and produces the self as embodied, performative, 
and intersubjective 
- 
the critique of Cartesianism thus also involves a Hegelian dimension as the 
French Phenomenologists theorised a self that was both embodied but also articulated in relation 
to a self-other (master-save) dialectic. 26 It was Merleau-Ponty and Lacan, as already suggested, 
who in 1940's and 1950's began to theorise the splitting or dissolving of the Cartesian subject 
Jones suggests that Merleau-Ponty's observations about the contingency and reciprocity of the 
self/other, and his emphatic critique of vision-oriented theories that polarise subject/object 
Lacan as the predominant theoretical model in her work by the mid 1980s. As much as in Jones, the fascination 
with phenomenology seems to have been largely gender-based although Jones states that she interviewed several feminist Body Artists active during the same period (Schneemann, Wilke, and others) who said they were not directly interested in phenomenology, although they were aware of many of these issues. 225 Merleau-Ponty, M., Phenomenology of Perceptions, trans. Colin Smith, New York, Humanities Press, 1962, p. 141, quoted by Jones, A., op. cit., p. 39. 226 Jones refers to this conception of an intersubjective, embodied subject contingent on her or his others as expanded 
upon and radicalised by poststructuralism and feminism as well as, she argues by Body Art. Thus, the intellectual trajectory of phenomenology (especially from France) and a feminist poststructuralism, both of which articulate an 
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relations, seem to relate closely to Gofman's paradigm. 
Jones suggests that Merleau-Ponty's anti-empiricism and his insistence on the fully 
embodied nature of inter-subjectivity enables him to conceptualise inter-subjectivity 
as imbricated rather than oppositional, as inter-subjective and embedded rather than 
simplistically staged in a discrete social environment. 227 While Sartre sustains in his 
phenomenological work a more strictly Hegelian view of self/other relations as 
structured by conflict, Merleau-Ponty posits the self-other as reciprocal. Additionally, 
Merleau-Ponty insisted on embodiment by going beyond vision-oriented models of 
self and other to differentiate his work from Lacan' s theories of self. 228 
Merleau-Ponty's theory of inter-subjectivity moves away from what Jones defines as 
`the lingering idealism' of Phenomenology of Perception to theorise a Chiasmic 
intertwining of self and other. His The Chiasm-The Intertwining, published 
posthumously in 1964, is especially rich in relation to Body Art. In this text, Merleau- 
Ponty embeds vision in touch, touch in vision, and their chiasmic crossing is the flesh of 
the world/the body itself: differentiating modes of vision (colour and visible) is a tissue 
that is ` not a thing but a possibility, a latency, and a flesh of things. The chiasmus is the 
doubled and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and of the tangible in the 
visible, ' and the flesh of the visible indicates the carnal being- at once subjective and 
objectified. 229 Merleau Ponty writes that there is a `reciprocal insertion and intertwining' 
of the seeing body in the visible body: we are both subject and object simultaneously, 
explicitly anti-Cartesian theory of the subject, underlies and informs my attempt to rethink Body Art and move it out of 
its consignment o essentialist oblivion. 227 Jones, A., op. cit., p. 228 Jones explains, at least as the latter have been popularised in contemporary cultural discourse in the United States (where the subject is staged through a disembodied-if psychically invested sense of vision that produces 
her/him as image). 22' Merleau-Ponty, M., The Chiasm-The Intertwining, pp. 134,135 
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and our `flesh' merges with the flesh that is the world. There is no limit or boundary 
between the body and the world since the world is flesh 
. 
230 
Amelia Jones states that the body/self is simultaneously both subject and object in 
the experience of the world, the two subjects involved (art maker, art interpreter) are 
collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity. 231 
Through the notion of flesh Merleau-Ponty theorises the interrelatedness of both mind and 
body defined by Jones as `the embodiedness of the self 232 and the reciprocity and 
contingency of the body/self on the other. According to Jones, this is what Lacan describes 
as the phenomenology of the transference by which the self is located in the other: `What I 
seek in speech is the response of the other. What constitutes me as subject is my question. 
... 
I identify myself in language, but only by losing myself in it like an object'. 233 
Jones suggests that in Lacan's view it is in seeing a whole chain come into play at the 
level of the desire of the other that the subject's desire is constituted. 
Jones argues that, while the body/self is inexorably sexual in Merleau-Ponty's formulation, 
and while he acknowledges (with a distant glance toward the master/ slave dialectic) the 
asymmetry of the reversibility of perception, like Lacan he theorises the sexual 
subject/object from an implicitly masculine point of view and continues her argument by 
drawing upon feminist writers such as Judith Butler, Luce Irigaray and Carolyn Dean. 234 
230 Ibid., p. 138. 231 Jones, A., op. cit., p. 4 1. 232 Jones, A., op. cit. p. 41. 233 Lacan, J., Ecrits': A Selection, tr. Alan Sheridan, Norton, New York, London, p. 86. 234 Jones in Chapter II of her book Body Art Performing the subject, traces an account of feminist Philosophers 
and writers who, drawing upon Lacan and Merleau-Ponty, contributed to the decentering of the masculine subject between 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the work of Judith Butler, Luce Irigaray, Carolyn Dean. Amelia Jones in the cited opus expands on the argument by illustrating that a number of feminist philosophers have reworked Merleau-Ponty's formulation through the lens of sexual difference, acknowledging the rendered configuration of 
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In illustrating both Vergine's and Jones's understandings of the audience involvement in 
Body Art, I realised that that two positions relate to the development of my own practical 
research, also in a chronological order. In my own work I was much more aware of the 
cathartic and psychoanalytic aspect of the work, the phenomenological reading of which 
allowed me to readdress my aims towards the relationship between the psychological 
and the physical, to investigate my own position within Merleau-Ponty's ` flesh of the 
world'. 
IV. 4.1. Artist/audience interaction 
In this section, I shall focus on how Body artists addressed the issue of interchange in 
their own practice particularly in relation to the audience in order to form the context 
for my own pieces adopting similar strategies. 
According to Jones, around 1969 New York artist Vito Acconci used his body to provide 
an alternative to the poetic text; it was a way, he said, of shifting the focus from the words 
to himself as an image. So instead of writing a poem about following Acconci acted the 
Following Piece as part of Street Works IV (1969). I relate Acconci' s Following Piece to 
my project Mirroring, in its relationship to the viewers. The piece consisted of Acconci 
following randomly chosen individuals in the street, abandoning them when they left the 
the asymmetrical master/slave aspect of the subjectlobject relations in Western patriarchy. Judith Butler pinpoints 
Merleau-Ponty's tendency, in the earlier work, to theorise self/other relations in terms that implicate without 
theorizing gender asymmetry in Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological Description. Luce Irigaray plays against 
Merleau-Ponty's blindness to gender by inserting the ` maternal-feminine' into his language: the flesh is 
feminized as "a maternal, materialising flesh, reproduction 
... 
placental tissue. ' The Invisible of the Flesh a 
reading ofMerleau Ponty 
. 
Simone de Beauvoir, friend and colleague of Merleau-Ponty, lover of Sartre, was the first to expose the gendered specificity of the self/other relation in her 1949 opus The Second Sex. Beauvoir's 
book was the first to expand the general critique of the Cartesian subject of modernism and to interrogate it as having an exclusionary, masculinist dimension. Jones explains further that Beauvoir's book begins a radical 
particularisation of the phenomenological theory of a subject still (in the 1940s) largely assumed to be 
`universal'. Here, the dialectic between the self and other outlined by Sartre (and more subtly transformed by Merleau-Ponty and Lacan) is reworked with an awareness of the mapping of power through gender in patriarchy. Sartre's existentialist argument, in Being and Nothingness, that the subject has the capacity to project himself into 
transcendence (the pour-sot) out of the fundamental immanence of the en-soi, is reread by Beauvoir as a 
privileged potentiality open only to male subjects in patriarchy. 
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street to enter a building. According to Jones, Acconci' s strategic act of following is 
motivated, as he himself admits, by a desire to define himself through a relation with the 
other rather than by any need to explore the other for her or his own sake: `If I pick 
someone to follow, then I can be tied into this other person. I can be dragged into another 
person. 
... 
[In Following Piece] there was no viewer or, if anything, I was the viewer. I see 
myself as the audience of people walking in the street'. Here, Acconci has enabled his wish 
to incorporate the other, to become the viewer, not to explore her/him in her/his difference. It 
was invisible in that people were unaware that it was going on; Acconci made other pieces 
that were equally private. Jones suggests that, though introspective, they were also the work 
of an artist looking at himself as an image, seeing the artist as others might see him: Acconci 
saw himself as a marginal presence. In Jones's view the implications of others in his 
subsequent performances led Acconci to the notion ofpower-fields as described by the 
psychologist Kurt Lewin in the Principle of Topological Psychology, where Acconci found a 
description of how each individual radiated a personal power-field, which included all 
possible interaction with people and objects in a particular physical space. His work from 
1971 dealt with this power-field between himself and others in specially constructed spaces. 
Acconci's subsequent works led to a further interpretation of the power-field, designing a 
space which suggested his personal presence. In Command Performance (1974), Acconci 
takes this withdrawal of the performance to an extreme and is absent entirely. The work 
consisted of an empty space, chair and monitor, with the soundtrack inviting the viewer to 
create his or her own performance. 235 Jones's reading of Acconci's Body Art works is to 
enable a critical reading of masculinity and Cartesian subjectivity in general. 236 
235 Amelia Jones writes about Acconci's work in the chapter The body in Action; Vito Acconci and the Coherent 
Male Artistic Subject of the previously mentioned book. Vito Acconci's work from this period exemplifies the 
potential of Body Art projects `both to interrogate the normative values inscribed in the trope of the artist genius 
epitomised by the modernist Jackson Pollock and to subvert formalist modernism's closed systems of 
`disinterested' interpretation by insisting on the intersubjective' dimension of the experience and interpretation of 
works of art. Acconci's ambivalent, self-exposing Body Art works point to the dilemma faced by male artists in 
the post-1960 period in the United States and Europe. Jones, A., op. cit., p. 103. 
'm She argues that `Acconci's pathetic masculinity blatantly fails to cleanse itself of the "feminine" and the "homose ial"'. 
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In Jones view, in Acconci's `Seedbed' (1972), he enacted in the ` most literal fashion 
the structures by which the institutions of art veil the modernist genius'; hidden 
under a ramp at New York's Sonnabend Gallery, he responded to the visitors' 
footsteps by masturbating, transmitting his verbal fantasies and moans of pleasure 
back to them via a sound projection system. In Jones's view, through Acconci' s act, 
the visitor would have been inexorably involved in the inter-subjective articulation of 
`artistic' meaning. 237 She suggests that `in all of his body art work, Acconci 
exaggeratedly performs the Chiasmus - the inter-subjective erotic intertwining - of 
the interpretive exchange'. 
Through Body Art projects such as this, Acconci himself became one of the most 
important artist incorporating the re-embodiment of art production and art reception as a 
radical challenge to modernist formalism. According to Jones, staging art is a 
communicative exchange between desiring subjects -a phenomenological intertwining 
or psychoanalytic transference/counter transference involving an exchange of codes, 
behaviours, expressivities and embodied, erotically invested subjectivities. 
What is most important in Jones position is her suggestion that ` body art projects 
explicitly stage the phenomenological model of intersubjectivity, in which the exchange 
of subjectivities (their intertwining) takes place through the engagement of bodies 
/subjects as well as, more specifically, the reversibility of expression and perception (as 
well as of subject and object) through which we constitute ourselves in the world'. 238 
237 This is an articulation, moreover, that Freud described in terms of transference (an intersubjective exchange of 
identities); transference, 'invariably resting] ultimately on an erotic basis', marks the struggle for meaning as 
necessarily an erotic exchange. 238 Jones, op. cit., p. 107 
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As an art maker I do experience that by opening the embodied artist/subject to the other 
(following Jones argument), Body Art also opens the embodied other to the artist; each 
projects onto the other, each taking its place there as subject while simultaneously 
authorising the other as subject. 
Like the ground opened up by Acconci, Bruce Nauman and Dan Graham, establish a 
framework for linking performance, the engagement of the spectator and in their 
case, the use of video, outside a concept of performance dominated by catharsis. 
Since 1970, like the Minimalists Bruce Nauman became very interested in the relation of a 
work to its environment and with the involvement of the spectator. For example, he explored 
this in the installation Corridors. When I experienced the piece at the Hayward Gallery in 
the exhibition Nawnan Bruce in September 1998,1 found myself in situations of anxiety 
and surprise caused by the strong presence perceptual nd phenomenological element Going 
around the corner piece (1970) is a piece which I experienced myself in the same xhibition. 
As spectator I became are of my own simple action of walking around the cubic structure, 
by watching my own image on the monitors placed at each comer. 
Bouncing in the Corner, N2: upside down (1969) is a performance that does not deal 
with the concept of space and additionally, it incorporates the use of video. Talking 
about it Nauman states: ` [the performance] 
... 
at the Whitney Museum during the 
Illusion show in '69.1 had already made a video of it, bouncing in the corner for one 
hour. At the Whitney the performance was by three people, instead of just myself, 
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and after that I tried making pieces where other people could be involved in the 
performance situation [... ]', 239 
I am aware that, particularly in the use of video recording as an integral part of a 
performance work, Bruce Nauman provides a reference point for some of my own art 
practice, for example in Ancora Cerca, Bl uX, Diagrammi, Morning Toilette, Public 
Private Perceptions. In Nauman's World Piece (Projected) and World Peace 
(Received) (1996) spectator's become integral part of the work. I use these works as 
a reference for the complex experience for the active and passive engagement of the 
viewer and how this is changed by intervention of video. In World Piece 
(Projected), as described in the Catalogue from the exhibition at the Hayward 
Gallery, the five video projections feature actors who communicate to each other and 
to the spectator. A fast-moving edit switches the image and voice from one screen to 
another. Spectators are encouraged to move around in this installation in which they 
can grasp only fragments of the text, although its results are very disorienting. In 
World Peace (Received), on the other hand, the spectator is encouraged to take a seat 
amid five monitors in a rather more intimate space. The work evokes the relationship 
established between television and its viewers. The gestures and phrases are the same 
as before; only the montage is different, with an extremely fast rhythm leaving the 
viewer very little mental space. The two installations present two modes of reception 
and media communication. 
239 Nauman Bruce, Catalogue from the exhibition at the Hayward Gallery, London, 16 July-6 September 1998, 
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Mirror, 1977, Amsterdam 
The South Bank Centre, London 1998, p. 92, from an interview 1971. 
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The study of the active and passive conduct of the viewer became the basis of many 
of the New York artist Dan Graham's performances from the early seventies. 
Graham's highly psychological works also form an extremely important reference 
for my own production. It was through Graham's work and statements that I first 
became aware of the possible relationship between an art experience and a 
theoretical concept. In particular here a relationship with Lacan is referred to by the 
following Graham's statement (1997): ` the time-delay videos and the pavilions 
have parallels with Lacanian and phenomenological models of consciousness [... 
Performance pieces through to Public Space/Two Audiences deal with American 
psycho-social theories of micro-behavioural gestures and with the phenomenology of 
the individuals, either alone or in groups[... ]1.240 
Graham wished to combine the role of active performer and passive spectator in one 
and the same person. So he introduced mirrors and video equipment which would 
allow performers to be spectators of their actions. This self-scrutiny was intended to 
set up a heightened consciousness of every gesture. In some of his notes for the piece 
Body Press (1970-73) he describes the performers' behaviour and writes: 
Two filmmakers stand (within a surrounding and completely mirrored 
cylinder), body trunk stationary, hands holding and pressing a camera's back 
end flush to, while slowly rotating it about, the surface cylinder of their 
individual bodies. One rotation circumscribes the body's contour, spiralling 
slightly upward with the next turn. With successive rotations, the body 
surface areas are completely covered by the back of the camera(s) until the 
cameraman's eye level is reached; then a reverse mapping downward 
begins until the original starting point is reached. The rotations are at 
240 `Dan Graham Architecture , Catalogue from the exhibition at Camden Arts Centre, 11-4/25-5 1997 and 
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corresponding speeds; when each camera is rotated to each body's rear, it is 
facing and filming the other as they are exchanged so the camera's "identity" 
"changes hands" and each performer is handling a new camera... 241 
Graham's interest is the subjective mask of the observer, arguing that behind the glass 
the vision of the spectator is objective, so that the spectator's subjectivity is dissimulated; 
this is explored in Two Consciousness Projection(s) (1974), Present Continuous Past 
(1974), Video Piece for Two Glass Office Buildings (1976) amongst other pieces. 42 
In the piece Two Consciousness Projection(s) (1974) Graham created a situation 
which would increase that consciousness even further, since two people were asked 
to verbalise (in front of an audience) how they viewed one of the partners. A woman 
sat in front of a video screen which showed her face, while a man looked through the 
video camera trained on her face. As she examined her features and described what 
she saw, the man, at the same time, related how he read her face. In this way both the 
woman and the man were active in that they were creating the performance, but they 
were also passive spectators in that they were watching themselves performing. The 
specific results of the piece vary according to the context in which it is performed, 
with changing historical circumstances, locale, or use of different social classes of 
audience or actors. Graham's theory of audience-performer relationship was based 
on Bertolt Brecht's idea of imposing an uncomfortable and self-conscious state on 
the audience in an attempt to reduce the gap between the two. In subsequent work 
Graham explored this further by adding the elements of time and space in using 
video techniques and mirrors. 
Architectural Association, London, 22-5/24-5,1997, p. 18. u' Ibid., artist contribution. 242 This is discussed by Andel, J., ` Miroir et autoreflextion' in 
.4 travers le miroir de Bonnard ä Buren, Editions de la Reunion des Musees Nationaux, Paris, 2000, p. 85-86 (my translation from French). 
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In Present Continuous Past (1974) the mirror acted as a reflection of the present time, 
while video feedback showed the performer/spectator their past action. Graham's text 
specifies: `The image seen by the camera reflecting everything in the room) appears 
eight seconds later on the video monitor. [... ]A person viewing the monitor sees both the 
image of himself eight seconds ago, and what was reflected in the mirror from the 
monitor eight seconds ago of himself, which is sixteen seconds in the past. An infinite 
regress of time continuums within time continuums is created[... ]. '243 
The piece Performer /Audience /Mirror 244 first performed in 1977 was based on the 
simple idea of mirroring the behaviour with language. I saw a video documentation 
of it at the Lisson Gallery in September 2001. The live description of the event has a 
very powerful quality. The precision of this description captured my attention 
because I was simultaneously experiencing what was described and could compare 
Graham's description to my own. Here is part of a written documentation of the 
pieces by Dan Graham. The text states: 
A performer faces a seated audience. Behind the performer, covering the 
back wall (parallel to the frontal view of the seated audience), is a mirror 
reflecting the audience. 
Stage 1. The performer looks in the general direction of the audience. He 
begins a continuous description of his external movements and the 
attitudes he believes are signified by this behaviour for about five 
minutes. The audience hears the performer and sees his body. 
243 Graham, D., Two-Way Mirror Power Selected Writings by Dan Graham on His Art, Ed Alberro, A. intr. Wall, J., MIT Press, 1999 Cambridge, Massachussetts, London England, p. 39 written in 1974. 244 first performed at de appel Amsterdam, Holland in June 1977, at PSI, New York in 1977 and Riverside Studios, London, England in March 1979. I saw a video documentation at Lisson Gallery in September 2001. I The text of performance was first published in Anton Herbert, ed., Dan Graham: Theatre (ghent: de appel, 1982) 
166 
Stage 2. The performer continues facing the audience. Looking directly 
at them, he continuously describes their external behavior for about five 
minutes. (See Observation 2. ) 
Stage 3. The performer faces the mirror (his back turned to the audience). 
For about five minutes he continuously describes his front body's 
gestures and the attitudes it may signify. He is free to move about, in 
order to better see aspects of his body's movements. When he sees and 
describes his body from the front, the audience, inversely, sees his back 
(and their front). The performer is facing the same direction as the 
audience, seeing the same mirror-view. The audience cannot see (the 
position of) the performer's eyes. 
Stage 4. The performer remains turned, facing the mirror. For about five 
minutes he observes and continuously describes the audience who he can 
see mirror-reversed from Stage 2 (their right and left now being the same 
as his). He freely moves about relative to the mirror in order to view 
different aspects of the audience's behavior. His change of position 
produces a changing visual perspective which is correspondingly 
reflected in the description. The audience's view remains fixed; they are 
not (conventionally) free to move from their seats in relation to the 
mirror covering the front staging area. 245 
In some of his observations on the audience involved Graham writes: 
Through the use of a mirror the audience is able to instantaneously perceive 
itself as a public body (as a unity), offsetting its definition by the performer. 
This gives it a power within the performance equivalent to that of the 
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performer [... ]. Cause and effect relations are further complicated when 
members of the audience (because they can see and be seen in the mirror by 
other members of the audience) attempt to influence (through eye contact, 
gestures, etc. ) the behavior of other audience members, which thereby 
influences the performer's description (of the audience's behavior). 246 
My own understanding of this particular performance led me to conceive the piece 
Diagrammi, interactive performance, on 3 July 1999,48th Venice Biennale. 247 
When I conceived the project I was interested in the shift of positions of artist and 
perceiver by interacting with the audience in order to get them involved in the 
creative process, and the concept of central-focus, perspectival space, left room for 
the concept of proximity: I put myself in a marginal position in relation to the space 
of the artistic event (also like Acconci) and the audience (fig. 49). The development 
of the composition and representation of the space in which the audience-artist 
relationship operates thus becomes symbolic for my understanding of that 
relationship. 248 Also, in my own work the subjective approach adopted (I invited 
245 Graham, D., `Two 
- 
Way Mirror Power, Selected Writings by Dan Graham in His art', edited by Alberro., 
The MIT Press Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 1999, p. 124-125. 246 Ibid., p. 125. 
247 Notes on the Vert are pubes in fiste at the Venice Biennale, `Institutions in Great Britain: Artist as Researcher. Diagrams', Charta, Milan 2000, presented as part of exhibition `Demomacy', 13th April- 13th May 2000- Royal 
College ofArt, London. 
248 Text of Performance: PREFACE: communication between people depends on codes of the context in which they meet, 
communication is not possible if the code is not shared by everybody, communication is possible if the barriers are removed, by 
acting a virtual context is possible to remove social barriers 
Audience: people I met during my lifetime. 
INTENTIONS: 1. to reimve our perception of each other based on assumptions that we made when met in a 
particulu context, according to a pailicular ole. 
2-to mate a new context in which to exchange messages and therefore communicate opeople who I met in the past in a different context 
2a. the use of words within social and cultic al codes, has to show the poietic dimension and become instrumental in the 
operation of loss of social identity to let the personal identity emerge. It is here where Maria Grazia introduction becomes important. 
THE OTHER INTRODUCTION by Mazia Grazia Recanati, fiieznd, opposite, mnror 
"In the labyrinth of philosopher EM Cioran (Romania, 1911- Paris, 1995) aphorisms, by using Lacrime e santi (1937), Sillogisrni dell'amareaa (1952), L'inconveniente di essere nati (1973), I chose phrases for us. Dialogues on the pasonage (the I represented in the performance, in precarious balance between discovered inwardness and truth of appearance), and on 
`exarcises of admiration', as Cioran would have called them. Themes are those linking the pasorage to Elena, through which t hei friendship was btnlt The personage believes in the power of words, but they contradict her when they are more intense. 
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The power of the Name is on her opinion, part of being. When the being comes to light, is named and exist. To name the being 
and to amte it are one thing, but the created falls in the finite and death of the cc e: the word is metaphor of this death. 
Cioran writes: ' at the time in which we had no name, we have probably heard everything'. The personage talks to Elena 
through an ideal interlocutor, who as much as Elena experienced life in another cc*nhiy and who found in being bilingual his 
strength. To open a piece of The F_c+clesiaste, translated by Guido Cennetti, it is about life and death ant represent the Cioran's 
ideal interlocutor. Chosen to contradict, Emil Cieran breaks distrust towards paradox created by lexical mechanisms, opening 
up the poietic dimension of the wad The style adopted by the interlocutor, who loved to define herself searta y of sensations, 
is that of seismographic recording of inwardness, the only possible fairy tail with a fragmented and visionary L Also the 
personage lives of energetic impulses transmitting codes through heisch She sees herself as a point on a journey in a big spiral, 
observing towards up and down in every segment, because the continuity has always the same shape, without 
3. to exchange role within the new context by inducing the audience to participate in the creation of the narrative of the new 
context. `A person's identity consists of a sense of belonging to a social community, on the one hand, and its self-awareness a  
a unique individual, on the other. One's personal identity is its difference fiten others'. Erik Enron 
PERFORMANCE PHASES 
Phase a. I introduce myself with different social identities that the audience unconsciously relate to, while projecting 
the diagram: Figlia daughter figlia daughter scrella sister nippte nephew cugina cousin nipote nephew zia aunt 
cognata sister in law oomivente flatmate amica friend amante lover amica friend alunna pupil studcnte student 
studs to professcrrssa teacher vice preside vice-head socia member president promoter manager mcmbm del publico 
public dipendente employee iicercatore researcher 
The first phase will show a situation in which we recognise ourselves as part of a certain social context and by doing 
so we will focus our attention on our social identity (me) detached from the (I). The relation is initially between 
myself and the audience b. To invite the audience to create a composition which breaks the system audience- 
pc former and adjust the chairs with no order. Now the dynamic in the relation is in the new situation one-to-= 
c. MariaGrazia and Simon stand up and step out 
Maria Grazia and Simon read: 
Qohelet, 1,8-11, in Guido Ceraietti version (and my translation). 
In turtte le parole e fatica Un uano non basta a diele Mai sazia gli occhi il vedere Mai 6 troppo agli ox cjccchi 1'udire 11 
Sari fu giä 11 Si Farä fu fatto Non si dä some il sole L. a novitä Si pada di qualcosa 
- 
Guarda! Qui del nuovo... 
- Non b the del Gin Fu Nei mondi prima the fossimo c'era Nessuno rinornina i primi Non c'b piü il none di chi sari 
Nichte ricada chi 6 stato Nie to ricoida chi veaä. 
In all words is hard work A man is not enough to tell them Never enough the sight to the eyes Never enough the 
hearing to the ears The will be was already The will do was done One doesn't give under the sum The new One 
speaks about something 
- 
Locid Here the new... 
- 
It is just what has been already In the worlds before we were there 
was Nobody names again the first ones The will be's name is not here anymore. Nothing remembers who has been 
Nothing remembers who will come. 
d. To create an artistic coated my role as atist, theirs as audience. I stand up and step out my self 
First dialogue to be red by Maria Grazia and myself 
MG. Pcrche dowcsti frugare nella mill menoria ?A the serve cicordard dime? Aniverai un gismo a misurare la tua 
caduta e la pcesenza della mia angoscia nella tua? 
E. Ogni amicizia 6 un dramma impercettibile, una serie di sottili ferite. 
MG. Qualsiasi parola mi fa male. Eppure, quanta mi sarebbe grato sentire i fiori chiacclucrare dclla nute! 
E. Hai sognato di incendiare 1'universo, e non sei neanche riuscita a conuinicare la tun fiamma alle parole, ad 
accendeine una solo! 
MG. Fallire la pmpria vita significa accedere alla poesia 
- 
senza il suppc to del talcNo. 
Per tutta la vita he vissuto con il sentimento di essere state allontanata dal trio vero luogo. Se 1'espressione "esilio 
metafisico" non avesse alcun sense, la min solo esistenza gliene darebbe um. 
Same dialogue red by Simon and myself S. Why should You look into my memory? What do you remember me fa? A day will come whin you will 
measure your failure and the presence of my anguish in yours? 
E. Every friendship is an imperceptible drama, a series of subtle injuries. 
S. Any werd hurts me. Even so, how grateful I will be in listening the flowers talc about death! E You dreamt to set on fire the universe, and you couldn't even inflame the wands, not even one! S. To fail ones own life means have access to poetry- without talent as support For all my life I have lived with the feeling of having been taken apart from my real place. If expression "metaphysical exile" wouldn't make sense at all, than my own existence would be the meaning 
contact with the Beings. 
e. A situation in which the audience will create the nan-ative. During this phase the partition between me-performer 
and audience dissolves. We will be all responsible for the action in the created new context. I will pronounce the word yellow directed to Maria Grazia, she will answer by saying another word to another person In the mean time I say blue to Simon who will answer in the same way. A game starts made of spcmtaneous 
words, the rhythm grows: all people are involved and communicate oeach other. In the communicative act of 
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people I had met in various contexts throughout my living experience and used a text for 
the dialogue that was based on a friend's personal response to a given input), give further 
meaning to the concept of the work. In this sense my piece was different from Graham's 
approach, which was more broadly socio-psychological and less subjective. 
Visual models, often used in research to clarify or synthesise a particular theory, or define 
a method, are particularly useful in my own artistic practice. The diagram used in the 
performance (fig. 48) comes from a drawing that I made in 1996. At that time I was 
making a choice from images coming from memory and contexts in which I had lived. 
The diagram is very simple to read: myself in the centre relating to a specific context, in 
and outside of Italy (my own native country). This relation is not fixed and refers to a 
continuous repositioning of myself within the contexts. This dynamic generates an always 
new relation within the communication schema. In the notes prepared for the event I wrote: 
The perception of a work of art is the first step to communication. 
sending and receiving signs to which feedback are expected, we will have changed our behaviour, hopefully 
understood a little bit mae who we are in relation to others. 
. 
£ We both artist and audience recognise ourselves in a new context with a new identity 
We read overlapping voices (myself; Simon, MariaGrazia) : 
Vi siete mai guardati allo specchio quando Ira voi e la mote non si ßrappone pit nicnte? 
Have you ever looked at yourself in the mirror when between you and death there isn't anything left? 
Avete inteirogato i vostri occhi? 
Have ever asked a question to your eyes? 
Avete capito, in quel momento, the non potevate meire? 
Have you understood, atthat time that you could die? 
Le pupille dilatate dal terrore into sonn piü impassibili delle piramidi. 
Pupils expanded by beaten tear are more impassible than pyramids. 
Una cetezza nasce dally for immobilitä, una ceitezza strana e tonificazde nel suo lapidario mistero: tu non puoi nnrire. 
A certainty was born from their immobility, a strange and refreshing certainty in its lapidary mystery: you cannot die, 
E' il silen2io degli occhi, b il nostro sguardo the incon ra se stesso, caber egizia del sogno davanti al tecrore della mate. It is the eye'silence, it is our Gaze that meets isel f, Egyptian calm of the dream in fron of terror for death. Quando questo ten= vi cogle, guardatevi allo spocchio, interrogate i vostri occhi, e capirete percbe non potete moire, perch 
non morirete mai. 
When this fear catches you, look at yourselves in the mirror, interrogate your eyes, and you will widerstazid the reason why you 
cannot die. 
I nostri occhi sann tutto. 
Our eyes know everything. 
Imbetvti del nulls ci assicurano the niente ci pub piü accadere. 
Imbibed of nothing they ass= us that nothing can happen to us anymore. 
ThevhtWdimeasianalso miners thesaurealchmdet of the new crowd a sated. 
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I (personal Identity) logdentiti personals) 
Me(soclal identity) 
_wlthln context nil contester me(ldentltä social@) other's I lo deal altri 
other's Me me depll alhl 
= feedback in communication 
figure 48. Diagram of the context for the interaction in the piece, 1999 
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figure c 49-5,0. Diagrams of the composition artist-audience in the 
space designed in preparation of the event Diagrammi (1999) 
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figure 51. Diagrammi, video documentation, still of the dialogue stage, 1999 
figure 52. Diagrammi, video documentation, still of audience interaction stage, 1999 
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All forms or media of communication extend the power of our senses. 
[... ] Communication is a process. When we communicate, we exchange 
messages. Communication is about the giving and receiving of signs to 
which we attach meanings, within a given conventional context. 
Meanings change according to context and time. By communicating we 
are involved in a kind of behaviour that may well be a way of trying to 
change the behaviour of others. The context always effects the act of 
communication. We present different personalities to other people, 
according to the situation we are in we stage a performance through a 
persona. The idea of staging is that we do put on a show. The persona is 
the character that we adopt to play the part. A performance is the act of 
presenting the self. Feedback regulates our contact with others. It is our 
reaction to other people's communication, and their reaction to ours. 
Perception is about noticing signs that tell us about ourselves and another 
person, and then making sense of them. The way we make sense of them 
is itself based on our previous knowledge and experience. There are 
barriers in communication which act as filters of messages in the 
formulation and interpretation of the message: in the process of 
perception, the most common kind of filtering happens because we make 
inaccurate assumptions. Semantic barriers are to do with problems in 
conveying, receiving and agreeing about meaning (language). 
Psychological barriers are to do with assumptions and prejudices which 
cause the message to be filtered. 
249 
Zag Cologni, E., Interaction in art making as data collecting system. Chiasmus, Mirror, Interaction: Mirroring, B1uX, Diagrammi, http: //www. modia. uwe. ac. uklcxchangeý_onlinci 
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The script of the performance was prepared with Maria Grazia Recanati (as her 
response to a friend), based on E. M. Cioran (Romany, 1911- Paris, 1995) aphorisms, 
the dialogues were read by herself, Simon Tweed and myself. After the introduction 
when the arrangement of the space was as illustrated in diagram (fig. 49). By getting 
people to move the chairs in the arrangement as shown in diagram (fig. 50). In order 
to break a fixed dynamic artist-audience and the exchanging of words (feedback) 
following the dialogues, the audience was involved in the action. My intention was 
that people would have forgotten about their social identity in order to let the 
personal one come out through the action of communicating in the new created 
artistic context. The audience's feedback was a series of words : giallo, luce, blu, 
tranquillity, atmosfera, luna, giappone, rosso, verde, arancione, giardino, erba, fiori, 
pomodoro, rosso, bianco, padiglione, cinema, luce, acqua, mare, liguria, bianco, 
cielo, bimbo, amore, anguilla, pesce, cane, nero, cane, gioco, bambino, padre, io, 
anguilla, pesce, acqua. 
The performance contains many of the concepts that have broadened throughout my 
research: issues of mirroing, audience involvement, the adoption of a 
multidirectional concept of space, the split self. However, I have a concern with the 
piece which has mainly to do with my own performance, and the fact that there is an 
element of acting in it, which, as I subsequently understood, it is not part of my 
performative vocabulary. Also, the piece marks a point in my research development: 
the deconstruction of a single point perspective spatial composition leaving room for 
a molti-focal one. This also means that, as performer, I now allow and stimulate 
interference and interaction to be part of the pieces, whereas here, as I can see from 
the recording, although I asked for it, I was still afraid of that interference. 
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M. 5. The interchange with the audience and the environment 
through an investigation of the senses. 
My own artistic contribution to the debate previously illustrated is based on a holistic 
approach to senses, mainly based on my understanding of Merleau-Ponty. Such an 
approach enabled me to question the primacy of vision over the other senses and to 
test my own perception of the world through other senses or to create situations 
where the spectators would become aware of their own. As much as Merleau-Ponty 
investigated the relationship of vision-touch, in my own work the same parallel is 
engaged. Synaesthesia between smell and vision is also addressed in one of my 
pieces. As a result a new element emerged from the presentation of the pieces: 
memory. These elements will be discussed in relation to the work made. 
III. 5.1. Synaesthetic relations 
An aspect of the vision-touch relation can be represented by the phenomenon of 
Synaesthesia. 25° Richard E. Cytowic, explains that Synaesthesia is an involuntary 
physical experience, the joining (cross modal association) in which the real 
information of one sense is accompanied by a perception in another sense. In 
addition to being involuntary, this additional perception is regarded by the synesthete 
as real, often outside the body, instead of imagined. Synaesthesia has been known to 
medicine for almost three hundred years, interest peaked between 1830 and 1930, but 
psychology and neurology were somewhat premature sciences. 251 
250 Although many interpretations have been attributed to the term, in the Oxford dictionary it is defined as follows: Syn-aes-the-sia n. Physiol. Sensation produced at a point other than or remote from the point of 
stimulation, as of a colour from hearing a certain sound (fr. Gr, syn - together + aisthesis - to perceive). 
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Johnathan Harrison in Synaesthesia, the Strangest Thing illustrates the importance of studies 
of synaesthic relationship colour-smell/taste - conducted by June Downey of the University 
of Wyoming. She states that cases of coloured taste have been less well described in the 
literature, though attributes this not to the frequency with which this variant occurs, but to the 
failure of those who experience it to notice that tastes (or smells) evoke colours. Downey 
suggests that this is because objects that smell and/or taste are usually bound to ` an object 
that naturally has a colour which masks the synaesthesic colour. This may or may not be 
true, but it is our experience that those with, say, coloured smell are very aware of the colour 
of the odiferous object, as well as the colour percept elicited by the smell'. 52 
Harrison also suggests that'smell function has, for the last couple of decades, been of 
interest to a number of researchers who investigate Parkinson's disease, which 
features olfactory loss amongst its sequelae'. 253 The test conducted by a synaethete 
patient showed a consintent result of shape perception in relation to smells. 
Downey attempts to clarify two distinct types of Synaesthesia, which he named 
sensational and imaginal. ` Would the synaesthete automatically 'see' the colour on 
being stimulated with the appropriate odour on each occasion that the odour was 
251 Richard E. Cytowic in Phenomenology and Neuropsyehology, 1995, 
http: //psyche. cs. monash. edu. au/v2/psyche-2-10-cytowic. html 252 Jonathan Harrison in Synaesthesia, the Strangest Thing, Oxford University Press, 2001, illustrates the different 
positions regarding the nature of this condition, including: Chris Frith, Cytowic, Zeki, Smith Churchland. 
Downey's participant, S, reports having experienced coloured gustation for as long as he can remember. In 
contrast to our experience with coloured hearing synaesthetes, S was able to locate his synaesthesiae, in this case 
in the mouth. Intriguingly, S also reported that, whilst some colours were agreeable tastes (such as pink and 
lavender), others, such as reds and browns, were found to be disagreeable. S never experienced blue tastes. After 
eliciting these subjective accounts of his synaesthesia, Downey set about answering the following questions: 
1. Does S possess a normal sensitivity to taste? 
2. Are the colour tones of his tastes uniformly determined by any particular factor in the gustatory complex? 
3. Is the induced colour sensational or imaginal. 
Downey set out to address these questions by administering these tastes and then recording S's responses. 
Psychophysical experimentation revealed that S seemed particularly sensitive to small concentrations of saccharin (sweet), salt (sodium chloride), sour (sulphuric acid! ), and bitter (quinine). However, S was quite poor at 
distinguishing some tastes; for example, he was seemingly unable to tell quinine from cayenne pepper and took 3 
minutes to identify the taste of peppermint. The answer to question 2 appears to be no. 253 Harrison, J., op. cit., p. 170. 
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presented? '254 If the answer were to be yes then the perception could be described as 
sensational. However, if it is necessary for the synaesthete to conj our up the colour 
in an particular fashion, then the perception might best be described as imaginal. 
Harrison suggests an alternative definition of terms but he also proposes two terms. 
For the synaesthesia that are believed to be automatic, constant and irrepressible, the 
term correspondence can be used describing the relationship between the primary 
sensation and the synaesthesic percept. In contrast, when referring to synaesthesia 
that are learnt (and therefore not automatic, constant, and irrepressible) the term 
association can be used. In my works relating to this phenomenon I tend to refer to 
the latter in that the associations are stimulated also in non-synaesthetic individuals. 
Some recent research into Synaesthesia has examined which brain areas are activated 
when blind people read braille. This research is based on the knowledge that 
sensorimotor strip is the brain region that detects touch, so this would seem to be an 
obvious and expected neural substrate for braille reading. At a functional level 
according to this research people become very inventive about finding alternative 
strategies for dealing with the loss of sensory information. 255Harrison states that 
braille reading is a relatively new human skill, just a couple of hundred years old. In 
terms of the history of our species, visual reading is also relatively new, being no 
more than a few thousand years old. Given this, it is unlikely that the human brain is 
specialised for reading. There simply hasn't been enough time for this to occur. Our 
ability to read is therefore likely to be subserved by a number of pre-existing 
cognitive skills, such as our ability to see and our language capacity, abilities we 
know are housed in occipital and temporal lobe structures. Much of our 
254 Harrison, J., p. 34 
177 
understanding of brain function has been revealed to us through nature's exceptions 
and, as a consequence, neuroscience has been much occupied with the various 
deficits exhibited by patients with physical damage to either the brain or the sense 
regions that convey information to the brain. The advent of functional neuroimaging 
has meant that, for the first time, we can look to see how nature deals with these 
exceptions. 
One of the first studies to be conducted in this area (Sadato 1996) compared the 
blood flow maps of people in normal conditions with those of braille readers who 
had been blinded early in life. All subjects were scanned while engaged in a tactile 
discrimination task and a tactile task that required no discrimination. As predicted the 
latter task yielded no unexpected activation in either group. However, a marked 
dissociation was seen in the discrimination task such that blood flow to primary 
visual areas increased in the braille reader's group but decreased in normal subjects. 
This remarkable study has shown that brain regions ordinarily subserving vision are 
recruited when the unsighted are engaged in making tactile discriminations. 56 
In relation to my work, the distinction Harrison makes between environmental nd 
genetic is particularly appropriate to my `test' in the piece Public Private Perceptions. 
According to Bulat Galeyev's theory the phenomenon of Synaesthesia derives from 
social and cultural phenomenon, he describes it as being co-imagination or co-feeling' 
and that by its psychological nature it is an intersensory association. He claims that the 
ability to connect in consciousness the visual and audible phenomena is inherent to 
everyone. This is one of the reason why I wanted to test the synaesthetic onnection in 
my own experience through the piece Public Private Perceptions. 
255 ibid. p. 249. 
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In relation to this phenomenon, together with other elements, I developed the project 
Senses, and begun discussions in May 2000 with the Five Senses Section of the 
Fondazione Science Museum Leonardo Da Vinci in Milan, for an exhibition at their 
Museum. The plans for work consist of five interactive pieces based on the cross- 
modal associations of the senses in order to investigate modes of expression other 
than, or in relation to vision. One of the pieces Drawing Scents has recently been 
presented to the public, the others remain work in progress. 
The initial design for the whole Senses project was presented at the CADE 
Conference of Digital Creativity in Glasgow in April 200 1,257 where I also tested an 
interactive method to gain data on the audience response to it in the video piece 
Through Senses (discussed earlier). 
The design for the projects refers to the presence of a container, designed to 
stimulate the cognitive process, and a content, which functions as stimuli to which 
the audience respond. The chosen stimuli are video clips, generated noise, 
reconstructed scents drawn from my own subjective experience, to which the 
responses (taking different forms) become part of the work itself. 
Synaesthesia as interpreted within this project is understood as a specific way of 
perceiving based on a concept of duality, connections, rebounds, non-linear 
dynamics, which are concepts also present in my way of working through 
interaction. Interactive dynamics have a maieutic quality in that they involve 
256 Ibid., pp. 240,241. 257 The presentation was published in `Through Senses' p. 86-88 in Show, & and McKay, J., Digital Creativity: Crossing the Border, The School of Art Press ISBN 0 901904 82 1,2001 Glasgow 
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participants by stimulating curiosity and desire to know, together with the ludic 
aspect of the process, such that it will generate physical awareness of themselves in 
relation to work in the space. 
The complete Senses project though some work are in progress, represent the end 
point of my practical research within the PhD. The works were conceived as follows. 
1. Life Archive, where a Chiasmatic composition is implied to relate sound to visual 
stimuli. Adopting a mirror composition in the space I try to relate my own vision of 
the world represented by the video and audio information to the seeing and hearing 
of the audience. Furthermore, the content of information refers to places I know 
through my life experience, but they can be familiar to many so that they have space 
to fill in with their own life experience. 258 
258 Installation: One couple out of the 20 video clips are projected symmetrically one in front of the other onto 
walls. In all situation a web of infrareds will be the keyboard for playing sound. Perceivers behaviour: Perceivers enter in the room wearing headsets connected to sound. Video clips are 
projected and they have to find/associate the sound file to the paying video. This is played and change according 
to the infrareds. This is connected to an archive of twenty video files 1,30 minute long each. Perceiver is left free to imagine the situation that the sound refers to. 
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2. Take my breath away. The work aims to generate a need for synchronicity with the 
rhythm of the waves. In this the interaction is, I would say involuntary because it is 
not activated consciously, but depends on the emotional state of the perceiver 
recorded through the rhythm of the breathing. 259 
3. Noisy Depth. Would we be able to draw the space in a darkened place, had we 
only propagation of sound in the space as information? What does the spatiality of 
sound do to our mapping of the space? These are the questions I asked myself, while 
experimenting with the audience to find out how sensitive we can be to sound in 
perceiving space without the aid of vision. Blind people sense the presence of an 
obstacle because they hear their own voice rebounding back as indicative of the 
distance from it. I have thought about a long and narrow corridor, along the walls a 
series of sound amplifiers are positioned at regular distances. Infrareds rays are 
placed one after the other at a similar distance at the height of the perceiver's legs, to 
be interrupted as the perceiver walks through the room. 
4. Don't Touch! The work is very simple, but expresses my own position in this 
work: I am present with the provided material, but I am not physically there. I touch 
the screen which divides myself from the viewer. I cannot be touched, I disappear. 260 
259 Installation: In the darkened room three videos lasting 45" each are projected symmetrically onto the floor in 
front of the perceiver and in the next walls from floor to half height. 
As much as the composition in the installation projection, also the shots were taken from above and each of the sides. 
Behaviour of perceiver: perceivers entering in the room will locate the sensor which will record the alterations of the 
breathing. Three frequencies (high, medium, low) are connected to the three videos, which will be played according to the 
alteration of the breathing of the perceivers. They will then activate their own rhythm in the video composition. 260 Perceiver behaviour: As soon as the perceiver touches the screen the video changes, which means that my 
hand moves in a different way. In this, visual perception is still involved even though the sense involved mainly 
is that of touch. Installation: a touch screen onto which one of the two videos showing my hands move, in one 
vertically, in the other horizontally, is playing. When the perceiver touches the screen this action will stop the 
video playing while activating the other. 
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5. Drawing Smell (title changed to Drawing Scents), was presented to the public in the 
exhibition In between held in the Lethaby Gallery between 28 May and 1 June 2002. 
Through the piece I investigate the association between scents and colours, to interrogate 
the concepts of memory, presence and absence. It was designed in the following way: a 
number of sources of smell are placed along the wall. Next to each one is a touch screen 
with a number of colours. On the wall in front of it a screen shows the update of the 
generated outcome depending on the audience feedback. 
The work functions in fours stages in relation to the perceiver's behaviour: 
1. fruition (perception through smelling) 
2. perceiver's feedback through association with colour among a given selection 
3. the perceiver's choice is connected to a series of parameters to implement a 
graphic program 
4. Those parameters take shape on the digital screen behind the perceiver in the 
form of a colour 
5. The colour fills the space and will influence the next perceiver reaction 
The audience response was then averaged after the exhibition, the RGB information of the 
selected colours over the period of the exhibition was: 140,116,118.261 The installation will 
be presented to audiences in other countries where I will record the different reactions to the 
same olfactory stimuli, which will be translated into a different colour. In this sense the 
reaction is not explained, but its illustration becomes part of the work itself in the form of a 
printed single colour photographic piece of the resulting colour. 
" here some of the results out of the four adopted macs produced in real time and then collected: gmac2avgc 
- 
rgb(171, 102,112), mac3avge rgb(115,123,144), gmac4avge 
- 
rgb(165,128,112), gmac5avge 
- 
rgb(98,115,105) 
part of the text files produced: mac2, rgb( 255,0,0) mac3, rgb( 255,0,170) mac4, rgb(85,0,255 )mac5, rgb(0,0,170 )mac2, rgb(255,170,85 )mac3, rgb(255,85,170)niac4, rgb(170,85,0)mac5, rgb(0,85,0)mac2, rgb(255,170,170 )mac3, rgb(170,255,255 )mac4, rgb( 255,255,0 )mac2, rgb( 255,255,170)mac3, rgb(85,0,170)mac4, rgb(0,85,0 )mac5, rgb(85,255,170 )mac2, rgb(170,255,170)mac3, rgb(0,85,255 )mac4, rgb( 255,85,0 )mac5, rgb(170,85,85 )mac3, rgb(170,255,255 )mac4, rgb( 255,170,85 )mac5, rgb(170,170,255)mac2, rgb(85,0,255 )mac3, rgb(170,170, 255)mac4, rgb( 255,170,85 )mac3, rgb( 255,255,85 )mac4, rgb(170,85,255 )mac5, rgb(85,85,0)mac3, rgb(85,255,0 )mac2, rgb( 255,255,170)inac5, rgb(0,85,0)mac3, rgb(170,255,85 )mac4, rgb( 255 
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H. 5.2. Touch and vision 
In order better to understand the synaesthetic direction taken in my most recent 
works, and to link one aspect, touch and vision, I found it necessary to review some 
of the philosophical concepts underlying this debate. 
`From Descartes to Berkeley to Diderot, vision is conceived in terms of analogies to 
the sense of touch [... ] Diderot, in his work Letters on the Blind (1749), asserts the 
possibility of a tactile geometry and that touch as well as sight carries with it capacity 
for apprehending universally valid truths [... ]'262: states Jonathan Crary in his book 
Techniques of the Observer On vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century. He 
also writes that even in Diderot, a so-called materialist, the senses are conceived 
more as adjuncts of a rational mind and less as physiological organs. Each sense 
operates according to an immutable semantic logic that transcends its mere physical 
mode of functioning. Thus, the significance of the image is discussed in Diderot's 
Letters on the Blind: a blindfolded man in an outdoor space steps forward, tentatively 
holding a stick in each hand, extended to feel the objects and area before him. He 
continues by stating that ` [... ] paradoxically this is not an image of a man literally 
blind; rather it is an abstract diagram of a fully-sighted observer, in which vision 
operates like the sense of touch. Just as the eyes are not finally what see, however, so 
the carnal organs of touch are also disengaged from contact with an exterior 
world', 
263 
262 Crary, J., Techniques of the Observer. On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1990, p. 59. 263 this is part of an historical account on vision conducted by Crary in order to contextualise an in-depth description of the instruments for representation in relationship to the evolution of the position of the observer, ibid., p. 60. 
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Jacques Lacan writes on Diderot's script in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho- 
Analysis264, to show how the Cartesian spatial construction is not a necessary reference for 
visual construction. That kind of geometrical space of vision is, in his view, perfectly 
imaginable by a blind man. In Lacan' s view, geometrical perspective's aim is to map the 
space, not sight A blind man can conceive the space that he knows being real to be 
perceived at a distance and with a simultaneous act. His point is to apprehend via temporal 
action instantaneously. Lacan writes also that in Cartesian Dioptrics, the action of the eyes 
is represented by the action of the two sticks. The geometrical dimension of vision does 
not represent what the actual field of vision offers to us, which is the relation of 
subjectification. 
In Crary' s view, Bishop Berkeley's theory of perception was based on the essential 
dissimilarity of the senses of vision and touch, but he writes that this insistence on 
the heterogeneity of the senses is remote from nineteenth-century notions of the 
autonomy of vision and the separation of the senses. Berkeley was not alone in the 
eighteenth century in his concern with achieving a fundamental harmonisation of the 
senses, in which a key model for visual perception is the sense of touch. 
The Molyneux problem, which preoccupied the thought of the eighteenth century, 
poses the case of a perceiver who is ignorant of one of the languages of the senses: 
sight. The best known formulation of the problem is Locke's: 
Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to 
distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and 
nightly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the 
264 Lacan, J., The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho Anayisis, Translated by Sheridan, J. A., Penguin Books, 
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other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and 
sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see: quaere, 
whether by his sight before he touched them, he could now 
distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube? 265 
Discussing the matter, Martin Kemp writes that Molyneux answered that he could 
not, on the basis of Locke's assertion. The man would have to learn which visual 
sensations would correspond to the tactile ones of sphericity and squareness. 266 
Crary writes that Diderot's position in his script is not so much a depreciation of the sense of 
vision as it is a refutation of its exclusivity. Diderot details Saunderson' s devices for 
calculation and demonstration, rectangular wooden boards with built-in grids marked out by 
raised pins. By connecting the pins with silk threads Saunderson' s fingers could trace out 
and read an infinity of figures and their relations, all calculable by their location on the 
demarcated grid. Here the Cartesian table appears in another form, but its underlying status is 
the same. The certainty of knowledge did not depend solely on the eye but on a more general 
relation of a unified human sensorium to a delimited space of order on which positions could 
be known and compared. In a sighted person the senses are dissimilar, but through what 
Diderot calls `reciprocal assistance' they provide knowledge about the world. 267 
Martin Jay suggests that 
The empiricist solution 
- 
that each sense was utterly distinct 
- 
and the 
intellectualist alternative 
- 
that a transcendental knowledge of space 
exists prior to sense experience 
- 
were both inadequate, because they 
1977, p. 86 265 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, ix, 8. 266 Kemp, M, The Science ofArt, Optical Themes in Western Art from Brunelleschl to Seurat, Yale University Press 1990, p. 235. 
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failed to register the primary layer of intersensory experience in the 
body anterior to the differentiation of the senses on the level of reflected 
thought. Instead, Merleau-Ponty claimed, the unification was like the 
merging of binocular into monocular vision, produced by a kind of 
bodily intentionality before mind distinguished itself from matter. 268 
In both cases the world was construed as a spectacle to be observed from afar by a 
disembodied mind. It was necessary instead to delve into the experience of perception 
prior to the constitution of the body as object and the cogito as rational subject. 
Although his own philosophical tools were inevitably reflective, Merleau-Ponty sought 
to explore the pre-reflexive phenomenal field he called `being in the world'. 269 
Kemp refers to the Cartesian image previously discussed and writes: 
Descartes had compared our perception of the inverted retinal image with 
a blind man feeling objects with a pair of crossed sticks, an analogy 
illustrated by Le Cat in 1740 (fig. 60). The actual orientation was 
irrelevant, since our understanding depends upon how the mind interprets 
the ` information'. And if we have to learn to make this interpretation, as 
Locke believed, the erstwhile blind man would not immediately be able 
to interpret what the ` crossed sticks' of the optical processes in his eyes 
meant with respect to his previous sensations of touch. 270 
267 Crary, op. cit., p. 59. 268 Jay, M., p. 310. 
269 Jay, M., p. 308. 270 Kemp, op. cit., p. 235 
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figure 60. Studies of the eye and binocular vision, including the crossed sticks analogy, from Nicolas le 
Cat's A Phi'sical Essay on the Senses, London, 1750. In Kemp, M. op. cit., p. 235. 
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In Crary' s view, regardless of how the problem was ultimately answered, whether the 
claim was nativist or empiricist, the discussion of the senses constituted a common surface 
of order for the eighteenth century. But for those whose answers to Molyneux were, in one 
way or another, negative: a blind man suddenly restored with sight would not immediately 
recognise the objects before him and these included Locke, Berkeley, Diderot, Condillac, 
and others. They share little with the physiologists and psychologists of the nineteenth 
century who were also, with greater scientific authority, to answer the question negatively. 
By insisting that knowledge, and specifically knowledge of space and depth, is built up out 
of an orderly accumulation and cross-referencing of perceptions on a plane independent of 
the viewer, eighteenth-century thought could know nothing of the ideas of pure visibility to 
arise in the nineteenth century. 271 
Martin Kemp refers to Bishop Berkeley as a great radical philosopher of perception 
in Britain at this time, who argued that a blind man who was suddenly able to see 
would not know by his eyes alone what was high or low, erect or inverted. ` For the 
objects he had hitherto used to apply the terms up and down, high or low, were such 
as only affected or were in some way perceived by his touch; but the proper objects 
of vision make new sets of ideas, perfectly distinct from the former. Nothing could 
be more removed from Berkeley's theory of how distance is perceived than the 
science of the stereoscope. ' 272 The stereoscope as Crary shows in his text, became a 
crucial indication of the re-mapping and subsumption of the tactile within the optical. 
Jay writes that Merleau-Ponty challenged the Cartesian account of vision, critically 
examining La Dioptrique. `Descartes was right in abandoning the medieval notion of 
"intentional species" flying through the air from object to eye, and with it, the 
271 Crary, J., pp. 58,59. 
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resemblance theory of vision. For if such entities existed, the different perspectival 
profiles of perception would be impossible. But Descartes still remained too beholden to 
the realist paradigm, which turned vision into a view on the world, rather than in it. '273 
But Merleau-Ponty, as already suggested, and also in Jay's view, reinterpreted 
Descartes claim that it is not the eyes, but the soul that really sees as the spiritual 
category in his own terms and opposed it to something else: 
It is the soul which sees and not the brain; it is by means of the perceived 
world and its proper structures that one can explain the spatial values 
assigned to a point of the visual field in each particular case. [... ] The 
universe of consciousness revealed by the cogito and in the unity of which 
even perception itself seemed to be necessarily enclosed, was only a 
universe of thought in the restricted sense: it accounts for the thought of 
seeing, but the fact of vision and the ensemble of existential knowledges 
remain outside of it. 274 
As mentioned before, Merleau-Ponty by means of explaining the ontology of the Chiasm 
embraces adiscussion of touch in relation to vision particularly in the notes published with 
the title The Visible and the Invisible. Opposing his view to that of Sartre, 275 Merleau- 
Ponty granted that ` the two hands are never simultaneously in the relationship of touched 
and touching to each other', but he refused to concede that this meant that the touched 
hand is simply an object in the world like any other thing: ` In passing from one role to the 
other, I can identify the hand touched as the same one which will in a moment be touching'. 
272 Kemp, M., p. 235. 
273 Jay, op cit., p. 304. 
274 Merleau-Ponty, M., The Primacy of Perception, pp. 192-193. Quoted by Jay, op, cit. p. 305. 275 The disagreement with Sartre over the status of the touched hand reflects their more basic divergence 
regarding the nature of the `pre-reflective cogito' 
- 
that ` non-positional' self-consciousness which, for both, 
grounded all reflective acts. 
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Merleau-Ponty states: 
In this bundle of bones and muscles which my right hand presents to 
my left, I can anticipate for an instant the integument or incarnation of 
that other right hand, alive and mobile, which I thrust towards things in 
order to explore them. The body catches itself from the outside engaged in 
a cognitive process; it tries to touch itself while being touched, and initiates 
`a kind of reflection' which is sufficient to distinguish it from objects. 276 
He continues by writing that this equivocation between touching and being touched 
is one of the ` structural characteristics of the body itself; the body is both subject and 
object, capable of both seeing and suffering'. 277 
James Schmidt states that throughout the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau- 
Ponty had argued `for a different understanding of the pre-reflective cogito [this] 
must be understood as an incarnate consciousness, as a body-subject. Hence, there 
can be no question of the body being simply an object among other objects in the 
world. Without downplaying the extent of Merleau-Ponty's dissent from Being and 
Merleau-Ponty's later examinations of the touched hand thus proceed without 
recourse to the tacit cogito'. 278 
Schmidt suggests that at this point all of the terms associated with the philosophy of 
the cogito are now suspect. In a long working note from May 1960 he stressed a 
point which had been noted only in passing in his earlier discussion: the touching 
hand is `never exactly the touched'; it always eludes us. `Something other than the 
body is needed for the junction to be made; it takes place in the untouchable. 
276 Meleau-Ponty, M., Phenomenology ofPerception, p. 93 
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Schmidt gains nothing by foisting another name onto this untouchable and saying 
that the touching and the touched `coincide "in the mind" or at the level of 
"consciousness". These words only transform ` a true negative' into `a positive that is 
elsewhere (a transcendent)' 
. 
279 The place where the toucher and the touched meet is not 
simply de facto untouchable. It, like the `invisible of vision' or the ` unconsciousness 
of consciousness', is the ` other side or the reverse of sensible Being'. 280 
Merleau-Ponty stresses that the touching hand always escapes the hand that tries to 
touch it. But Schmidt explains that the non-coincidence of the touching and the 
touched is not a `failure', but rather, the sort of joining of obverse and reverse, which 
is typical of the Chiasm. The analysis of the touched hand must take as its starting- 
point the fundamental lesson the Chiasm teaches: `there is not identity, nor non- 
identity... there is inside and outside turning around one another'. 281 
Merleau-Ponty by clarifying that, although my hands are never able to coincide with 
one another, they nevertheless are able 
- 
because of `a very peculiar relation from 
one to the other across corporeal space' 
- 
to join together as one `sole organ of 
experience' and explore the world. In the same way, the monocular views of my 
individual eyes are tied together into `one sole cyclopean vision'. In Merleau-Ponty's 
words: 
My two hands touch the same things because they are the hands of one same 
body. And yet each of them has its own tactile experience. If nonetheless they 
have to do with one sole tangible, it is because there exists a very peculiar 
relation from one to the other, across the corporeal space-like that holding 
Z" ibid., p. 95. 278 Scmidt, op. cit., pp 92-93. 279 Merleau Ponty, M., The Visible and the Invisible, p. 254. 280 ibid. 
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between my two eyes-making of my hands one sole organ of experience, as it 
makes of my two eyes the channels of one sole Cyclopean vision. 282 
Vision should be understood as the ` turning back' of one part of the visible upon the 
rest. In Merleau-Ponty's view the Chiasm is our primordial relation with the world: 
The seer is caught up in what he sees, it is still himself he sees: there is 
a fundamental narcissism of all vision. [ 
... 
] What is open to us, 
therefore, with the reversibility of the visible and the tangible, is-if not 
yet the incorporeal-at least an intercorporeal being, a presumptive 
domain of the visible and the tangible, which extends further than the 
things I touch and see sit present. 283 
Merleau-Ponty's thought, therefore, was based on the connection of senses: `The 
senses translate each other without any need of an interpreter, and are mutually 
comprehensible without the intervention of any idea. '284 Martin Jay suggests that if 
the phenomenal field linking, but not fully uniting, lived body and natural 
environment was to Merleau-Ponty, based on the communication of the senses, so 
too the human Lebenswelt entailed reciprocity rather than conflict. Indeed, the very 
bodily experience of being at once viewer and viewed, toucher and object of the 
touch, was an ontological prerequisite for that internalization of otherness underlying 
human intersubjectivity. 
*** 
ssi Ibid., p. 264. 292 Ibid., p. 139. 283 Ibid., p. 143. 294 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 235. 
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In my own art practice the understanding of the intertwining between vision and touch 
was the basis for the piece I made: Public Private Perceptions. For its realisation I acted 
blind-folded. By doing so I was both making the statement that I would present myself in 
a vunarable position (being the object of other people's Gaze although active by 
performing) and I was physically testing scientific readings on Synaesthesia. I also 
interpret this as a response to the anti-ocularcentric discourse, as a result of which I 
begun to understand the relationship between memory and non-vision. This relationship 
was investigated by Derrida in discussing the the origin of drawing. In the catalogue of 
the exhibition held at the Louvre in Paris in 1990, Memoires d'aveugle: L'autoportrait et 
autres ruines (Memoirs of the Blind, The Self-Portrait and other Ruins), Jacques Derrida 
writes on the origin of drawing in relation to memory and vision, to then find in 
Merleau-Ponty's concept of non-visible in the visible, a possible link. Derrida writes 
that, by attributing the origin of drawing to memory rather than to perception, Charles 
Baudelaire is, in turn, making a show of memory. He is writing himself into an 
iconographic tradition that goes back to at least Charles Le Brun. 
In this tradition, the origin of drawing and the origin of painting give rise 
to multiple representations that substitute memory for perception. First, 
because they are representations, next, because they are drawn most often 
from an exemplary narrative (that of Butades, the young Corinthian lover 
who bears the name of her father, a potter from Sicyon), and finally, 
because the narrative relates the origin of graphic representation to the 
absence or invisibility of the model. 285 
Derrida explains that Butades does not see her lover because their gazes cannot meet 
(for example in J. B. Suvee' s Butades or the Origin of Drawing in fig. 61): it is as if 
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seeing were forbidden in order to draw, as if one drew only on the condition of not 
seeing. Finally, he explains, it is as if the drawing were a declaration of love destined 
for or suited to the invisibility of the other. In Derrida's view, whether Butades 
follows the traits of a shadow or a silhouette, or whether she draws on the surface of 
a wall or on a veil, a skiagraphia or shadow writing in each case inaugurates an `art 
of blindness'. Derrida explains that Butades was a young Corinthian lady who had to 
face the separation from her loved one for some time. Noticing the shadow on the 
wall of her man generated by the light of the lamp, inspired by love, she wanted to 
stop this image by tracing the contours of the shadow. 
Derrida then poses the question of the ` invisible that lost memory': amnesia. This to 
prevent any implication of visibility, `invisibility that inhabits the visible'. 
Invisibility that looks for the visible to the point that it is confused with it, to assure 
the ghost of its impossibility as the most appropriate source. 
The visible is in these terms invisible, not as visibility, phenomenology or essence of 
the visible, but as body of the visible itself. Thus, as emanation of the visible, it 
produces blindness. To be other than visible, Derrida explains that absolute 
invisibility does not have to take place somewhere else nor has it to constitute 
another visible, which has already appeared or disappeared some monumental spectacle 
of ruins called reconstruction, coming from memory. This non-visible does not describe 
a phenomenon which is present somewhere else, latent, imaginary, unconscious, hidden 
or past; it is a phenomenon whose non appearance is something else. 
295 Derrida, J., Memoirs of the Blind, The Self-Portrait and other Ruins, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 51-52. 
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In a similar way in my work, a constant concern with memorising and 
recording through video, scripts and photographs was implied. On the one hand 
this enabled me to compare the documentation regarding a particular event to 
my own memory of it filtered by time, and experiences. on the other hand at a 
conceptual level the very notion of non vision within visibility suggets a 
comparison with memory, immagination, a-perception: the boundary between 
imagination and lived experience. In order to give a sense of what is the 
context for the above here are some of Merleau-Ponty's notes published after 
his death with the title The Visible and The Invisible: 
January, 1960. Principle: not to consider the invisible as an other visible 
`possible' or a `possible' visible for an other.... The invisible is there 
without being an object, it is pure transcendence, without an ontic mask. 
And the ` visibles' themselves, in the last analysis, they too are only 
centered on a nucleus of absence. Raise the question: the invisible life, 
the invisible community, the invisible other, the invisible culture. 
Elaborate a phenomenology of `the other world', as the limit of a 
phenomenology of the imaginary and the 'hidden'. 286 
[May 1960]. When I say that every visible is invisible, that perception is 
imperception, that consciousness has a `punctum caecum' that to see is always 
to see more than one sees-this must not be understood in the sense of a 
contradiction it must not be imagined that I add to the visible... a nonvisible... 
One has to understand that it is visibility itself that involves a nonvisibility. 287 
286 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1968, pp. 229. 2s' Ibid., pp. 229,247. 
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What [consciousness] does not see it does not see for reasons of principle; 
it is because it is consciousness that it does not see. What it does not see is 
what in it prepares the vision of the rest (as the retina is blind at the point 
where the fibers that will permit the vision spread out into it). 299 
The process of recording, using video, photography, text, can be seen as a need 
to define (without solution) the boundary between imagination and lived 
experience although, as Merleau-Ponty, suggests it does not exist. 
`I have had a very happy childhood... 
... 
a wooden white wardrobe with golden relief 
decorations as large as the wall in front of my bed and 
that of my little sister Paola. Our beds were low, too 
low if compared to the wardrobe; mine was on the side of 
the window and the balcony. At night in bed, when trying 
to fall asleep, I could see the wardrobe coming towards 
me, falling down on me. I am trying to remember the 
images that I used to see and that I now remember with 
the idea that the wardrobe was falling down onto myself. 
I am not sure if these images appeared in a state of 
semi-consciousness, as a dream or if they were a visual 
distortion due to the shadows in the dark that I 
consciously visualised. The wardrobe was shaped like an 
image seen through a wide-angle lens and was falling 
down. I remember that I used to fear this visions and 
then I got used to it. I think I never talked about it 
before, thus this image of the wardrobe, absolutely 
real, of my childhood forms, together with other images 
my visual archive, from which I still draw upon. ' 
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Some of the implications of the non-vision with touch relation, also aiming to 
generate synaesthetic relation, were tested through the piece Public /'rival e 
Perceptions. This was performed on 21 October 2001 at the Toynbee Theatre in 
London29" and the version 02 was performed on 16 March 2002, and remained as a 
video installation for the following two weeks at the Neon Gallery in Bologna. 
'B'Ibid., p. 248. 
289 From my diary 17 May 2001. 
'90 The documentation of it was presented at the Performance As Research In Practice Symposium, University of 
Bristol 10-1 1 November 2001 as part of the Paper: 'Private action becoming public. A practical investigation on 
the performer's reactions to the environment. 
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The production was driven by my instinctive interest in knowing more of symbology 
and limits of the sense of sight. I started working on the ideas around which Public 
Private Perceptions was conceived in April 2001, as can be gathered from my notes: 
`April and May have been very productive months. New 
environments, new conditions, new people 
... 
new me. The 
investigation for my research had already become 
conceptually more clear and focused: by looking back at my 
previous work I can see the genuine intuition which 
influences the most recent work becoming conscious 
intention. 
`... going to the bedroom from the dining room' in April 
2001 and `... going to the rear garden from the side 
entrance' (action and video installation project) in May 
2001 represent my own way to apprehend a part of the 
domestic space around me through touch. The soundtrack of 
it is silent, the visual appearance of the space narrow. I 
wanted to record the tactile sensation of these places, in 
the first one with the aim of remembering, in the second 
one of meeting. This is a subjective experience of the 
readings on senses and cognitive processes; I have been 
working on environments to be perceived by the viewer, to 
stimulate his or her reactions. In a way these two actions 
represent a way of stepping into the role of the viewer 
again to then look at the documentation of it, and myself 
in it, as the work [... ]' 
291 
The overall context investigated in the work is the relationship body-environment: 
how this influences my perception of myself in delivering a piece. The nature of the 
context, as well as the conditions, generate a different tension and therctore 
experience of the piece in myself the performer and of course the audience (as a 
consequence of the Tate event in March 2001 previously illustrated). 
29' From my diary, May 2001. 
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May 2001, stills from Hideo documentation 
I believe that the awareness of the bodily experience (here through touch) of the environment 
enables me to reposition my self within a particular place. The apprehension is subject to the 
changing conditions of the context; from the juxtaposition of present and past action the 
space/time in between seems to arise as a possible answer. By exploring the environment 
through touch with my eyes blindfolded, I gathered information about a particular space up 
untill then perceived with all the senses. I related a colour sensation to a tactile one. This was 
repeated in two different situations: at home with no audience before the event, and in the 
theatre. By performing in front of the public, while the video of the domestic action is 
projected, I presented myself simultaneously in two environments playing different 
roles. Not only the physical space was different, but the work stressed my difference in 
relation to it. The colours are named in Italian in the private dimension and in English in 
the public one. The surfaces present certain characteristics that I tried to visualise with 
my eyes blindfolded, and by naming colours I drew a sort of map, neurological as well 
as one that indicates urban places. 
In the Bologna version 02 the piece was composed of two video-clips, the first recorded 
in The London Underground, a public place with an audience, and the second a live 
recording of the action taking place in an isolated (private) context the ground floor of 
the gallery, without an audience. Public and private here are not indoor-outdoor, but 
outofthecountry-withinthecountry. The audience simultaneously in two projections 
perceived the two ` dimensions' of the enactment 
-a relationship between two 
representations of myself in different dimensions of time and space. My presence is 
through video representation, but the audience was able to feel the tension generated by 
the live event. The recording of the live event remained in the gallery for presentation 
during the following two weeks. 
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figure 65. stills from recorded action in Westminster Underground Station London 
and live action as perceived by the audience at Neon Gallery Bologna Italy 
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enhanced drawing, with stills from DVD used for installation 16-30 March 2002 
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The video 'documentation' of the actions, which now constitutes the piece, was 
presented in the exhibition In Between at the Lethaby Galley from 28 `h of May to l ti` 
of June 2002. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no single conclusion to this research. The practical work has developed and 
progressed in respect of a greater understanding of the relationship between artist as 
maker and audience; artist as maker and self audience and audience as participant. 
The practice has also developed through an investigation of the dialogue of the 
scopic regime, the domination of the scopic in art practice and, more importantly the 
relationship between my non-scopic works and a developing theory of the anti- 
ocularcentric. 
Though non linear, this conceptual progress within aesthetic practice, from opticality 
and its contradictions in the earlier works to the exploration of synaesthesia in the 
later works, is evident. I cannot demonstrate any simple one-to-one relationship 
between the theoretical discourse and the practice because, although interlaced with 
theory, practice also opens up interpretations within its own territory and language. 
However, there are clear parallels between some concepts in the theory with my own 
practice and the practice of others 
- 
for example the relationship of Lacan to the 
work of Dan Graham and to my own or, Merleau-Ponty's notion of ('hiusm in 
Acconci's and again in my own work. 
I believe my original contribution to be both in the content of the artworks and the 
methodology adopted, rather than at theoretical level. Whilst I acknowledge that my 
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art practice owes a debt to the work of other artists and is connected to a range of art 
concepts evident in recent history, I believe some of the practical work does make 
original contribution and establishes some new ground 
- 
particularly recent 
performative works using video and the exploration of synaesthesia in the context of 
memory. 
By adopting a variety of strategies in the creation of my work, I have challenged the 
static artist-audience relationship implicit in the one-way perception of 
representations based on central-focus perspective. My hypothesis, which 
encompassed a two-way artist-audience interaction, was first tested in the body of 
work I produced in 1999. The theoretical argument of chiusmutic intertwining I 
subsequently developed, allowed me to place my practice within the anti- 
ocularcentric discourse and confirmed the direction undertaken in the practice. The 
validity of my initial hypothesis was further confirmed by the participation of the 
audience in aspects of the art making process of the recent video-live installations. 
Despite subjective and sometimes unpredictable directions in my practice, I believe 
that the work has been methodical in the interplay between a tracking diary, video 
documentation, analytical diagrams and attempted theoretical connections being 
made throughout. 
Some of the issues opened up have not been resolved. In particular there is a range of 
work that might be undertaken in exploring the creative potential of synaesthesia and 
linking this to scientific experiment on brain structure and psychological formation. 
This is beyond the scope of the current research. 
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Although the work developed and shifted from a psychoanalytic to a 
phenomenological ground, through an engagement with perception, questions of 
memory and imagination have arisen, particularly in the more recent pieces. This 
may suggest that while questioning the primacy of vision, through an engagement 
with the other senses, a form of visual response is generated as a break between sight 
and consciousness. In this respect I now believe I could relate my positon to Sartre's, 
who directly challenged the ocularcentric traditions that equate the I and the eye. 
Sartre dealt with the issue of images and the imagination292by posing a radical 
difference between sense perception and the imagination. He criticised the belief that 
images were only likenesses of external objects reflected in consciousness. In my 
work I have increasingly come to distinguish images from perception, visual or 
otherwise, and instead identify them with the intentionality of action. In my future 
work, following Sartre in this respect may offer a possibility to `escape' the Gaze of 
others through an awareness and understanding of the ` invisibility' of non 
perceptual, non visual images. Together with the continued exploration of 
synaesthesia nd the concept of performative this represents another and future 
project. 
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